From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
"Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/24] landlock: Add unique ID generator
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 15:15:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250307.db38587e80e7@gnoack.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250131163059.1139617-3-mic@digikod.net>
On Fri, Jan 31, 2025 at 05:30:37PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/id.c
> +static atomic64_t next_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
> +
> +static void __init init_id(atomic64_t *const counter, const u32 random_32bits)
> +{
> + u64 init;
> +
> + /*
> + * Ensures sure 64-bit values are always used by user space (or may
> + * fail with -EOVERFLOW), and makes this testable.
> + */
> + init = 1ULL << 32;
> +
> + /*
> + * Makes a large (2^32) boot-time value to limit ID collision in logs
> + * from different boots, and to limit info leak about the number of
> + * initially (relative to the reader) created elements (e.g. domains).
> + */
> + init += random_32bits;
> +
> + /* Sets first or ignores. This will be the first ID. */
> + atomic64_cmpxchg(counter, COUNTER_PRE_INIT, init);
It feels like this should always need to succeed. Or to say it the
other way around: If this cmpxchg were to fail, the guarantees from
your commit message would be broken. Maybe it would be worth handling
that error case in a more direct way?
> +static void __init test_init_once(struct kunit *const test)
> +{
> + const u64 first_init = 1ULL + U32_MAX;
> + atomic64_t counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(COUNTER_PRE_INIT);
> +
> + init_id(&counter, 0);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init);
> +
> + init_id(&counter, ~0);
> + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init);
Maybe we can annotate this with an explanatory message,
to make it slightly clearer that this is the point of the test:
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, atomic64_read(&counter), first_init,
"should still have the same value after the subsequent init_id()");
–Günther
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-07 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-31 16:30 [PATCH v5 00/24] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 01/24] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 02/24] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-07 14:15 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2025-03-08 18:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 03/24] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 04/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 05/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 06/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for scope Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 07/24] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for fowner Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 08/24] landlock: Identify domain execution crossing Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 09/24] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-14 22:52 ` [PATCH v5 9/24] " Paul Moore
2025-02-18 19:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 10/24] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-14 22:52 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-18 19:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-26 23:41 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 11/24] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 12/24] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 13/24] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 14/24] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 15/24] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 16/24] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 17/24] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET_SUBDOMAINS Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 20:28 ` kernel test robot
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 18/24] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_CROSS_EXEC Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 19/24] samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 20/24] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self()'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 21/24] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit and LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_QUIET Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 22/24] selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 23/24] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-31 16:30 ` [PATCH v5 24/24] landlock: Add audit documentation Mickaël Salaün
2025-02-22 19:47 ` [PATCH v5 00/24] Landlock audit support Günther Noack
2025-02-25 19:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
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