From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
"Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 04/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2025 17:30:39 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250131163059.1139617-5-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250131163059.1139617-1-mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change that is needed for audit support, specifically to
be able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Add landlock_get_applicable_subject(), mainly a copy of
landlock_get_applicable_domain(), and which will fully replace it in a
following commit.
Optimize current_check_access_path() to only handle the access request.
Partially replace get_current_fs_domain() with explicit calls to
landlock_get_applicable_subject(). The remaining ones will follow with
more changes.
Remove explicit domain->num_layers check which is now part of the
landlock_get_applicable_subject() call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131163059.1139617-5-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v4:
- New patch.
---
security/landlock/cred.h | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/landlock/fs.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.h b/security/landlock/cred.h
index bf755459838a..fdbbaf66d151 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.h
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include "access.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
#include "setup.h"
@@ -53,6 +54,55 @@ static inline bool landlocked(const struct task_struct *const task)
return has_dom;
}
+/**
+ * landlock_get_applicable_subject - Return the subject's Landlock credential
+ * if its enforced domain applies to (i.e.
+ * handles) at least one of the access rights
+ * specified in @masks
+ *
+ * @cred: credential
+ * @masks: access masks
+ * @handle_layer: returned youngest layer handling a subset of @masks. Not set
+ * if the function returns NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns: landlock_cred(@cred) if any access rights specified in @masks is
+ * handled, or NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static inline const struct landlock_cred_security *
+landlock_get_applicable_subject(const struct cred *const cred,
+ const struct access_masks masks,
+ size_t *const handle_layer)
+{
+ const union access_masks_all masks_all = {
+ .masks = masks,
+ };
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *domain;
+ ssize_t layer_level;
+
+ if (!cred)
+ return NULL;
+
+ domain = landlock_cred(cred)->domain;
+ if (!domain)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (layer_level = domain->num_layers - 1; layer_level >= 0;
+ layer_level--) {
+ union access_masks_all layer = {
+ .masks = domain->access_masks[layer_level],
+ };
+
+ if (layer.all & masks_all.all) {
+ if (handle_layer)
+ *handle_layer = layer_level;
+
+ return landlock_cred(cred);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void);
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 71b9dc331aae..d5b153d29fcb 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -771,11 +771,14 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
if (!access_request_parent1 && !access_request_parent2)
return true;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!path))
return true;
+
if (is_nouser_or_private(path->dentry))
return true;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1 || !layer_masks_parent1))
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layer_masks_parent1))
return false;
allowed_parent1 = is_layer_masks_allowed(layer_masks_parent1);
@@ -926,16 +929,21 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
access_mask_t access_request)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
+ const struct access_masks masks = {
+ .fs = access_request,
+ };
+ const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+ landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), masks, NULL);
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
- if (!dom)
+ if (!subject)
return 0;
- access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
- dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
- if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(dom, path, access_request, &layer_masks,
- NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
+ access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
+ access_request, &layer_masks,
+ LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(subject->domain, path, access_request,
+ &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@@ -1098,7 +1106,8 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
struct dentry *const new_dentry,
const bool removable, const bool exchange)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
+ const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+ landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), any_fs, NULL);
bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
struct path mnt_dir;
@@ -1106,10 +1115,9 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
layer_mask_t layer_masks_parent1[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {},
layer_masks_parent2[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
- if (!dom)
+ if (!subject)
return 0;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
- return -EACCES;
+
if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
return -ENOENT;
if (exchange) {
@@ -1134,10 +1142,11 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
* for same-directory referer (i.e. no reparenting).
*/
access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks(
- dom, access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
+ subject->domain,
+ access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
&layer_masks_parent1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
- dom, new_dir, access_request_parent1,
+ subject->domain, new_dir, access_request_parent1,
&layer_masks_parent1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
@@ -1160,10 +1169,12 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
old_dentry->d_parent;
/* new_dir->dentry is equal to new_dentry->d_parent */
- allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(dom, mnt_dir.dentry, old_parent,
+ allow_parent1 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
+ old_parent,
&layer_masks_parent1);
- allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(
- dom, mnt_dir.dentry, new_dir->dentry, &layer_masks_parent2);
+ allow_parent2 = collect_domain_accesses(subject->domain, mnt_dir.dentry,
+ new_dir->dentry,
+ &layer_masks_parent2);
if (allow_parent1 && allow_parent2)
return 0;
@@ -1175,9 +1186,9 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
* destination parent access rights.
*/
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
- dom, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1, &layer_masks_parent1,
- old_dentry, access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2,
- exchange ? new_dentry : NULL))
+ subject->domain, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1,
+ &layer_masks_parent1, old_dentry, access_request_parent2,
+ &layer_masks_parent2, exchange ? new_dentry : NULL))
return 0;
/*
@@ -1504,11 +1515,10 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access,
optional_access;
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
- landlock_get_applicable_domain(
- landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain, any_fs);
+ const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
+ landlock_get_applicable_subject(file->f_cred, any_fs, NULL);
- if (!dom)
+ if (!subject)
return 0;
/*
@@ -1529,9 +1539,10 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
- dom, &file->f_path,
- landlock_init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request,
- &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
+ subject->domain, &file->f_path,
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(subject->domain,
+ full_access_request, &layer_masks,
+ LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
allowed_access = full_access_request;
} else {
--
2.48.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-31 16:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-31 16:30 [PATCH v5 00/24] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 01/24] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 02/24] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-07 14:15 ` Günther Noack
2025-03-08 18:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 03/24] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 05/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 06/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for scope Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 07/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for fowner Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 08/24] landlock: Identify domain execution crossing Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 09/24] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-14 22:52 ` [PATCH v5 9/24] " Paul Moore
2025-02-18 19:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 10/24] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-14 22:52 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-18 19:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-26 23:41 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 11/24] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 12/24] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 13/24] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 14/24] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 15/24] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 16/24] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 17/24] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET_SUBDOMAINS Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 20:28 ` kernel test robot
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 18/24] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_CROSS_EXEC Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 19/24] samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 20/24] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self()'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 21/24] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit and LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 22/24] selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 23/24] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 24/24] landlock: Add audit documentation Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-22 19:47 ` [PATCH v5 00/24] Landlock audit support Günther Noack
2025-02-25 19:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
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