From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 02/13] perf scripts: Add a coverage harness for perf
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 20:15:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-219585@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117200433.45174-3-acme@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] perf scripts: sticky-bit and root-shell bypass in
check_root_path()
- [Low] perf scripts: symlink following via chown without -h in
fix_ownership()
--
commit a0647612ea142c35ebab221e54c45ab482f8b7ad
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
perf scripts: Add a coverage harness for perf
This commit adds tools/perf/scripts/coverage.sh and corresponding make
targets to build perf with clang source-based coverage, run the perf test
suite, and report coverage statistics.
> diff --git a/tools/perf/scripts/coverage.sh b/tools/perf/scripts/coverage.sh
> new file mode 100755
> index 0000000000000..073d665229697
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/perf/scripts/coverage.sh
> @@ -0,0 +1,984 @@
[ ... ]
> +DEFAULT_BUILD_DIR=/tmp/build/perf-coverage
[ ... ]
> +if [ "$ROOT" = 1 ] && [ "$PREP" = 0 ] && [ "$TABLE" = 0 ]; then
> + if [ "$REPORT_ONLY" = 0 ] && [ "$SKIP_BUILD" = 0 ] &&
> + { [ "$FORCE_BUILD" = 1 ] ||
> + { [ ! -f "$PERF_DIR/.coverage-build-dir" ] &&
> + [ ! -x "$BUILD_DIR/perf" ]; }; }; then
> + say "Running as root, building perf in $BUILD_DIR"
> + else
> + SKIP_BUILD=1
> + say "Running as root, using the coverage build in $BUILD_DIR"
> + fi
> +fi
> +
> +#
> +# Under sudo the build directory comes from a file the invoking user wrote;
> +# root would execute the perf found there and delete and rewrite its cov/
> +# directory, so refuse one owned by somebody else or writable by another
> +# group or by others. Every parent is checked too: a directory another
> +# user can write lets them swap an entry between this check and the run.
> +#
> +check_root_path()
> +{
> + local path=$1 uid gid mode
> + [ "$ROOT" = 1 ] && [ -n "${SUDO_UID:-}" ] || return 0
> + # abspath() resolves links such as /home -> /var/home on Silverblue
> + # and CoreOS, so the walk below checks their targets. A path not
> + # resolved that way, like $BUILD_DIR/perf, must not be a link.
> + [ -L "$path" ] && die "$path is a symbolic link, use its target"
> + while :; do
> + if [ -e "$path" ]; then
> + if ! read -r uid gid mode < \
> + <(stat -c '%u %g %a' "$path" 2>/dev/null); then
> + die "could not stat $path"
> + fi
> + # A sticky directory (/tmp) lets anybody create entries
> + # but not replace one that belongs to somebody else.
> + if [ $(( 8#$mode & 8#1000 )) = 0 ]; then
> + [ "$uid" = 0 ] || [ "$uid" = "$SUDO_UID" ] ||
> + die "$path is owned by uid $uid, not by root or $SUDO_UID"
> + # A user private group with umask 002
> + # gives 775, so only the developer's
> + # own group may write here.
> + [ $(( 8#$mode & 8#002 )) = 0 ] ||
> + die "$path is writable by others"
> + if [ $(( 8#$mode & 8#020 )) != 0 ] &&
> + [ "$gid" != "${SUDO_GID:-}" ]; then
> + die "$path is writable by group $gid"
> + fi
> + fi
> + fi
> + [ "$path" = / ] && return 0
> + path=$(dirname "$path")
> + done
> +}
[Severity: Medium]
Can an unprivileged local user bypass check_root_path() by setting the
sticky bit on /tmp/build/perf-coverage?
Any user can chmod +t directories and files they own, and the sticky bit
check skips all uid, gid and permission checks when $(( 8#$mode & 8#1000 ))
is non-zero instead of only allowing root-owned sticky directories.
Because DEFAULT_BUILD_DIR is /tmp/build/perf-coverage and running as root
automatically sets SKIP_BUILD=1 whenever $BUILD_DIR/perf is executable, a
local user can pre-create /tmp/build/perf-coverage/perf with mode 1755 (and
a dummy __llvm_profile symbol) so that root executes their binary. In
addition, an owner of a sticky /tmp/build directory can still unlink and
replace subdirectories inside it, and check_root_path() returns early when
SUDO_UID is unset in a direct root shell.
