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From: mru@users.sourceforge.net (Måns Rullgård)
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: File Permissions are incorrect. Security flaw in Linux
Date: Wed, 01 Oct 2003 15:08:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <yw1x65j9m7g3.fsf@users.sourceforge.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 1065012013.4078.2.camel@lisaserver

"Lisa R. Nelson" <lisanels@cableone.net> writes:

> [1.] One line summary of the problem:    
> A low level user can delete a file owned by root and belonging to group
> root even if the files permissions are 744.  This is not in agreement
> with Unix, and is a major security issue.
>
> [2.] Full description of the problem/report: 
>     Permissions on a file basis take precedence over directory
> permissions (for most cases), but in Linux they do not.  In order to
> secure a file, you have to secure the directory which effects all files
> within it.  
>     As user 'lisa', I do all my work on my server.  One task is to move
> pictures from my digital camera to my server picture directory that is
> wide open to everyone.  All users can create sub-folders and put
> pictures in there.  But every hour I have a cron job run that changes
> the ownership to root, and sets the permissions to 644 on all files in
> that directory structure.  Thinking the files could no longer be altered
> by anyone but root (as would be the case in unix), and found anyone
> could delete them.  That's when I discovered this major bug.

This is not a bug.  Deleting a file is in effect a modification to the
directory containing the file, not to the file itself.  If the file
has a hard link in another directory, it will still remain there,
unmodified.  If you want only the owner of a file to be able to delete
it, set the sticky bit on the directory containing it, like this:

chmod 1777 /the/dir

This is commonly used on /tmp.  It is also the all Unix systems I've
been using work.

-- 
Måns Rullgård
mru@users.sf.net


  reply	other threads:[~2003-10-01 13:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2003-10-01 12:40 File Permissions are incorrect. Security flaw in Linux Lisa R. Nelson
2003-10-01 13:08 ` Måns Rullgård [this message]
2003-10-01 13:08 ` Mathieu Chouquet-Stringer
2003-10-01 13:23 ` viro
     [not found]   ` <1065017722.2995.10.camel@localhost.localdomain>
2003-10-01 15:40     ` viro
2003-10-01 19:27       ` DervishD
2003-10-01 13:53 ` Jurjen Oskam
2003-10-01 14:09   ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-10-01 14:22     ` Andreas Schwab
2003-10-01 15:01   ` John Bradford
2003-10-01 13:58 ` Felipe Alfaro Solana
2003-10-01 14:21 ` DervishD
     [not found] ` <1065044031.2158.23.camel@wynken.reefedge.com>
2003-10-01 14:37   ` Lisa R. Nelson
2003-10-01 15:11     ` Bas Mevissen
2003-10-01 15:12     ` Randy.Dunlap
2003-10-01 16:08     ` Richard B. Johnson
2003-10-01 19:21       ` DervishD
2003-10-01 20:30         ` viro
2003-10-01 17:23     ` Brett
2003-10-01 19:24       ` DervishD
2003-10-02 10:32 ` Christian

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