All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: tip-bot for Dave Hansen <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, mingo@kernel.org, jcm@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, aarcange@redhat.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 15:34:04 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-8a931d1e24bacf01f00a35d43bfe7917256c5c49@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com>

Commit-ID:  8a931d1e24bacf01f00a35d43bfe7917256c5c49
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/8a931d1e24bacf01f00a35d43bfe7917256c5c49
Author:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 14:49:39 -0800
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 00:30:25 +0100

x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real

The inital fix for trusted boot and PTI potentially misses the pgd clearing
if pud_alloc() sets a PGD.  It probably works in *practice* because for two
adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will
clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear).  The second
call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.

Defer the NX clearing to a point after it is known that all top-level
allocations have occurred.  Add a comment to clarify why.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 262b6b30087 ("x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: "Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ning.sun@intel.com
Cc: tboot-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: andi@firstfloor.org
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Cc: law@redhat.com
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Cc: nickc@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110224939.2695CD47@viggo.jf.intel.com
---
 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
index 75869a4..a2486f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
 	p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);
 	if (!p4d)
 		return -1;
-	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
 	pud = pud_alloc(&tboot_mm, p4d, vaddr);
 	if (!pud)
 		return -1;
@@ -139,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
 		return -1;
 	set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
 	pte_unmap(pte);
+
+	/*
+	 * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+	 * name of making them unusable for userspace.  To execute
+	 * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+	 *
+	 * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
+	 * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
+	 */
+	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-10 23:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-10 22:49 [PATCH] x86/pti: unpoison pgd for trusted boot Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 22:53 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-10 23:34 ` tip-bot for Dave Hansen [this message]
2018-01-11 23:22 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real tip-bot for Dave Hansen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=tip-8a931d1e24bacf01f00a35d43bfe7917256c5c49@git.kernel.org \
    --to=tipbot@zytor.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jcm@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.