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From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2026 09:39:30 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5ajymya4ud.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <auSfroz-gNb62nMG@FV6GYCPJ69>

Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> writes:

> Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:10PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>>Use EVIDENCE_ACCEPT to enter secure operation after userspace has
>>checked the evidence. Check the referenced device and evidence
>>generations before calling the driver, and record acceptance on success.
>>
>>Remove the separate DEVSEC_RUN command and callback.
>>
>>Keep DEVSEC_STATE_GET so userspace can read both evidence acceptance and
>>device state. Clearing acceptance does not undo the device state change.
>>For example, with the following PCI/TSM patches:
>
> Note that the published wip_attestation_all_1 baseline still
> has DEVSEC_RUN. I am planning this merge into EVIDENCE_ACCEPT for
> my next revision, which is not pushed yet.
>

I agree with your comments here and in the other emails regarding
attestation. I will wait for the next revision of your attestation
series. If you can accommodate these changes there, I can rework my
patches accordingly.

Could you also add the ctlv-attestation-spdm family so that I can base
the PCI/TSM changes on top of it?

-aneesh

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-31  4:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  6:24     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:09     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:05     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-31  4:22     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29  5:30     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30  9:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  3:47           ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32   ` Jason Gunthorpe

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