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From: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>,
	"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
	linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, security@kernel.org,
	Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] sg: mitigate read/write abuse
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 13:11:56 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq1bmbx321v.fsf@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180625142544.182673-1-jannh@google.com> (Jann Horn's message of "Mon, 25 Jun 2018 16:25:44 +0200")


Jann,

> As Al Viro noted in commit 128394eff343 ("sg_write()/bsg_write() is
> not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS"), sg improperly accesses
> userspace memory outside the provided buffer, permitting kernel memory
> corruption via splice().  But it doesn't just do it on ->write(), also
> on ->read().
>
> As a band-aid, make sure that the ->read() and ->write() handlers can
> not be called in weird contexts (kernel context or credentials
> different from file opener), like for ib_safe_file_access().

Applied to 4.18/scsi-fixes with the naming fix pointed out by Doug.

Thanks!

-- 
Martin K. Petersen	Oracle Linux Engineering

      parent reply	other threads:[~2018-06-26 17:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-25 14:25 [PATCH v3] sg: mitigate read/write abuse Jann Horn
2018-06-25 23:18 ` Douglas Gilbert
2018-06-26 17:11 ` Martin K. Petersen [this message]

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