From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] howto: document more tools for recovery corruption
Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2015 15:21:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqq4mozmqw3.fsf@gitster.dls.corp.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150401210856.GA23050@peff.net> (Jeff King's message of "Wed, 1 Apr 2015 17:08:56 -0400")
Jeff King <peff@peff.net> writes:
> Long ago, I documented a corruption recovery I did and gave
> some C code that I used to help find a flipped bit. I had
> to fix a similar case recently, and I ended up writing a few
> more tools. I hope nobody ever has to use these, but it
> does not hurt to share them, just in case.
I am having a hard time deciding if I should take the Date: header
of the patch e-mail into consideration. The munge thing looks
serious enough, though.
> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
> ---
> .../howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 237 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> b/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> index 23e685d..9c4cd09 100644
> --- a/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/howto/recover-corrupted-object-harder.txt
> @@ -240,3 +240,240 @@ But more importantly, git's hashing and checksumming noticed a problem
> that easily could have gone undetected in another system. The result
> still compiled, but would have caused an interesting bug (that would
> have been blamed on some random commit).
> +
> +
> +The adventure continues...
> +--------------------------
> +
> +I ended up doing this again! Same entity, new hardware. The assumption
> +at this point is that the old disk corrupted the packfile, and then the
> +corruption was migrated to the new hardware (because it was done by
> +rsync or similar, and no fsck was done at the time of migration).
> +
> +This time, the affected blob was over 20 megabytes, which was far too
> +large to do a brute-force on. I followed the instructions above to
> +create the `zlib` file. I then used the `inflate` program below to pull
> +the corrupted data from that. Examining that output gave me a hint about
> +where in the file the corruption was. But now I was working with the
> +file itself, not the zlib contents. So knowing the sha1 of the object
> +and the approximate area of the corruption, I used the `sha1-munge`
> +program below to brute-force the correct byte.
> +
> +Here's the inflate program (it's essentially `gunzip` but without the
> +`.gz` header processing):
> +
> +--------------------------
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <zlib.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +
> +int main(int argc, char **argv)
> +{
> + /*
> + * oversized so we can read the whole buffer in;
> + * this could actually be switched to streaming
> + * to avoid any memory limitations
> + */
> + static unsigned char buf[25 * 1024 * 1024];
> + static unsigned char out[25 * 1024 * 1024];
> + int len;
> + z_stream z;
> + int ret;
> +
> + len = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf));
> + memset(&z, 0, sizeof(z));
> + inflateInit(&z);
> +
> + z.next_in = buf;
> + z.avail_in = len;
> + z.next_out = out;
> + z.avail_out = sizeof(out);
> +
> + ret = inflate(&z, 0);
> + if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END)
> + fprintf(stderr, "initial inflate failed (%d)\n", ret);
> +
> + fprintf(stderr, "outputting %lu bytes", z.total_out);
> + fwrite(out, 1, z.total_out, stdout);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +--------------------------
> +
> +And here is the `sha1-munge` program:
> +
> +--------------------------
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +#include <openssl/sha.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +
> +/* eye candy */
> +static int counter = 0;
> +static void progress(int sig)
> +{
> + fprintf(stderr, "\r%d", counter);
> + alarm(1);
> +}
> +
> +static const signed char hexval_table[256] = {
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 00-07 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 08-0f */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 10-17 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 18-1f */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 20-27 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 28-2f */
> + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, /* 30-37 */
> + 8, 9, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 38-3f */
> + -1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, -1, /* 40-47 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 48-4f */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 50-57 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 58-5f */
