Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] remote: do not show credentials when relative_url() fails

[Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>]

Derrick Stolee <stolee@gmail.com> writes:

> In environments that store stdout/stderr logs, those systems already
> need to be careful about such strings in the commands themselves, let
> alone the output strings.

Hmph, is this true?  How can these systems be _careful_ without
knowing what these strings are?  By guessing that https:// is a common
enough thing that shoud raise red flag if there is some:thing@ that
follows it?

> And back to the bundle-URI application: if the bundle list uses such
> URIs for its child bundles, then that's not a safe mechanism for
> communicating those credentials. This isn't going to protect secrets
> like that from being exposed.

This is very true.  So the patch may be protecting us against an
issue that does not exist in practice?

Where do we use anonymize_url() in existing code paths?

 - "git clone" leaving "clone: from X" in the reflog
 - "git fetch" showing "From X" to show ref updates
 - "git push" shwoing "Pushing to X" in verbose output
 - remote-curl talking about "url" in die() messages
 - transport showing "To X" to show push_report.

These are all talking about what is shown on the screen except for
the reflog entry left by "git clone", I think.

Thanks.