From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Nikolay Aleksandrov" <razor@blackwall.org>, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: allow bpf_sk_assign on tc egress with refcounted sockets
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:28:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-223384@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119142231.2612515-4-razor@blackwall.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 9 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] bpf: BUG_ON(skb->sk) in skb_orphan() via bpf_sk_assign() in
test_run
- [High] bpf: socket protocol and family type confusion via egress
bpf_sk_assign()
- [High] bpf: cross-netns delivery and ip_forward() drops with
sock_pfree_ref
- [High] net: sk_wmem_alloc corruption on sock_pfree_ref skbs in frag
and esp
- [High] bpf: kTLS TX fallback and offload triggered on non-TLS
sock_pfree_ref skbs
- [High] bpf: UAF of RCU listener in skb_do_redirect() due to
sk_is_refcounted()
- [High] bpf: refcount underflow and wmem corruption on redirected
ingress sk_assign
- [High] bpf: missing skb_orphan() for syncookie reqsk in
skb_do_redirect()
- [Medium] bpf: skb_expand_head() converts sock_pfree_ref ownership into
sock_wfree
--
commit cb5207c254ec50312656daa003d320c5cdb9abbb
Author: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
bpf: allow bpf_sk_assign on tc egress with refcounted sockets
This commit extends bpf_sk_assign() to support assigning full refcounted
sockets on the TC egress path using sock_pfree_ref as the skb destructor.
> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> index 1ad57a3715343..feeb752f7a008 100644
> --- a/net/core/filter.c
> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> @@ -2559,14 +2559,17 @@ int skb_do_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (unlikely(!dev))
> goto out_drop;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_INET
> /*
> - * Prefetched sockets may borrow a listener under RCU. Orphan them
> - * before redirects that can outlive this section. Peer ingress
> - * stays in the same RCU section.
> + * Prefetched listeners may be borrowed under RCU. Drop borrowed
> + * assignments before redirects that can outlive this section.
> + * Peer ingress stays in the same RCU section.
> */
> - if (skb_sk_is_prefetched(skb) &&
> + if (skb->destructor == sock_pfree &&
> + !sk_is_refcounted(skb->sk) &&
> (!(flags & BPF_F_PEER) || (flags & BPF_F_EGRESS)))
> skb_orphan(skb);
> +#endif
[Severity: High]
Does checking !sk_is_refcounted(skb->sk) here preserve unreferenced
syncookie request_socks and non-full sockets across redirects?
sk_is_refcounted() returns !sk_fullsock(sk) || !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE),
which evaluates to true for TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV and TCP_TIME_WAIT sockets.
When bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk() attaches a syncookie request_sock (with
rsk_refcnt == 0 and an unreferenced RCU pointer in req->rsk_listener) or
ingress bpf_sk_assign() attaches a non-full socket with sock_pfree, this
check skips skb_orphan(skb). Redirecting the skb across an RCU grace
period then allows skb_steal_sock() or sk_to_full_sk() to dereference a
freed listener socket, and allows non-full sockets onto the egress path.
[Severity: High]
Can a syncookie request_sock from bpf_sk_assign_tcp_reqsk() outlive its
RCU read-side critical section when redirected by skb_do_redirect() or
queued by __nf_queue()?
Because sk_fullsock() is false for TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV,
!sk_is_refcounted(skb->sk) is false in both skb_do_redirect() and
__nf_queue(). If the packet is queued to the receive backlog, an egress
qdisc, or NFQUEUE while the TCP_LISTEN socket in req->rsk_listener closes,
skb_steal_sock() later extracts the dangling req->rsk_listener pointer
with *refcounted = false, causing a use-after-free in tcp_v4_rcv() or
tcp_v6_rcv().
> if (flags & BPF_F_PEER) {
> dev = skb_get_peer_dev(dev);
> if (unlikely(!dev ||
[Severity: High]
When an skb with sock_pfree_ref crosses onto a peer device via
bpf_redirect_peer() or a virtual interface (such as netkit or veth without
GRO), does keeping skb->sk across ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core() break
forwarding and netns isolation?
