From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/2] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 04:22:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-222442@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119040705.684987-2-atomlin@atomlin.com>
> At present, the task_setscheduler LSM hook only accepts the target
> task_struct pointer. It lacks visibility into the requested scheduling
> attributes (sched_attr) and the CPU affinity or cpuset mask (cpumask).
> Consequently, security modules cannot inspect the target scheduling
> parameters or CPU mask passed through the hook.
>
> For CPU affinity requests via sched_setaffinity(), auditing or
> filtering the raw mask requested by userspace requires inspecting the
> mask before __sched_setaffinity() intersects it with the task's allowed
> cpuset CPUs. Seccomp filters cannot perform this inspection because the
> affinity mask and scheduling attribute structures are passed behind
> user pointers, and scheduler tracepoints only observe the effective
> mask after intersection with the cpuset configuration.
>
> This patch expands the security_task_setscheduler() hook signature to
> [ ... ]
> mediation of explicit scheduling policy and parameter updates,
> sched_setaffinity() requests, and cpuset task migrations.
>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # Smack
> Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261119040705.684987-1-atomlin@atomlin.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 4:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 4:07 [PATCH v6 0/2] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-19 4:07 ` [PATCH v6 1/2] " Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-19 4:22 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-19 4:07 ` [PATCH v6 2/2] selftests/bpf: Verify task_setscheduler LSM hook parameters Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-19 4:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 4:52 ` bot+bpf-ci
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-222442@kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.