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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Guicai Ma" <maguicai@kylinos.cn>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Florian Bauckholt" <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 02:36:36 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-224374@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120022447.789625-1-maguicai@kylinos.cn>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found no new issues
in this patch, but noticed 1 related pre-existing issue it does not
introduce:
- [High] KEYS: in2_len overwritten with max_sig_size in
  keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() [1]
--

commit a87f672b96b4f7c3b4eabf969b369139c77f96be
Author: Guicai Ma <maguicai@kylinos.cn>

KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()

This commit passes the caller-supplied uparams.out_len back from
keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() to keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and returns -EOVERFLOW if
the operation output exceeds the userspace buffer size.

> diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
> index e7121523b9c9a..b5f82804b5ad1 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
> @@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
>  static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
>  				    const char __user *_info,
>  				    int op,
> -				    struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
> +				    struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
> +				    u32 *user_out_len)
>  {
>  	struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
>  	struct kernel_pkey_query info;
> @@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
>  	}
>  
>  	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
> +	if (user_out_len)
> +		*user_out_len = uparams.out_len;
>  
>  	switch (op) {
>  	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:

[Severity: High]
This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but in the
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY case just above this hunk, commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS:
fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") also overwrote params->out_len
(which aliases params->in2_len in struct kernel_pkey_params) with
info.max_sig_size instead of preserving uparams.in2_len [1]:

security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c:keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() {
	...
	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) {
			ret = -EINVAL;
			goto out_up_key_sem;
		}

		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
		break;
	...
}

When keyctl_pkey_verify() verifies a variable-length signature shorter than
info.max_sig_size (such as an ASN.1 DER-encoded ECDSA signature), does
memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len) read past the end of the userspace _in2
buffer and either fail with -EFAULT or pass trailing garbage bytes to
asym_verify_signature()?

Should KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY set params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len instead?

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/bug/linux-dd9ad2ca-a846-4d0d-89d6-aa262ffd40f1

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120022447.789625-1-maguicai@kylinos.cn?part=1

      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20  2:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-20  2:24 [PATCH] KEYS: fix userspace buffer overflow in keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() Guicai Ma
2026-11-20  2:36 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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