Because skb_sk_is_prefetched() is true for sock_pfree_ref, ip_rcv_core()
and ip6_rcv_core() do not orphan skb->sk on the receiving interface:
net/ipv4/ip_input.c:ip_rcv_core() {
...
/* Must drop socket now because of tproxy. */
if (!skb_sk_is_prefetched(skb))
skb_orphan(skb);
...
}
If the peer forwards the packet, ip_forward() and ip6_forward() drop it at
if (unlikely(skb->sk)) goto drop. If the peer is in another network
namespace (which BPF_F_PEER requires) and delivers the packet locally,
inet_steal_sock() and inet6_steal_sock() deliver the packet across
namespaces to the sender namespace's socket and cache the peer namespace's
dst_entry in sk->sk_rx_dst.
[ ... ]
> return flags & BPF_F_NEIGH ?
> __bpf_redirect_neigh(skb, dev, flags & BPF_F_NEXTHOP ?
> &ri->nh : NULL) :
> __bpf_redirect(skb, dev, flags);
[Severity: Medium]
What happens if a redirected skb with sock_pfree_ref (or refcounted
sock_pfree) needs headroom expansion in skb_expand_head(), for example via
__bpf_redirect_neigh() -> bpf_out_neigh_v4()?
net/core/skbuff.c:skb_expand_head() {
...
if (skb_shared(skb) || !is_skb_wmem(skb)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
...
if (sk)
skb_set_owner_w(nskb, sk);
consume_skb(skb);
skb = nskb;
}
...
}
Because is_skb_wmem(skb) is false for sock_pfree_ref and sock_pfree,
skb_expand_head() converts the skb to sock_wfree via skb_set_owner_w(),
dropping the sk_refcnt held by sock_pfree_ref, charging sk->sk_wmem_alloc,
and clearing skb_sk_is_prefetched().
> @@ -8115,21 +8118,26 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie_proto = {
>
> BPF_CALL_3(bpf_sk_assign, struct sk_buff *, skb, struct sock *, sk, u64, flags)
> {
> + bool egress = !skb_at_tc_ingress(skb);
> + bool refcounted;
> +
> if (!sk || flags != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (!skb_at_tc_ingress(skb))
> + if (egress && (!sk_fullsock(sk) || !sk_is_refcounted(sk) ||
> + skb_is_decrypted(skb)))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
[Severity: High]
Can assigning a socket whose family or protocol does not match the packet
on TC egress cause socket type confusion when the packet enters a receive
path?
On egress, bpf_sk_assign() does not check that sk is an AF_INET or
AF_INET6 TCP or UDP socket matching the packet (for instance, a TCP socket
can be assigned to a UDP or IPv6 packet, or ctx->sk from a hashed
AF_PACKET or SOCK_RAW socket can be passed back to bpf_sk_assign()). When
the packet traverses loopback, veth without GRO, netkit, or bpf_redirect()
with BPF_F_INGRESS, ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core() preserve skb->sk
because skb_sk_is_prefetched() is true for sock_pfree_ref, and
inet_steal_sock() / inet6_steal_sock() return sk to the packet's L4
handler without checking sk_family or sk_protocol:
include/net/inet_hashtables.h:inet_steal_sock() {
...
if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
return sk;
} else if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
return sk;
} else {
return sk;
}
...
}
__udp4_lib_rcv() and udpv6_rcv() then cast a stolen tcp_sock or
packet_sock via udp_sk(sk), and tcp_v4_rcv() / tcp_v6_rcv() cast a non-TCP
or AF_INET socket to tcp_sock / inet6_sk(sk), causing out-of-bounds
accesses or a NULL pointer dereference.
[Severity: High]
What happens when bpf_sk_assign() on TC egress assigns a socket that has
kTLS TX device offload enabled (sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb != NULL) to a
non-decrypted packet?