> + -1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, -1, /* 60-67 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 68-67 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 70-77 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 78-7f */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 80-87 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 88-8f */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 90-97 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* 98-9f */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* a0-a7 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* a8-af */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* b0-b7 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* b8-bf */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* c0-c7 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* c8-cf */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* d0-d7 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* d8-df */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* e0-e7 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* e8-ef */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* f0-f7 */
> + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, /* f8-ff */
> +};
> +
> +static inline unsigned int hexval(unsigned char c)
> +{
> +return hexval_table[c];
> +}
> +
> +static int get_sha1_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char *sha1)
> +{
> + int i;
> + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
> + unsigned int val;
> + /*
> + * hex[1]=='\0' is caught when val is checked below,
> + * but if hex[0] is NUL we have to avoid reading
> + * past the end of the string:
> + */
> + if (!hex[0])
> + return -1;
> + val = (hexval(hex[0]) << 4) | hexval(hex[1]);
> + if (val & ~0xff)
> + return -1;
> + *sha1++ = val;
> + hex += 2;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int main(int argc, char **argv)
> +{
> + /* oversized so we can read the whole buffer in */
> + static unsigned char buf[25 * 1024 * 1024];
> + char header[32];
> + int header_len;
> + unsigned char have[20], want[20];
> + int start, len;
> + SHA_CTX orig;
> + unsigned i, j;
> +
> + if (!argv[1] || get_sha1_hex(argv[1], want)) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "usage: sha1-munge <sha1> [start] <file.in\n");
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + if (argv[2])
> + start = atoi(argv[2]);
> + else
> + start = 0;
> +
> + len = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf));
> + header_len = sprintf(header, "blob %d", len) + 1;
> + fprintf(stderr, "using header: %s\n", header);
> +
> + /*
> + * We keep a running sha1 so that if you are munging
> + * near the end of the file, we do not have to re-sha1
> + * the unchanged earlier bytes
> + */
> + SHA1_Init(&orig);
> + SHA1_Update(&orig, header, header_len);
> + if (start)
> + SHA1_Update(&orig, buf, start);
> +
> + signal(SIGALRM, progress);
> + alarm(1);
> +
> + for (i = start; i < len; i++) {
> + unsigned char c;
> + SHA_CTX x;
> +
> +#if 0
> + /*
> + * deletion -- this would not actually work in practice,
> + * I think, because we've already committed to a
> + * particular size in the header. Ditto for addition
> + * below. In those cases, you'd have to do the whole
> + * sha1 from scratch, or possibly keep three running
> + * "orig" sha1 computations going.
> + */
> + memcpy(&x, &orig, sizeof(x));
> + SHA1_Update(&x, buf + i + 1, len - i - 1);
> + SHA1_Final(have, &x);
> + if (!memcmp(have, want, 20))
> + printf("i=%d, deletion\n", i);
> +#endif
> +
> + /*
> + * replacement -- note that this tries each of the 256
> + * possible bytes. If you suspect a single-bit flip,
> + * it would be much shorter to just try the 8
> + * bit-flipped variants.
> + */
> + c = buf[i];
> + for (j = 0; j <= 0xff; j++) {
> + buf[i] = j;
> +
> + memcpy(&x, &orig, sizeof(x));
> + SHA1_Update(&x, buf + i, len - i);
> + SHA1_Final(have, &x);
> + if (!memcmp(have, want, 20))
> + printf("i=%d, j=%02x\n", i, j);
> + }
> + buf[i] = c;
> +
> +#if 0
> + /* addition */
> + for (j = 0; j <= 0xff; j++) {
> + unsigned char extra = j;
> + memcpy(&x, &orig, sizeof(x));
> + SHA1_Update(&x, &extra, 1);
> + SHA1_Update(&x, buf + i, len - i);
> + SHA1_Final(have, &x);
> + if (!memcmp(have, want, 20))
> + printf("i=%d, addition=%02x", i, j);
> + }
> +#endif
> +
> + SHA1_Update(&orig, buf + i, 1);
> + counter++;
> + }
> +
> + alarm(0);
> + fprintf(stderr, "\r%d\n", counter);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +--------------------------
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-04-01 22:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-16 8:34 pack corruption post-mortem Jeff King
2013-10-16 8:59 ` Duy Nguyen
2013-10-16 15:41 ` Martin Fick
2013-10-17 0:35 ` Jeff King
2013-10-17 15:47 ` Junio C Hamano
2013-10-25 7:55 ` Jeff King
2013-10-17 1:06 ` Duy Nguyen
2013-10-19 10:32 ` Duy Nguyen
2013-10-19 14:41 ` Nicolas Pitre
2013-10-19 19:17 ` Shawn Pearce
2013-10-20 20:56 ` Nicolas Pitre
2013-10-20 4:44 ` Duy Nguyen
2013-10-20 21:08 ` Nicolas Pitre
2015-04-01 21:08 ` [PATCH] howto: document more tools for recovery corruption Jeff King
2015-04-01 22:21 ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2015-04-02 0:49 ` Jeff King
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