From: fche@redhat.com (Frank Ch. Eigler)
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pjones@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
dhowells@redhat.com, jwboyer@redhat.com,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 15:33:47 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <y0my5frsg5w.fsf@fche.csb> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130117151825.GA12165@redhat.com> (Vivek Goyal's message of "Thu, 17 Jan 2013 10:18:25 -0500")
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> writes:
> [...]
>> Can you please tell a bit more how this patch protect against direct
>> writing to the blocks?
>
> If you have loaded all the pages from disk and locked them in memory and
> verified the signature, then even if somebody modifies a block on disk
> it does not matter. We will not read pages from disk anymore for this
> exec(). We verified the signature of executable loaded in memory and
> in-memory copy is intact.
Does this imply dramatically increasing physical RAM pressure and load
latency, because binaries (and presumably all their shared libraries)
have to be locked & loaded? (Else if they are paged out to
encrypted-swap, is that sufficient protection against manipulation?)
- FChE
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-01-17 20:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-01-15 21:34 [PATCH 0/3] ELF executable signing and verification Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 21:34 ` [PATCH 1/3] module: export couple of functions for use in process signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 21:34 ` [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 4:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-16 4:55 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 7:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-16 14:00 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 14:48 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 15:54 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 17:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 18:21 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 18:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 18:57 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 19:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 19:47 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 20:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 21:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 8:37 ` Elena Reshetova
2013-01-17 14:39 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 14:35 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-16 16:34 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 18:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 18:28 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 19:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 21:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 14:58 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 15:06 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 15:21 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 15:18 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 16:27 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 20:33 ` Frank Ch. Eigler [this message]
2013-01-17 20:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 21:46 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 21:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-20 16:36 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-21 16:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-21 18:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 22:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 22:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 23:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-17 15:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-17 15:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 16:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-17 17:01 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 17:03 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 17:42 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 17:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-20 17:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-21 15:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-21 18:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-20 16:17 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-01-20 16:55 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-20 17:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-01-15 21:34 ` [PATCH 3/3] binfmt_elf: Do not allow exec() if signed binary has intepreter Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 21:37 ` [PATCH 4/3] User space utility "signelf" to sign elf executable Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 22:27 ` [PATCH 0/3] ELF executable signing and verification richard -rw- weinberger
2013-01-15 23:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 23:17 ` richard -rw- weinberger
2013-01-17 16:22 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 17:25 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-22 4:22 ` Rusty Russell
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