From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:21:48 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-221192@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118140421.584086-3-giometti@enneenne.com>
> Systems with neither a TEE nor a crypto engine able to keep keys still
> want keys that user space cannot read and that are bound to one
> algorithm and purpose, and the same interface on every device.
>
> Add the "sw" backend, of the kernel tier: it seals each key with
> AES-256-GCM under a key derived with HMAC-SHA256 from a "trusted" key
> named by master=, authenticating the keycrypt header with it, and runs
> the operations with the kernel's crypto library. A loaded key is in
> clear in kernel memory until revoked or destroyed, which the kernel
> log says when the backend registers and when the first key is loaded;
> the backend is chosen only by tier=kernel, by backend=sw, or when no
> backend of a higher tier is registered, and a system that must not use
> it raises the system tier above it (CONFIG_KEYCRYPT_SYSTEM_TIER_*), or
> leaves this option off.
>
> In that derivation the trusted key's material is what the HMAC
> processes, under a label and a random salt as its key, and not the
> other way round: AF_ALG lets user space name a trusted key by its
> serial number as the key of an HMAC socket, so with the material as the
> key anyone allowed to search the master could recompute the sealing
> key of every blob.
>
> It depends on TRUSTED_KEYS and is a module when trusted keys are one.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rodolfo Giometti <giometti@enneenne.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118140421.584086-1-giometti@enneenne.com?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 14:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:21 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:33 ` sashiko-bot--- via OP-TEE
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:07 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:08 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:10 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:11 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:12 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 0:25 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:25 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 0:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-19 10:18 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 10:18 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 0:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-19 0:43 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 0:43 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 1:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 1:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-19 4:35 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 4:35 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19 5:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 5:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-19 12:17 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 12:17 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 10:19 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 10:19 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 14:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 14:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE
2026-11-19 18:33 ` Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19 18:33 ` Rodolfo Giometti
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