From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
"Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 04/30] landlock: Add unique ID generator
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 16:43:12 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250108154338.1129069-5-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250108154338.1129069-1-mic@digikod.net>
Landlock IDs can be generated to uniquely identify Landlock objects.
For now, only Landlock domains get an ID at creation time. These IDs
map to immutable domain hierarchies.
Landlock IDs have important properties:
- They are unique during the lifetime of the running system thanks to
the 64-bit values: at worse, 2^60 - 2*2^32 useful IDs.
- They are always greater than 2^32 and must then be stored in 64-bit
integer types.
- The initial ID (at boot time) is randomly picked between 2^32 and
2^33, which limits collisions in logs between different boots.
- IDs are sequential, which enables users to order them.
- IDs may not be consecutive but increase with a random 2^4 step, which
limits side channels.
Such IDs can be exposed to unprivileged processes, even if it is not the
case with this audit patch series. The domain IDs will be useful for
user space to identify sandboxes and get their properties.
These Landlock IDs are more robust that other absolute kernel IDs such
as pipe's inodes which rely on a shared global counter.
For checkpoint/restore features (i.e. CRIU), we could easily implement a
privileged interface (e.g. sysfs) to set the next ID counter.
IDR/IDA are not used because we only need a bijection from Landlock
objects to Landlock IDs, and we must not recycle IDs. This enables us
to identify all Landlock objects during the lifetime of the system (e.g.
in logs), but not to access an object from an ID nor know if an ID is
assigned. Using a counter is simpler, it scales (i.e. avoids growing
memory footprint), and it does not require locking. We'll use proper
file descriptors (with IDs used as inode numbers) to access Landlock
objects.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-5-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v3:
- Rename landlock_get_id_range() helper to reflect the "range" of IDs.
- Add docstring for landlock_get_id_range().
Changes since v2:
- Extend commit message.
- Rename global_counter to next_id.
- Fix KUnit's test __init types, spotted by kernel test robot.
Changes since v1:
- New patch.
---
security/landlock/.kunitconfig | 2 +
security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
security/landlock/id.c | 249 +++++++++++++++++++
security/landlock/id.h | 25 ++
security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
tools/testing/kunit/configs/all_tests.config | 2 +
6 files changed, 282 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/landlock/id.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/id.h
diff --git a/security/landlock/.kunitconfig b/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
index 03e119466604..f9423f01ac5b 100644
--- a/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
+++ b/security/landlock/.kunitconfig
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
+CONFIG_AUDIT=y
CONFIG_KUNIT=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST=y
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
index b4538b7cf7d2..e1777abbc413 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Makefile
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -4,3 +4,5 @@ landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
cred.o task.o fs.o
landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
+
+landlock-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += id.o
diff --git a/security/landlock/id.c b/security/landlock/id.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b3c353d6e0cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Unique identification number generator
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "id.h"
+
+#define COUNTER_PRE_INIT 0
+
+static atomic64_t next_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+static void __init init_id(atomic64_t *const counter, const u32 random_32bits)
+{
+ u64 init;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensures sure 64-bit values are always used by user space (or may
+ * fail with -EOVERFLOW), and makes this testable.
+ */
+ init = 1ULL << 32;
+
+ /*
+ * Makes a large (2^32) boot-time value to limit ID collision in logs
+ * from different boots, and to limit info leak about the number of
+ * initially (relative to the reader) created elements (e.g. domains).
+ */
+ init += random_32bits;
+
+ /* Sets first or ignores. This will be the first ID. */
+ atomic64_cmpxchg(counter, COUNTER_PRE_INIT, init);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void __init test_init_min(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+ init_id(&counter, 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), 1ULL + U32_MAX);
+}
+
+static void __init test_init_max(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+ init_id(&counter, ~0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), 1 + (2ULL * U32_MAX));
+}
+
+static void __init test_init_once(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ const u64 first_init = 1ULL + U32_MAX;
+ atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+
+ init_id(&counter, 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init);
+
+ init_id(&counter, ~0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+void __init landlock_init_id(void)
+{
+ return init_id(&next_id, get_random_u32());
+}
+
+/*
+ * It's not worth it to try to hide the monotonic counter because it can still
+ * be inferred (with N counter ranges), and if we are allowed to read the inode
+ * number we should also be allowed to read the time creation anyway, and it
+ * can be handy to store and sort domain IDs for user space.
+ *
+ * Returns the value of next_id and increment it to let some space for the next
+ * one.
+ */
+static u64 get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids, atomic64_t *const counter,
+ u8 random_4bits)
+{
+ u64 id, step;
+
+ /*
+ * We should return at least 1 ID, and we may need a set of consecutive
+ * ones (e.g. to generate a set of inodes).