Rejecting skb_is_decrypted(skb) means any packet accepted by egress
bpf_sk_assign() is not an unencrypted kTLS record from sk. However,
sk_validate_xmit_skb() and tls_is_skb_tx_device_offloaded() only check
skb->sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb, so validate_xmit_skb() or the NIC driver
invokes tls_sw_fallback() or chcr_ktls_xmit() on the packet. Both
functions unconditionally read tcp_hdr(skb) and skb_tcp_all_headers(skb)
even if the packet is not TCP or skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) is
false, reading skb->head + 0xffff out of bounds or overflowing the 150-byte
stack buffer in chcr_ktls_write_tcp_options() when skb_tcp_all_headers(skb)
exceeds skb->len.
>
> skb_orphan(skb);
> skb->sk = sk;
> - skb->destructor = sock_pfree;
> + skb->destructor = egress ? sock_pfree_ref : sock_pfree;
>
> return 0;
> }
[Severity: High]
Does calling bpf_sk_assign() from BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN trigger
BUG_ON(skb->sk) in skb_orphan()?
In bpf_prog_test_run_skb(), the test runner allocates a dummy sk and sets
skb->sk = sk without setting skb->destructor, leaving skb->tc_at_ingress
as 0. Previously bpf_sk_assign() returned -EOPNOTSUPP when
!skb_at_tc_ingress(skb); now it treats the test skb as egress and calls
skb_orphan(skb), which hits BUG_ON(skb->sk) because skb->destructor is
NULL.
[Severity: High]
Can an skb with sock_pfree_ref corrupt sk->sk_wmem_alloc when fragmented
via a frag_list or encrypted by IPsec ESP?
bpf_sk_assign() does not charge skb->truesize to sk->sk_wmem_alloc, but
the frag_list loop in ip_do_fragment() (and ip6_fragment()) checks only
skb->sk before installing sock_wfree on each child fragment:
net/ipv4/ip_output.c:ip_do_fragment() {
...
BUG_ON(frag->sk);
if (skb->sk) {
frag->sk = skb->sk;
frag->destructor = sock_wfree;
}
skb->truesize -= frag->truesize;
...
}
When those fragments are freed, sock_wfree() subtracts their truesize from
sk->sk_wmem_alloc, underflowing the refcount and freeing sk while still in
use. Conversely, esp_output_head() and esp6_output_head() check
if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk)) and add tailen to sk->sk_wmem_alloc without
checking is_skb_wmem(skb), leaking sk_wmem_alloc because sock_pfree_ref
never uncharges it.
[Severity: High]
When bpf_sk_assign() is called on TC ingress with a refcounted socket, it
takes a reference on sk->sk_refcnt but still sets skb->destructor =
sock_pfree; if skb_do_redirect() then redirects that skb to egress, won't
egress paths see sock_pfree instead of sock_pfree_ref?
Because skb_do_redirect() now preserves sock_pfree when
sk_is_refcounted(skb->sk) is true, the skb enters egress with
skb->destructor == sock_pfree. chcr_ktls_copy_record_in_skb() then takes
the else branch, charging sk_wmem_alloc instead of calling sock_hold()
while copying sock_pfree to nskb, so freeing both skbs drops sk_refcnt
twice and leaks sk_wmem_alloc. complete_skb(), skb_orphan_partial(), and
tcf_bpf_act() likewise only check for sock_pfree_ref, corrupting
sk_wmem_alloc on TLS software fallback or orphaning the refcounted socket
in netem and act_bpf.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261119142231.2612515-1-razor@blackwall.org?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 15:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 14:22 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] bpf: add bpf_sk_assign support on egress Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: Orphan prefetched sk on skb_do_redirect() Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 15:01 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] net: track references owned by prefetched socket assignments Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: allow bpf_sk_assign on tc egress with refcounted sockets Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 15:19 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-19 15:36 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 15:28 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-20 16:31 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2026-11-20 17:02 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf: support SOCK_RCU_FREE sockets in bpf_sk_assign on egress Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 15:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: Delete assign_reuse namespace when opening it fails Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] selftests/bpf: Cover egress socket assignment with reuseport Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] selftests/bpf: Exercise netkit socket assignment to a host proxy Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-19 14:22 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: Check assigned socket lifetime across queues and drops Nikolay Aleksandrov
2026-11-20 19:17 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] bpf: add bpf_sk_assign support on egress Alexei Starovoitov
2026-11-20 19:24 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
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