Re: [PATCH] gpg-interface: trim CR from ssh-keygen -Y find-principals

[Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>]

Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> writes:

> On 03.12.2021 10:58, Jeff King wrote:
>>On Fri, Dec 03, 2021 at 01:31:16PM +0000, Johannes Schindelin via GitGitGadget wrote:
>>
>>> We need to trim \r from the output of 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' on
>>> Windows, or we end up calling 'ssh-keygen -Y verify' with a bogus signer
>>> identity. ssh-keygen.c:2841 contains a call to puts(3), which confirms this
>>> hypothesis. Signature verification passes with the fix.
>>> [...]
>>> @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
>>>  			if (!*line)
>>>  				break;
>>>
>>> -			trust_size = strcspn(line, "\n");
>>> +			trust_size = strcspn(line, "\r\n");
>>>  			principal = xmemdupz(line, trust_size);
>>
>>Just playing devil's advocate for a moment: this parsing is kind of
>>loose. Is there any chance that I could smuggle a CR into my principal
>>name, and make "a principal\rthat is fake" now get parsed as "a
>>principal"? Our strcspn() here would cut off at the first CR.
>>
>>I'm guessing probably not, but when it comes to something with security
>>implications like this, it pays to be extra careful. I'm hoping somebody
>>familiar with the ssh-keygen side and how the rest of the parsing works
>>(like Fabian) can verify that this is OK.
>>
>
> A good point. I just tested this and CR is a valid character to use in
> a principal name in the allowed signers file and as of now the
> principal will be passed to the verify call `as is` and everything
> works just fine. When we introduce the patch above a principal with a
> CR in it will fail to verify.
>
> I've added Damien Miller to this thread. He knows more about what the
> expected behaviour for the principal would/should be. I think at the
> moment almost everything except \n or \0 goes. Maybe restricting \r as
> well would make life easier for other uses too?
>
> From a security perspective I don't think this is problem. The
> principal does not come from any user input but is actually looked up
> in the allowed signers file using the signatures public key (with
> ssh-keygen -Y find-principals).  If I could manipulate this file I
> could change the key as well.
>
> If we add `trust on first use` in a future series I would assume we
> use the email address from the commit/tag author ident when adding a
> new principal to the file. Can the ident contain a CR?
> Even if it did, I would only allow a list of allowed alphanumeric
> chars to be added anyway since a principal can contain wildcards which
> we obviously don't want to trust on first use ;).

So instead of the posted patch, we should do something along this
line instead?

	trust_size = strcspn(line, "\n"); /* truncate at LF */
	if (trust_size && line[trust_size - 1] == '\r')
		trust_size--; /* the LF was part of CRLF at the end */