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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Ben Scarlato <akhna@google.com>,
	 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Charles Zaffery <czaffery@roblox.com>,
	 Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Francis Laniel <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
	 James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>,
	 Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	 Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
	Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
	 Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>,
	 Praveen K Paladugu <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Robert Salvet <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
	 Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@google.com>,
	Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	 Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
	Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>,
	audit@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 13/30] landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2025 12:24:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250110.ahKa1heipoh9@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250108154338.1129069-14-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Jan 08, 2025 at 04:43:21PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Always synchronize access_masked_parent* with access_request_parent*
> according to allowed_parent*.  This is required for audit support to be
> able to get back to the reason of denial.
> 
> In a rename/link action, instead of always checking a rule two times for
> the same parent directory of the source and the destination files, only
> check it when an action on a child was not already allowed.  This also
> enables us to keep consistent allowed_parent* status, which is required
> to get back to the reason of denial.
> 
> For internal mount points, only upgrade allowed_parent* to true but do
> not wrongfully set both of them to false otherwise.  This is also
> required to get back to the reason of denial.
> 
> This does not impact the current behavior but slightly optimize code and
> prepare for audit support that needs to know the exact reason why an
> access was denied.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-14-mic@digikod.net

Pushed in my next tree to simplify next patch series.

> ---
> 
> Changes since v2:
> - New patch.
> ---
>  security/landlock/fs.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>  1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index ddadc465581e..01f9d5e78218 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -854,15 +854,6 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
>  				     child1_is_directory, layer_masks_parent2,
>  				     layer_masks_child2,
>  				     child2_is_directory))) {
> -			allowed_parent1 = scope_to_request(
> -				access_request_parent1, layer_masks_parent1);
> -			allowed_parent2 = scope_to_request(
> -				access_request_parent2, layer_masks_parent2);
> -
> -			/* Stops when all accesses are granted. */
> -			if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
> -				break;
> -
>  			/*
>  			 * Now, downgrades the remaining checks from domain
>  			 * handled accesses to requested accesses.
> @@ -870,15 +861,32 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
>  			is_dom_check = false;
>  			access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1;
>  			access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;
> +
> +			allowed_parent1 =
> +				allowed_parent1 ||
> +				scope_to_request(access_masked_parent1,
> +						 layer_masks_parent1);
> +			allowed_parent2 =
> +				allowed_parent2 ||
> +				scope_to_request(access_masked_parent2,
> +						 layer_masks_parent2);
> +
> +			/* Stops when all accesses are granted. */
> +			if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
> +				break;
>  		}
>  
>  		rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
> -		allowed_parent1 = landlock_unmask_layers(
> -			rule, access_masked_parent1, layer_masks_parent1,
> -			ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent1));
> -		allowed_parent2 = landlock_unmask_layers(
> -			rule, access_masked_parent2, layer_masks_parent2,
> -			ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2));
> +		allowed_parent1 = allowed_parent1 ||
> +				  landlock_unmask_layers(
> +					  rule, access_masked_parent1,
> +					  layer_masks_parent1,
> +					  ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent1));
> +		allowed_parent2 = allowed_parent2 ||
> +				  landlock_unmask_layers(
> +					  rule, access_masked_parent2,
> +					  layer_masks_parent2,
> +					  ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2));
>  
>  		/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
>  		if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
> @@ -902,8 +910,10 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
>  			 * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is
>  			 * reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
>  			 */
> -			allowed_parent1 = allowed_parent2 =
> -				!!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL);
> +			if (walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) {
> +				allowed_parent1 = true;
> +				allowed_parent2 = true;
> +			}
>  			break;
>  		}
>  		parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
> -- 
> 2.47.1
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-10 11:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-08 15:43 [PATCH v4 00/30] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 01/30] lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 02/30] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 03/30] landlock: Factor out check_access_path() Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 04/30] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 05/30] landlock: Move access types Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:23   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 06/30] landlock: Simplify initially denied access rights Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 07/30] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management and export helpers Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 08/30] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DENY and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-15 23:53   ` [PATCH v4 8/30] " Paul Moore
2025-01-16 10:49     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-16 20:00       ` Paul Moore
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 09/30] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOM_{INFO,DROP} and log domain properties Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-15 23:53   ` [PATCH v4 9/30] " Paul Moore
2025-01-16 10:51     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-16 20:19       ` Paul Moore
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 10/30] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 11/30] landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 12/30] selftests/landlock: Add test to check partial access in a mount tree Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 13/30] landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24   ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 14/30] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 15/30] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 16/30] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 17/30] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 18/30] landlock: Control log events with LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 19/30] samples/landlock: Do not log denials from the sandboxer by default Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 20/30] selftests/landlock: Fix error message Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 21/30] selftests/landlock: Add wrappers.h Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:24   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 22/30] selftests/landlock: Add layout1.umount_sandboxer tests Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-10 11:25   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 23/30] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self()'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 24/30] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit and LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 25/30] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 26/30] landlock: Export and rename landlock_get_inode_object() Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 27/30] fs: Add iput() cleanup helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 11:15   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 16:45     ` Al Viro
2025-01-13 14:00   ` Jann Horn
2025-01-13 15:00     ` Christian Brauner
2025-01-13 16:55       ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 14:36   ` (subset) " Christian Brauner
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 28/30] audit,landlock: Add AUDIT_EXE_LANDLOCK_DENY rule type Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-13 14:55   ` Jann Horn
2025-01-13 15:02     ` Christian Brauner
2025-01-13 16:55     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-15 23:53   ` Paul Moore
2025-01-16 10:57     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-16 20:24       ` Paul Moore
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 29/30] selftests/landlock: Test audit rule with AUDIT_EXE_LANDLOCK_DOM Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-08 15:43 ` [PATCH v4 30/30] selftests/landlock: Test compatibility with audit rule lists Mickaël Salaün

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