From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9028F606A325 for ; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=bombadil.20210309 header.b=fbJDWq5m; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=GAn6dcht DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender:Reply-To:List-Subscribe: List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:Date: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:References:In-Reply-To:Cc:To:Subject: From:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Unsubscribe-Post:List-Owner; bh=P4p7+dT3o2H+gIQ6QbsyjQ17mHeKcLqHzY5Tmfoma+U=; b=fbJDWq5mrMzfStVrlUiOnfQph/ L1ueUzyJm6rhkK49Q7ZOMcMeOYv6m/9EnJ5o4rFm+uVjHKD2/hFvOIeDBnIy/JsCFSda3thBV0W2S iBR1jxmgvjNKFLs+6rI0XNuqG3OYWwNP/YalDlHBmDuKTP/v8GdCVC1Jg7eXcvNhjRV4l1uWUy9Xt 44ujArMk99cX+s4A6bKxfIlfppNBIkidzDKmoU5VpBXrn4j7LNEath55blI5WUXRHhQ8G4LiqDtOA LbAdPHBU4+EQRfX3AJpgm9K6gCa45RtqOaftVFcWRF5nNQBwa1gCsF9S849j+4Mbjdz+a2Gwaf7Pd Q2kP6YnQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.100.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1xUMxZ-0000000EpTB-4Bpz; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:18 +0000 Received: from sea.source.kernel.org ([172.234.252.31]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.100.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1xUMxY-0000000EpT4-2Qi0 for linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:16 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) by sea.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5604043079 for ; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 84B5D1F000C4; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795174755; bh=P4p7+dT3o2H+gIQ6QbsyjQ17mHeKcLqHzY5Tmfoma+U=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=GAn6dchtdcnqY253SB9g0zBiVOHAfXCpQOxLkK3QwhBXqPT8qmni9SU6CTc/WtKVP dX+TezFOyma/1rhRMgF252B6bwBeWdQ+X6FqSaGZiiHm1/Ig2zGzki95iUBcP0BkA+ +TKI47mponOV42Ep93sSd4s4fb5ohjuErlnMufYakSvDkpraJ09wpgWGmsfq+hfYUB Tcypb9HaE7xgO6LiHjUEtILYhW8k5vIjMZucui1Kal8pilMnSskop4c7xwLSPuR3F+ V0/lm2SQRUjeUPz6TcmoehtGe91g+iaRWNJ1vs6esga97ysFa5BhQBhKRwzMyRaATN 8fL2COCag99zA== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' To: "Hannes Reinecke" Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-9-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org> References: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org> <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-9-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:39:15 +0000 X-BeenThere: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Sender: "Linux-nvme" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.9 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 X-Archived-By: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issues to consider: - [High] nvmet: keyring reference leak in nvmet_host_release() - [Medium] nvmet: inverted error return sign in nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store() - [Medium] nvmet: unlocked host->dhchap_keyring access in nvmet_auth_set_key() - [Medium] nvmet: 1-byte OOB write in nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_show() via sprintf() -- commit 7f1bb5c7e432b0938e23615bf24751f61d823e03 Author: Hannes Reinecke nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' This commit adds a dhchap_keyring configfs attribute to the nvmet host directory so userspace can specify the keyring used for DH-HMAC-CHAP key lookups. > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c > index 4f2489c5d894b..d583813ef4f27 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c > +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c > @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_set_key(struct nvmet_host *host, const c= har *secret, > return 0; > } > len =3D strcspn(secret, "\n"); > - key =3D nvme_auth_extract_key(NULL, secret, len, &generated); > + key =3D nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_keyring, secret, len, &gener= ated); > if (IS_ERR(key)) { > pr_debug("%s: invalid key specification\n", __func__); > return PTR_ERR(key); [Severity: Medium] Can a concurrent write to dhchap_keyring free host->dhchap_keyring while nvmet_auth_set_key() is using it? CPU0 CPU1 nvmet_host_dhchap_key_store() nvmet_auth_set_key() keyring =3D host->dhchap_keyring nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store() down_write(&nvmet_config_sem) key_put(host->dhchap_keyring) host->dhchap_keyring =3D new_ring up_write(&nvmet_config_sem) nvme_auth_extract_key(keyring, ...) ... <-- use-after-free nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store() replaces host->dhchap_keyring and drops the old reference under nvmet_config_sem, whereas nvmet_auth_set_key() reads and uses host->dhchap_keyring without holding nvmet_config_sem or pinning it with key_get(). > diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c b/drivers/nvme/target/configf= s.c > index 319947aa0a40f..ffe0f852e59d9 100644 > --- a/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c > +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c > @@ -2347,6 +2347,62 @@ static ssize_t nvmet_host_dhchap_ctrl_key_store(st= ruct config_item *item, > =20 > CONFIGFS_ATTR(nvmet_host_, dhchap_ctrl_key); > =20 > +static ssize_t nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_show(struct config_item *item, > + char *page) > +{ > + struct nvmet_host *host =3D to_host(item); > + struct key *keyring; > + ssize_t ret; > + > + down_read(&nvmet_config_sem); > + keyring =3D key_get(host->dhchap_keyring); > + if (!keyring) { > + page[0] =3D '\0'; > + ret =3D 0; > + } else { > + down_read(&keyring->sem); > + if (key_validate(keyring)) > + ret =3D sprintf(page, "\n"); > + else > + ret =3D sprintf(page, "%s\n", keyring->description); > + up_read(&keyring->sem); > + key_put(keyring); > + } > + up_read(&nvmet_config_sem); > + return ret; > +} [Severity: Medium] Can sprintf() write one byte past the end of page here? add_key() accepts descriptions up to 4095 bytes (KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE - 1), and configfs fill_write_buffer() accepts a 4095-byte write without a trailing newline. Formatting a 4095-byte keyring->description with "%s\n" writes 4097 bytes (including the NUL terminator) into the 4096-byte PAGE_SIZE configfs read buffer. Using sysfs_emit() or snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, ...) would avoid the overflow. > + > +static ssize_t nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store(struct config_item *item, > + const char *page, size_t count) > +{ > + struct nvmet_host *host =3D to_host(item); > + struct key *keyring; > + char *desc; > + size_t len; > + int ret =3D 0; > + > + len =3D strcspn(page, "\n"); > + if (!len) > + return -EINVAL; > + desc =3D kstrndup(page, len, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!desc) > + return -ENOMEM; > + keyring =3D request_key(&key_type_keyring, desc, NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { > + ret =3D PTR_ERR(keyring); > + } else { > + down_write(&nvmet_config_sem); > + key_put(host->dhchap_keyring); > + host->dhchap_keyring =3D keyring; > + up_write(&nvmet_config_sem); > + } > + kfree(desc); > + > + return ret ? -ret : count; > +} [Severity: Medium] Does negating ret return a positive value when request_key() fails? PTR_ERR(keyring) is already negative, so returning -ret causes configfs_write_iter() to treat the positive errno as a successful write byte count and silently ignore the failure. [ ... ] > @@ -2445,6 +2502,11 @@ static struct config_group *nvmet_hosts_make_group= (struct config_group *group, > #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_AUTH > /* Default to SHA256 */ > host->dhchap_hash_id =3D NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA256; > + host->dhchap_keyring =3D key_lookup(nvme_keyring_id()); > + if (IS_ERR(host->dhchap_keyring)) { > + kfree(host); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); > + } > #endif > =20 > config_group_init_type_name(&host->group, name, &nvmet_host_type); [Severity: High] Does removing a host group leak host->dhchap_keyring? Both key_lookup() here and request_key() in nvmet_host_dhchap_keyring_store() acquire a reference on host->dhchap_keyring, but nvmet_host_release() never calls key_put(host->dhchap_keyring): drivers/nvme/target/configfs.c:nvmet_host_release() { struct nvmet_host *host =3D to_host(item); #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_TARGET_AUTH nvmet_auth_revoke_key(host, false); nvmet_auth_revoke_key(host, true); #endif kfree(host); } Every removed host configfs directory leaks a reference on its configured keyring. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-key= ring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=3D9