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From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: graysongordon-gl <graysongordon1@gmail.com>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org,  peff@peff.net,  avarab@gmail.com,  ps@pks.im
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] http: add http.sslVerifyStatus to check stapled OCSP responses
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 13:12:42 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqo6ezw5l1.fsf@gitster.g> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260818193710.56955-1-ggordon@gitlab.com> (graysongordon-gl's message of "Tue, 18 Aug 2026 15:37:10 -0400")

graysongordon-gl <graysongordon1@gmail.com> writes:

> +http.sslVerifyStatus::
> +	Whether to check the revocation status of the server
> +	certificate using the stapled OCSP response supplied during
> +	the TLS handshake ("OCSP stapling"). Defaults to false.
> ++
> +This is fail-closed: if the server staples no response, verification
> +fails. Set it per remote, e.g.
> +`http.https://example.com/.sslVerifyStatus`, rather than globally.

I do not see us describe a knob or setting that can stop the
operation depending on some condition as "fail-closed".  Can we
rephrase this for regular human beings?  Perhaps

	Whether to refuse connecting to the server when its
	certificate has been revoked.  Default to false, allowing
	connection even when its certificate is not known to be
	still valid.

or something like that might be a good starting point.  After all,
the "check revocation and/or validity" is *not* the primary
objective from the end-user's point of view.  Ensuring that they do
not talk to suspicious servers is.

Thanks.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-18 20:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-11 17:02 [PATCH] http: add http.sslVerifyStatus to check stapled OCSP responses graysongordon-gl
2026-08-11 19:28 ` Junio C Hamano
2026-08-11 20:44 ` [PATCH v2] " graysongordon-gl
2026-08-12  6:25   ` Patrick Steinhardt
2026-08-12 15:53     ` Grayson Gordon
2026-08-12 14:17   ` Junio C Hamano
2026-08-12 18:25     ` [PATCH v3] " graysongordon-gl
2026-08-12 21:34       ` Junio C Hamano
2026-08-13 16:06         ` Junio C Hamano
2026-08-17 18:52           ` [PATCH v4] " graysongordon-gl
2026-08-17 19:19             ` Junio C Hamano
2026-08-18  7:50             ` Patrick Steinhardt
2026-08-18 14:51               ` Grayson Gordon
2026-08-18 16:40               ` Junio C Hamano
2026-08-18 19:37           ` [PATCH v5] " graysongordon-gl
2026-08-18 20:12             ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2026-08-18 21:22               ` Grayson Gordon
2026-08-18 21:48           ` [PATCH v6] " graysongordon-gl

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