[ ... ]
> +fix_ownership()
> +{
> + local uid gid path
> + [ "$ROOT" = 1 ] || return 0
> + if [ -n "${SUDO_UID:-}" ]; then
> + uid=$SUDO_UID
> + gid=${SUDO_GID:-$SUDO_UID}
> + else
> + read -r uid gid < <(stat -c '%u %g' "$PERF_DIR" 2>/dev/null) || return 0
> + fi
> + [ "$uid" != 0 ] || return 0
> +
> + for path in "${COV_WRITES[@]}"; do
> + [ -e "$COV_DIR/$path" ] || continue
> + chown -R "$uid:$gid" "$COV_DIR/$path" ||
> + warn "could not give $COV_DIR/$path back to uid $uid"
> + done
> + if [ "$COV_CREATED" = 1 ]; then
> + chown "$uid:$gid" "$COV_DIR" ||
> + warn "could not give $COV_DIR back to uid $uid"
> + fi
> + if [ "$BUILD_CREATED" = 1 ]; then
> + chown -R "$uid:$gid" "$BUILD_DIR" ||
> + warn "could not give $BUILD_DIR back to uid $uid"
> + fi
> + if [ -n "$BUILD_STAMP" ] && [ -f "$BUILD_STAMP" ]; then
> + # -h: find matches a symlink by its own owner, but chown would
> + # otherwise follow it and change a file outside the build tree.
> + find "$BUILD_DIR" -user 0 -newer "$BUILD_STAMP" \
> + -exec chown -h "$uid:$gid" {} + ||
> + warn "could not give the files root built in $BUILD_DIR back to uid $uid"
> + rm -f "$BUILD_STAMP" || true
> + fi
> + if [ "$STATE_DIR_CREATED" = 1 ] && [ -d "$STATE_DIR" ]; then
> + chown "$uid:$gid" "$STATE_DIR" ||
> + warn "could not give $STATE_DIR back to uid $uid"
> + fi
> + if [ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]; then
> + chown "$uid:$gid" "$STATE_FILE" ||
> + warn "could not give $STATE_FILE back to uid $uid"
> + fi
> + if [ -f "$POINTER" ]; then
> + chown "$uid:$gid" "$POINTER" ||
> + warn "could not give $POINTER back to uid $uid"
> + fi
> +}
[Severity: Low]
Should the other chown calls in fix_ownership() also pass -h (and -RP when
recursive)?
Unlike the find ... -exec chown -h call on $BUILD_DIR, the chown calls on
$COV_DIR/$path, $STATE_FILE and $POINTER do not pass -h, and [ -e ] / [ -f ]
succeed on symlinks to existing files. If any of those paths is a symlink
(for example during --report-only, a subset -t run where baseline.txt is
not overwritten, or an early exit after the EXIT trap is armed), root will
dereference the symlink and hand ownership of its target to $uid:$gid.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117200433.45174-1-acme@kernel.org?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 20:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 20:04 [PATCH v6 0/13] perf coverage: A harness for perf, and the fixes it found Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] perf jvmti: Link the agent with EXTRA_CFLAGS Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] perf scripts: Add a coverage harness for perf Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:15 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18 6:56 ` Namhyung Kim
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] perf annotate: Handle absolute addressing in data type profiling Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 7:08 ` Namhyung Kim
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] perf tests: Exercise DW_OP_addrx global variables Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] perf tests: Exercise the flexible array member path Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] perf annotate-data: Count flexible array accesses for the whole struct Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:10 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] perf tests: Exercise data type resolution from a register Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 7:16 ` Namhyung Kim
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] perf annotate: Print the stats after the annotations Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] perf tests: Silence the libbfd probe in build-test Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] perf build: Record the display-only features in FEATURE-DUMP Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] perf tests: Fix the Intel PT virtual LBR check Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] perf test: Drop samples without an IP in the dlfilter test Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 20:04 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] perf test: Skip the LBR inline unwinding check when unsupported Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-11-17 20:29 ` sashiko-bot
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