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(number_of_ids <= 0))
+ number_of_ids = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Blurs the next ID guess with 1/16 ratio. We get 2^(64 - 4) -
+ * (2 * 2^32), so a bit less than 2^60 available IDs, which should be
+ * much more than enough considering the number of CPU cycles required
+ * to get a new ID (e.g. a full landlock_restrict_self() call), and the
+ * cost of draining all available IDs during the system's uptime.
+ */
+ random_4bits = random_4bits % (1 << 4);
+ step = number_of_ids + random_4bits;
+
+ /* It is safe to cast a signed atomic to an unsigned value. */
+ id = atomic64_fetch_add(step, counter);
+
+ /* Warns if landlock_init_id() was not called. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(id == COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
+ return id;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_range1_rand0(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 0), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 1);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand1(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 1), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 2);
+}
+
+static void test_range1_rand16(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 16), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 1);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand0(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 0), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 2);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand1(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 1), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 3);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand2(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 2), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 4);
+}
+
+static void test_range2_rand16(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+ atomic64_t counter;
+ u64 init;
+
+ init = get_random_u32();
+ atomic64_set(&counter, init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 16), init);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+ test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()),
+ init + 2);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+/**
+ * landlock_get_id_range - Get a range of unique IDs
+ *
+ * @number_of_ids: Number of IDs to hold. Must be greater than one.
+ *
+ * Returns: The first ID in the range.
+ */
+u64 landlock_get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids)
+{
+ return get_id_range(number_of_ids, &next_id, get_random_u8());
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static struct kunit_case __refdata test_cases[] = {
+ /* clang-format off */
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_init_min),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_init_max),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_init_once),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand0),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand1),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range1_rand16),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand0),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand1),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand2),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_range2_rand16),
+ {}
+ /* clang-format on */
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+ .name = "landlock_id",
+ .test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_init_section_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/landlock/id.h b/security/landlock/id.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..99f596123c19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/id.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Unique identification number generator
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+void __init landlock_init_id(void);
+
+u64 landlock_get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+static inline void __init landlock_init_id(void)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ID_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index 28519a45b11f..d297083efcb1 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
#include "fs.h"
+#include "id.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "setup.h"
#include "task.h"
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid = {
static int __init landlock_init(void)
{
+ landlock_init_id();
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
landlock_add_task_hooks();
landlock_add_fs_hooks();
diff --git a/tools/testing/kunit/configs/all_tests.config b/tools/testing/kunit/configs/all_tests.config
index b3b00269a52a..ea1f824ae70f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/kunit/configs/all_tests.config
+++ b/tools/testing/kunit/configs/all_tests.config
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ CONFIG_DAMON_DBGFS_DEPRECATED=y
CONFIG_REGMAP_BUILD=y
+CONFIG_AUDIT=y
+
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
--
2.47.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-08 15:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-08 15:43 [PATCH v4 00/30] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 01/30] lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 02/30] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 03/30] landlock: Factor out check_access_path() Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 05/30] landlock: Move access types Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 06/30] landlock: Simplify initially denied access rights Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 07/30] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management and export helpers Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 08/30] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DENY and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-15 23:53 ` [PATCH v4 8/30] " Paul Moore
2025-01-16 10:49 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-16 20:00 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 09/30] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOM_{INFO,DROP} and log domain properties Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-15 23:53 ` [PATCH v4 9/30] " Paul Moore
2025-01-16 10:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-16 20:19 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 10/30] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 11/30] landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 12/30] selftests/landlock: Add test to check partial access in a mount tree Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 13/30] landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 14/30] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 15/30] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 16/30] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 17/30] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 18/30] landlock: Control log events with LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 19/30] samples/landlock: Do not log denials from the sandboxer by default Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 20/30] selftests/landlock: Fix error message Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 21/30] selftests/landlock: Add wrappers.h Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 22/30] selftests/landlock: Add layout1.umount_sandboxer tests Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 23/30] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self()'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 24/30] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit and LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 25/30] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 26/30] landlock: Export and rename landlock_get_inode_object() Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 27/30] fs: Add iput() cleanup helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 11:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 16:45 ` Al Viro
2025-01-13 14:00 ` Jann Horn
2025-01-13 15:00 ` Christian Brauner
2025-01-13 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 14:36 ` (subset) " Christian Brauner
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 28/30] audit,landlock: Add AUDIT_EXE_LANDLOCK_DENY rule type Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 14:55 ` Jann Horn
2025-01-13 15:02 ` Christian Brauner
2025-01-13 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-15 23:53 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-16 10:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-16 20:24 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 29/30] selftests/landlock: Test audit rule with AUDIT_EXE_LANDLOCK_DOM Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 30/30] selftests/landlock: Test compatibility with audit rule lists Mickaël Salaün
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