From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hannes Reinecke" <hare@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:32:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-225048@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-4-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 7 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] nvme-fabrics: wrong key revoked in nvmf_free_options() for
dhchap_ctrl_key
- [High] nvme: build failure in nvmf_parse_options() and sysfs.c without
auth/keyring
- [High] nvme: removing secret length checks exposes underflows in key
preparsing
- [Medium] nvme: out-of-bounds write on read error in
dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
- [Medium] nvme-auth: host_key ref leak and inverted check in
nvme_auth_init_ctrl()
- [Medium] nvme: unlocked host_key and ctrl_key access in dhchap sysfs
show callbacks
- [Low] nvme: check !ctrl->opts for dhchap_key attrs in
nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible()
--
commit ddf0d4926edd9ec44ea25839b02c0ba20380f64e
Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
This commit parses DH-HMAC-CHAP secrets into struct key pointers during
fabric option parsing instead of storing raw secret strings in
nvmf_ctrl_options, and adds sysfs attributes to expose the host and
controller key serials.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> index 0ddf3834f4ea2..c189096f825ea 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1038,31 +1056,68 @@ int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
> INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_ctrl_auth_work);
> if (!ctrl->opts)
> return 0;
> - ctrl->host_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret,
> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret));
> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->host_key)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->host_key);
> - ctrl->host_key = NULL;
> - return ret;
> + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_key) {
> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
> + return 0;
> }
> + if (!ctrl->host_key)
> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
>
> - ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret,
> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret));
> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> - ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
> - goto err_free_dhchap_secret;
> + ctrl->host_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key);
> + if (!ctrl->host_key) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap host key %08x not present\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key));
> + return -ENOKEY;
> }
> + down_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->host_key);
> + up_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap host key %08x invalidated\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
> + key_put(ctrl->host_key);
> + ctrl->host_key = NULL;
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + }
> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
> + "%s: using dhchap host key %08x\n",
> + __func__, key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
>
> - if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret && !ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
> - return 0;
> + if (ctrl->ctrl_key)
> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
> +
> + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
> + ctrl->ctrl_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x not present\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + }
> + down_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> + up_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x invalidated\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
> + key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> + ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
> + return -EKEYREVOKED;
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Do the error returns in the ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block leak the
ctrl->host_key reference taken earlier in nvme_auth_init_ctrl()?
When nvme_auth_init_ctrl() fails, nvme_init_ctrl() jumps to
out_release_instance before initializing ctrl->ctrl_device, so
nvme_auth_free() is never called on that error path.
Also, the check before nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl) is inverted
(!ctrl->host_key instead of ctrl->host_key), and nvme_init_ctrl() calls
nvme_auth_init_ctrl() before assigning ctrl->device = &ctrl->ctrl_device,
so the dev_warn() and dev_dbg() calls here pass a NULL ctrl->device.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> index 5ed91557f0706..7ed8618257ca9 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1020,14 +1024,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
> - kfree_sensitive(p);
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
> - opts->dhchap_secret = p;
> + kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
> + host_secret = p;
> break;
> case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_CTRL_SECRET:
> p = match_strdup(args);
> @@ -1035,14 +1033,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
> - kfree_sensitive(p);
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> - opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret = p;
> + kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
> + ctrl_secret = p;
> break;
[Severity: High]
Does removing the minimum length checks here and in dhchap_secret_store() /
dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() allow short secret strings to underflow datalen
and ret in nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()?
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c:nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() {
...
if (sscanf(prep->data, "DHHC-%01hhu:%02hhu:%*s",
&version, &hmac) != 2) {
...
}
/* skip header and final ':' character */
datalen -= 11;
}
Because %*s is assignment-suppressed and %02hhu matches one or two digits,
sscanf() returns 2 for 8- to 10-byte strings such as "DHHC-1:0:a", causing
unsigned datalen -= 11 to wrap around and wrap the kzalloc() size
calculation sizeof(*upayload) + datalen. For 11- to 15-byte inputs such as
"DHHC-1:00:a" where base64_decode() returns 0..3, ret -= 4 in
nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() becomes negative and is passed as an unsigned
length to crc32(~0, upayload->data, ret), reading out-of-bounds across
kernel memory.
[ ... ]
> @@ -1086,6 +1078,41 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
> opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
> }
> +
> + opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
> + if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
> + opts->host = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (host_secret) {
> + pr_debug("lookup host identity '%s'\n", host_secret);
> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, host_secret,
> + strlen(host_secret));
> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(key);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + pr_debug("using dhchap host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
> + opts->dhchap_key = key;
> + }
> + if (ctrl_secret) {
> + if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + pr_debug("lookup ctrl identity '%s'\n", ctrl_secret);
> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, ctrl_secret,
> + strlen(ctrl_secret));
[Severity: High]
Does calling nvme_auth_extract_key() unconditionally here break the build
when CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS is enabled without CONFIG_NVME_AUTH (or when
CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS=y and CONFIG_NVME_AUTH=m)?
include/linux/nvme-auth.h declares nvme_auth_extract_key() without a
!CONFIG_NVME_AUTH stub, and match_token() is an external call so the
compiler cannot dead-code-eliminate the host_secret and ctrl_secret
branches when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is disabled.
