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From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, tglx@linutronix.de, ak@linux.intel.com
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:35:10 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Commit-ID:  b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a
Author:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:02:33 -0800
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:54:29 +0100

x86: Introduce barrier_nospec

Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from
rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec().

One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence
speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e.
force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline
to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially
operating on out-of-bounds data.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 4 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h     | 3 +--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
index 173b38f..30d4061 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
 /* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
 #define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
 
+/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */
+#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
+					   "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
 #define dma_rmb()	rmb()
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index 07962f5..30df295 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void)
 	 * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a
 	 * time stamp.
 	 */
-	alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC,
-			  "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+	barrier_nospec();
 	return rdtsc();
 }
 

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-30 22:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-30  1:02 [PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:33   ` [tip:x86/pti] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec tip-bot for Mark Rutland
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34   ` [tip:x86/pti] array_index_nospec: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-16  8:55   ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize " Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35   ` tip-bot for Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/usercopy: Replace " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/get_user: Use " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/syscall: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37   ` [tip:x86/pti] vfs, fdtable: Prevent " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-31  3:22   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31  8:07     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 13:49       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:42         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38   ` [tip:x86/pti] nl80211: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/spectre: Report " tip-bot for Dan Williams

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