From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Daniel Burgener" <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>, "Tyler Hicks" <code@tyhicks.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 26/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for filesystem
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 20:07:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250320190717.2287696-27-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250320190717.2287696-1-mic@digikod.net>
Test all filesystem blockers, including events with several records, and
record with several blockers:
- fs.execute
- fs.write_file
- fs.read_file
- fs_read_dir
- fs.remove_dir
- fs.remove_file
- fs.make_char
- fs.make_dir
- fs.make_reg
- fs.make_sock
- fs.make_fifo
- fs.make_block
- fs.make_sym
- fs.refer
- fs.truncate
- fs.ioctl_dev
- fs.change_topology
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v6:
- Check audit_count_records() calls for audit errors.
- Add regression test for commit d617f0d72d80 ("landlock: Optimize file
path walks and prepare for audit support").
- Add test_rename and test_exchange tests.
- Check domain allocation interwinded record.
- Add the execute_make test.
- Use a set of access rights instead of only one to make sure only the
relevant access rights are blocked and logged.
- Add new audit_layout1.mount test.
- Add comments.
Changes since v5:
- New patch.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h | 35 ++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 16 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 594 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 645 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h
index 08a5c53bd6f5..b9054086a0c9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h
@@ -208,6 +208,41 @@ static int audit_set_status(int fd, __u32 key, __u32 val)
return audit_request(fd, &msg, NULL);
}
+/* Returns a pointer to the last filled character of @dst, which is `\0`. */
+static __maybe_unused char *regex_escape(const char *const src, char *dst,
+ size_t dst_size)
+{
+ char *d = dst;
+
+ for (const char *s = src; *s; s++) {
+ switch (*s) {
+ case '$':
+ case '*':
+ case '.':
+ case '[':
+ case '\\':
+ case ']':
+ case '^':
+ if (d >= dst + dst_size - 2)
+ return (char *)-ENOMEM;
+
+ *d++ = '\\';
+ *d++ = *s;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (d >= dst + dst_size - 1)
+ return (char *)-ENOMEM;
+
+ *d++ = *s;
+ }
+ }
+ if (d >= dst + dst_size - 1)
+ return (char *)-ENOMEM;
+
+ *d = '\0';
+ return d;
+}
+
/*
* @domain_id: The domain ID extracted from the audit message (if the first part
* of @pattern is REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX). It is set to 0 if the domain ID is
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
index 6e1d143ddfa7..88a3c78f5d98 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
@@ -208,6 +208,22 @@ enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const int ruleset_fd)
}
}
+static void __maybe_unused
+drop_access_rights(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const ruleset_attr)
+{
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd =
+ landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, sizeof(*ruleset_attr), 0);
+ EXPECT_LE(0, ruleset_fd)
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to create a ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+}
+
struct protocol_variant {
int domain;
int type;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index aa6f2c1cbec7..f819011a8798 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#define _ASM_GENERIC_FCNTL_H
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include "audit.h"
#include "common.h"
#ifndef renameat2
@@ -5554,4 +5555,597 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout3_fs, release_inodes)
ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(TMP_DIR, O_RDONLY));
}
+static int matches_log_fs_extra(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ int audit_fd, const char *const blockers,
+ const char *const path, const char *const extra)
+{
+ static const char log_template[] = REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX
+ " blockers=fs\\.%s path=\"%s\" dev=\"[^\"]\\+\" ino=[0-9]\\+$";
+ char *absolute_path = NULL;
+ size_t log_match_remaining = sizeof(log_template) + strlen(blockers) +
+ PATH_MAX * 2 +
+ (extra ? strlen(extra) : 0) + 1;
+ char log_match[log_match_remaining];
+ char *log_match_cursor = log_match;
+ size_t chunk_len;
+
+ chunk_len = snprintf(log_match_cursor, log_match_remaining,
+ REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX " blockers=%s path=\"",
+ blockers);
+ if (chunk_len < 0 || chunk_len >= log_match_remaining)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ /*
+ * It is assume that absolute_path does not contain control characters nor
+ * spaces, see audit_string_contains_control().