In addition, drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c now includes <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
unconditionally, which fails to compile when CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING is
disabled due to a stray semicolon and a non-inline function definition in
the fallback block:
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h:
static inline struct key *nvme_dhchap_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac);
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
u8 nvme_dhchap_psk_hash(struct key *key)
{
return 0;
}
[ ... ]
> @@ -1304,8 +1326,18 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts)
> kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
> kfree(opts->host_traddr);
> kfree(opts->host_iface);
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> + if (opts->dhchap_key) {
> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap host key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_key));
> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
> + key_put(opts->dhchap_key);
> + }
> + if (opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap ctrl key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
> + key_put(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
> + }
[Severity: High]
In the opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block, should key_revoke() be passed
opts->dhchap_ctrl_key instead of opts->dhchap_key? Passing
opts->dhchap_key dereferences the host key after key_put(opts->dhchap_key)
has already dropped its reference, and leaves opts->dhchap_ctrl_key
unrevoked.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> index a5c1511e49ac2..1311f5e29b004 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -818,11 +820,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev,
> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> {
> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
> + ssize_t count;
>
> - if (!opts->dhchap_secret)
> + if (!key)
> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret);
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -830,36 +844,47 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
[ ... ]
> + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> + old_key = ctrl->host_key;
> + dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke host key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(old_key));
> + key_revoke(old_key);
> +
> + ctrl->host_key = key;
> + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> + key_put(old_key);
[Severity: Medium]
Can a concurrent read of dhchap_secret (or dhchap_ctrl_secret, dhchap_key,
or dhchap_ctrl_key) race with dhchap_secret_store() or
dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() and trigger a use-after-free on the old key?
CPU0 CPU1
dhchap_secret_show()
key = ctrl->host_key;
dhchap_secret_store()
mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
old_key = ctrl->host_key;
key_revoke(old_key);
ctrl->host_key = key;
mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
key_put(old_key); <-- frees old_key
down_read(&key->sem); <-- use-after-free
None of dhchap_secret_show(), dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(), dhchap_key_show(),
or dhchap_ctrl_key_show() hold ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex or take a key_get()
reference before dereferencing ctrl->host_key or ctrl->ctrl_key. Once a
key has been replaced via sysfs store (so opts->dhchap_key no longer holds
a reference), ctrl->host_key holds the only reference, and key_put(old_key)
frees it while a concurrent show callback is using it.
> @@ -873,11 +898,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(struct device *dev,
> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> {
> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
> + struct key *key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
> + size_t count;
>
> - if (!opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
> + if (!key)
> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> }
[Severity: Medium]
Can a negative error return from key->type->read() cause an out-of-bounds
write before buf in dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show()?
Unlike dhchap_secret_show(), which declares ssize_t count, both
dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show() declare count as unsigned
size_t. If key->type->read() returns a negative error code (such as
-EINVAL), count wraps to a large positive value, passes count > 0, and
writes '\n' to buf[count] out-of-bounds. Commit "nvme: allow to pass in
key description as dhchap secret" later in this series replaces
key->type->read() in dhchap_key_show(), but dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
retains the unsigned size_t count and also omits the trailing newline on
"<invalidated>".
[ ... ]
> @@ -925,6 +970,41 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
> }
>
> static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RW(dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> +
> +static ssize_t dhchap_key_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
> + size_t count;
> +
> + if (!key)
> + return 0;
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_key);
> +
> +static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_key_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> +
> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key)
> + return 0;
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x\n", key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_ctrl_key);
> #endif
>
> static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
> @@ -956,6 +1036,8 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH
> &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr,
> &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr,
> + &dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr,
> + &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr,
> #endif
[Severity: Low]
Should nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible() hide dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr and
dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr when !ctrl->opts, the same way it hides
dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr and dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr? Without
that check, both attributes appear on non-Fabrics controllers (such as PCIe
controllers) when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is enabled.
Also, in this patch dhchap_key_show() outputs the key payload via
key->type->read() instead of key_serial(key) as dhchap_ctrl_key_show() does
(though commit "nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret"
later in the series updates dhchap_key_show() to emit key_serial()).
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:42 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 12:28 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] nvme-auth: switch to use 'struct key' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 13:08 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 19:24 ` kernel test robot
2026-11-20 19:37 ` kernel test robot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:32 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-20 13:55 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] nvmet-auth: parse dhchap key from configfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:15 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:48 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] nvme-auth: wait for authentication to finish when changing keys Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 14:52 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] nvme-fabrics: allow to pass in keyring by name Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:37 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 15:02 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:39 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 15:27 ` Hannes Reinecke
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-225048@kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=hare@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.