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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
	"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
	"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
	"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
	"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
	"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
	"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
	"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
	"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>, "Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
	audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 19/28] samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 20:07:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250320190717.2287696-20-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250320190717.2287696-1-mic@digikod.net>

By default, denials from within the sandbox are not logged.  Indeed, the
sandboxer's security policy might not be fitted to the set of sandboxed
processes that could be spawned (e.g. from a shell).

For test purpose, parse the LL_FORCE_LOG environment variable to log
every sandbox denials, including after launching the initial sandboxed
program thanks to LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v5:
- Update with new flag.

Changes since v3:
- Extend error message, suggested by Francis Laniel.

Changes since v2:
- New patch.
---
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/landlock/syscalls.c |  8 ++------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index 07fab2ef534e..4e2854c6f9a3 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
 #define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
 #define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
 #define ENV_SCOPED_NAME "LL_SCOPED"
+#define ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "LL_FORCE_LOG"
 #define ENV_DELIMITER ":"
 
 static int str2num(const char *numstr, __u64 *num_dst)
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 
 /* clang-format on */
 
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 6
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 7
 
 #define XSTR(s) #s
 #define STR(s) XSTR(s)
@@ -322,6 +323,9 @@ static const char help[] =
 	"  - \"a\" to restrict opening abstract unix sockets\n"
 	"  - \"s\" to restrict sending signals\n"
 	"\n"
+	"A sandboxer should not log denied access requests to avoid spamming logs, "
+	"but to test audit we can set " ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "=1\n"
+	"\n"
 	"Example:\n"
 	ENV_FS_RO_NAME "=\"${PATH}:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
 	ENV_FS_RW_NAME "=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
@@ -340,7 +344,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 	const char *cmd_path;
 	char *const *cmd_argv;
 	int ruleset_fd, abi;
-	char *env_port_name;
+	char *env_port_name, *env_force_log;
 	__u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
 	      access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
 
@@ -351,6 +355,8 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 		.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
 			  LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
 	};
+	int supported_restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
+	int set_restrict_flags = 0;
 
 	if (argc < 2) {
 		fprintf(stderr, help, argv[0]);
@@ -422,6 +428,13 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 		/* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_* for ABI < 6 */
 		ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~(LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
 					 LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
+		__attribute__((fallthrough));
+	case 6:
+		/* Removes LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON for ABI < 7 */
+		supported_restrict_flags &=
+			~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
+
+		/* Must be printed for any ABI < LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST. */
 		fprintf(stderr,
 			"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
 			"to leverage Landlock features "
@@ -456,6 +469,24 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 	if (check_ruleset_scope(ENV_SCOPED_NAME, &ruleset_attr))
 		return 1;
 
+	/* Enables optional logs. */
+	env_force_log = getenv(ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME);
+	if (env_force_log) {
+		if (strcmp(env_force_log, "1") != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Unknown value for " ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME
+					" (only \"1\" is handled)\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		if (!(supported_restrict_flags &
+		      LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON)) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Audit logs not supported by current kernel\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		set_restrict_flags |= LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON;
+		unsetenv(ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME);
+	}
+
 	ruleset_fd =
 		landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
 	if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
@@ -483,7 +514,7 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 		perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
 		goto err_close_ruleset;
 	}
-	if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+	if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, set_restrict_flags)) {
 		perror("Failed to enforce ruleset");
 		goto err_close_ruleset;
 	}
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 74d5cc2963b7..49ad633db54e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -508,12 +508,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
 	/* Translates "off" flag to boolean. */
 	log_subdomains = !(flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF);
 
-	/*
-	 * It is allowed to set %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with -1
-	 * as @ruleset_fd, but no other flag must be set.
-	 */
-	if (!(ruleset_fd == -1 &&
-	      flags == LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
+	if (!(flags == LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF &&
+	      ruleset_fd == -1)) {
 		/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
 		ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
 		if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
-- 
2.49.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-20 19:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-20 19:06 [PATCH v7 00/28] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/28] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-25 19:35   ` Günther Noack
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/28] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/28] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-25 19:37   ` Günther Noack
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for scope Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for fowner Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/28] landlock: Identify domain execution crossing Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/28] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-27 21:38   ` Tingmao Wang
2025-03-28 10:33     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/28] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 11/28] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 12/28] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 13/28] landlock: Factor out IOCTL hooks Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 14/28] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 15/28] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 16/28] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 17/28] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_*_EXEC_* flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 18/28] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 20/28] selftests/landlock: Add test for invalid ruleset file descriptor Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 21/28] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 22/28] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit flags and domain IDs Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 23/28] selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 24/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 25/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for abstract UNIX socket scoping Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 26/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 27/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 28/28] landlock: Add audit documentation Mickaël Salaün

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