Re: [PATCH 2/2] fixup! ssh signing: verify signatures using ssh-keygen

[Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>]

Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> writes:

> This behaviour changed during patch review and documentation no longer
> matched it.
> ---

Thanks, you'd need to sign-off, to make this a standalone bugfix
patch.

>  Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 4 +---
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
> index 51a756b2f1..4f30c7dbdd 100644
> --- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
> @@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile::
>  SSH has no concept of trust levels like gpg does. To be able to differentiate
>  between valid signatures and trusted signatures the trust level of a signature
>  verification is set to `fully` when the public key is present in the allowedSignersFile.
> -Therefore to only mark fully trusted keys as verified set gpg.minTrustLevel to `fully`.
> -Otherwise valid but untrusted signatures will still verify but show no principal
> -name of the signer.
> +Otherwise the trust level is `undefined` and git verify-commit/tag will fail.
>  +
>  This file can be set to a location outside of the repository and every developer
>  maintains their own trust store. A central repository server could generate this