From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>, "Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 16/28] landlock: Log scoped denials
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 20:07:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250320190717.2287696-17-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250320190717.2287696-1-mic@digikod.net>
Add audit support for unix_stream_connect, unix_may_send, task_kill, and
file_send_sigiotask hooks.
The related blockers are:
- scope.abstract_unix_socket
- scope.signal
Audit event sample for abstract unix socket:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.268:30): domain=195ba459b blockers=scope.abstract_unix_socket path=00666F6F
Audit event sample for signal:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.291:31): domain=195ba459b blockers=scope.signal opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
Refactor and simplify error handling in LSM hooks.
Extend struct landlock_file_security with fown_layer and use it to log
the blocking domain. The struct aligned size is still 16 bytes.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v6:
- Fix missing ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT for fown_layer, spotted by kernel test
robot.
- Update headers.
Changes since v5:
- Move request declarations in the landlock_log_denial() calls to
not impact allowed requests with audit, and return as soon as
possible when access is allowed.
- Store a fown_layer per file and use it to log the blocking domain.
- Refactor and simplify error handling in LSM hooks.
Changes since v4:
- Rebase on top of the landlock_log_denial() and subject type changes.
Changes since v3:
- Cosmetic change to the "scope.*" blocker names.
- Extend commit message.
Changes since v1:
- New patch.
---
security/landlock/audit.c | 8 ++++
security/landlock/audit.h | 2 +
security/landlock/fs.c | 8 +++-
security/landlock/fs.h | 16 ++++++++
security/landlock/task.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 66ff9a5d9866..2dcc55ad451c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings)))
return "unknown";
return net_access_strings[access_bit];
+
+ case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+ return "scope.abstract_unix_socket";
+
+ case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+ return "scope.signal";
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
index 486b4e7050d3..92428b7fc4d8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ enum landlock_request_type {
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY,
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
+ LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+ LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
/*
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 9d7443ff67c7..36d06a8e2287 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1774,6 +1774,7 @@ static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
struct landlock_ruleset *prev_dom;
struct task_struct *p;
struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject = {};
+ size_t fown_layer = 0;
/*
* Lock already held by __f_setown(), see commit 26f204380a3c ("fs: Fix
@@ -1791,8 +1792,8 @@ static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
.scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
const struct landlock_cred_security *new_subject =
- landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(),
- signal_scope, NULL);
+ landlock_get_applicable_subject(
+ current_cred(), signal_scope, &fown_layer);
if (new_subject) {
landlock_get_ruleset(new_subject->domain);
fown_subject = *new_subject;
@@ -1801,6 +1802,9 @@ static void hook_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
prev_dom = landlock_file(file)->fown_subject.domain;
landlock_file(file)->fown_subject = fown_subject;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ landlock_file(file)->fown_layer = fown_layer;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT*/
/* Called in an RCU read-side critical section. */
landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(prev_dom);
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index 3a09ba985b74..294ca813c7f2 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
@@ -61,6 +62,11 @@ struct landlock_file_security {
* _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL).
*/
deny_masks_t deny_masks;
+ /**
+ * @fown_layer: Layer level of @fown_subject->domain with
+ * LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL.
+ */
+ u8 fown_layer;
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
/**
@@ -73,6 +79,16 @@ struct landlock_file_security {
struct landlock_cred_security fown_subject;
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/* Makes sure all layers can be identified. */
+/* clang-format off */
+static_assert((typeof_member(struct landlock_file_security, fown_layer))~0 >=
+ LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
+/* clang-format off */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
/**
* struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
*
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 60e2953d2c71..e95e4ebe724d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
- * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks
+ * Landlock - Ptrace hooks
*
* Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2021-2025 Microsoft Corporation
*/
#include <asm/current.h>
@@ -265,26 +266,41 @@ static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock,
struct sock *const other,
struct sock *const newsk)
{
+ size_t handle_layer;
const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), unix_scope,
- NULL);
+ &handle_layer);
/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
if (!subject)
return 0;
- if (is_abstract_socket(other) && sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!is_abstract_socket(other))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain))
+ return 0;
- return 0;
+ landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+ .audit = {
+ .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
+ .u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
+ .sk = other,
+ },
+ },
+ .layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+ });
+ return -EPERM;
}
static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
struct socket *const other)
{
+ size_t handle_layer;
const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
landlock_get_applicable_subject(current_cred(), unix_scope,
- NULL);
+ &handle_layer);
if (!subject)
return 0;
@@ -296,11 +312,23 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
if (unix_peer(sock->sk) == other->sk)
return 0;
- if (is_abstract_socket(other->sk) &&
- sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!is_abstract_socket(other->sk))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain))
+ return 0;
- return 0;
+ landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
+ .audit = {
+ .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
+ .u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
+ .sk = other->sk,
+ },
+ },
+ .layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+ });
+ return -EPERM;
}
static const struct access_masks signal_scope = {
@@ -312,6 +340,7 @@ static int hook_task_kill(struct task_struct *const p,
const struct cred *cred)
{
bool is_scoped;
+ size_t handle_layer;
const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
if (!cred) {
@@ -330,7 +359,8 @@ static int hook_task_kill(struct task_struct *const p,
cred = current_cred();
}
- subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(cred, signal_scope, NULL);
+ subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(cred, signal_scope,
+ &handle_layer);
/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
if (!subject)
@@ -342,10 +372,19 @@ static int hook_task_kill(struct task_struct *const p,
landlock_get_task_domain(p),
signal_scope.scope);
}
- if (is_scoped)
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ if (!is_scoped)
+ return 0;
+
+ landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+ .audit = {
+ .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK,
+ .u.tsk = p,
+ },
+ .layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+ });
+ return -EPERM;
}
static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
@@ -374,10 +413,21 @@ static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
landlock_get_task_domain(tsk),
signal_scope.scope);
}
- if (is_scoped)
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ if (!is_scoped)
+ return 0;
+
+ landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+ .audit = {
+ .type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK,
+ .u.tsk = tsk,
+ },
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ .layer_plus_one = landlock_file(fown->file)->fown_layer + 1,
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+ });
+ return -EPERM;
}
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
--
2.49.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-20 19:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-20 19:06 [PATCH v7 00/28] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/28] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-25 19:35 ` Günther Noack
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/28] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/28] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-25 19:37 ` Günther Noack
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for scope Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for fowner Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/28] landlock: Identify domain execution crossing Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/28] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-27 21:38 ` Tingmao Wang
2025-03-28 10:33 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/28] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 11/28] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 12/28] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 13/28] landlock: Factor out IOCTL hooks Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 14/28] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 15/28] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 17/28] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_*_EXEC_* flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 18/28] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 19/28] samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 20/28] selftests/landlock: Add test for invalid ruleset file descriptor Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 21/28] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 22/28] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit flags and domain IDs Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 23/28] selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 24/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 25/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for abstract UNIX socket scoping Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 26/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 27/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 28/28] landlock: Add audit documentation Mickaël Salaün
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