+ */
+ absolute_path = realpath(path, NULL);
+ if (!absolute_path)
+ return -errno;
+
+ log_match_remaining -= chunk_len;
+ log_match_cursor += chunk_len;
+ log_match_cursor = regex_escape(absolute_path, log_match_cursor,
+ log_match_remaining);
+ free(absolute_path);
+ if (log_match_cursor < 0)
+ return (long long)log_match_cursor;
+
+ log_match_remaining -= log_match_cursor - log_match;
+ chunk_len = snprintf(log_match_cursor, log_match_remaining,
+ "\" dev=\"[^\"]\\+\" ino=[0-9]\\+%s$",
+ extra ?: "");
+ if (chunk_len < 0 || chunk_len >= log_match_remaining)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ return audit_match_record(audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS, log_match,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static int matches_log_fs(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, int audit_fd,
+ const char *const blockers, const char *const path)
+{
+ return matches_log_fs_extra(_metadata, audit_fd, blockers, path, NULL);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(audit_layout1)
+{
+ struct audit_filter audit_filter;
+ int audit_fd;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(audit_layout1)
+{
+ prepare_layout(_metadata);
+
+ create_layout1(_metadata);
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
+ self->audit_fd = audit_init_with_exe_filter(&self->audit_filter);
+ EXPECT_LE(0, self->audit_fd);
+ disable_caps(_metadata);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(audit_layout1)
+{
+ remove_layout1(_metadata);
+
+ cleanup_layout(_metadata);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_cleanup(-1, NULL));
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_make)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d1);
+ test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+ });
+
+ test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.execute",
+ file1_s1d1));
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.execute",
+ file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Using a set of handled/denied access rights make it possible to check that
+ * only the blocked ones are logged.
+ */
+
+/* clang-format off */
+static const __u64 access_fs_16 =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+/* clang-format on */
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, execute_read)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ copy_file(_metadata, bin_true, file1_s1d1);
+ test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d1);
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ /*
+ * The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.execute_read test is
+ * the extra ",fs\\.read_file" blocked by the executable file.
+ */
+ test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.execute,fs\\.read_file", file1_s1d1));
+ test_check_exec(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.execute,fs\\.read_file", file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, write_file)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.write_file", file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_file)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_file",
+ file1_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, read_dir)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.read_dir",
+ dir_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_dir)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_dir", dir_s1d2));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, AT_REMOVEDIR));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_dir", dir_s1d2));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, remove_file)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file", dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_char)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFCHR | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_char",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_dir)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0755));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_dir",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_reg)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFREG | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_reg",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sock)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFSOCK | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_sock",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_fifo)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFIFO | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_fifo",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_block)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d3, S_IFBLK | 0644, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.make_block", dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, make_sym)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink("target", file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.make_sym",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_handled)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, NULL));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_make)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s1d1, file1_s1d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer", dir_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_rename(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.refer", dir_s1d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s2d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_exchange)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3));
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ /*
+ * The only difference with the previous audit_layout1.refer_rename test is
+ * the extra ",fs\\.make_reg" blocked by the source directory.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_exchange(file1_s1d2, file1_s2d3));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.remove_file,fs\\.make_reg,fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s2d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This test checks that the audit record is correctly generated when the
+ * operation is only partially denied. This is the case for rename(2) when the
+ * source file is allowed to be referenced but the destination directory is not.
+ *
+ * This is also a regression test for commit d617f0d72d80 ("landlock: Optimize
+ * file path walks and prepare for audit support") and commit 058518c20920
+ * ("landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones").
+ */
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, refer_rename_half)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+ const struct rule layer1[] = {
+ {
+ .path = dir_s2d2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd =
+ create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, layer1);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(dir_s1d2, dir_s2d3));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno);
+
+ /* Only half of the request is denied. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.refer",
+ dir_s1d1));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, truncate)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = access_fs_16,
+ });
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, truncate(file1_s1d3, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd, "fs\\.truncate",
+ file1_s1d3));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, ioctl_dev)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+ int fd;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ access_fs_16 &
+ ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
+ });
+
+ fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIONREAD));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs_extra(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.ioctl_dev", "/dev/null",
+ " ioctlcmd=0x541b"));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
+TEST_F(audit_layout1, mount)
+{
+ struct audit_records records;
+
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata,
+ &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+ });
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, mount(NULL, dir_s3d2, NULL, MS_RDONLY, NULL));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
+ "fs\\.change_topology", dir_s3d2));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain);
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.49.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-20 19:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-20 19:06 [PATCH v7 00/28] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/28] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-25 19:35 ` Günther Noack
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/28] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/28] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-25 19:37 ` Günther Noack
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for scope Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/28] landlock: Prepare to use credential instead of domain for fowner Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/28] landlock: Identify domain execution crossing Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/28] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-27 21:38 ` Tingmao Wang
2025-03-28 10:33 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/28] landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 11/28] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 12/28] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 13/28] landlock: Factor out IOCTL hooks Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 14/28] landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 15/28] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 16/28] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 17/28] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_*_EXEC_* flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 18/28] landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 19/28] samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 20/28] selftests/landlock: Add test for invalid ruleset file descriptor Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 21/28] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 22/28] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit flags and domain IDs Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 23/28] selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 24/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 25/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for abstract UNIX socket scoping Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 27/28] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for network Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-20 19:07 ` [PATCH v7 28/28] landlock: Add audit documentation Mickaël Salaün
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