From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jslaby@suse.cz, dan.j.williams@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:38:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
Commit-ID: edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360
Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:21 -0800
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:54:32 +0100
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 400c34e..fdb6068 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-30 22:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-30 1:02 [PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:33 ` [tip:x86/pti] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec tip-bot for Mark Rutland
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34 ` [tip:x86/pti] array_index_nospec: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-16 8:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize " Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/usercopy: Replace " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/get_user: Use " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/syscall: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37 ` [tip:x86/pti] vfs, fdtable: Prevent " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-31 3:22 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31 8:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 13:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38 ` [tip:x86/pti] nl80211: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38 ` tip-bot for Dan Williams [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=tip-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360@git.kernel.org \
--to=tipbot@zytor.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jslaby@suse.cz \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.