From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 06/15] LSM: Exclusive secmark usage
Date: Sat, 21 Jun 2025 10:18:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250621171851.5869-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250621171851.5869-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The network secmark can only be used by one security module
at a time. Establish mechanism to identify to security modules
whether they have access to the secmark. SELinux already
incorparates mechanism, but it has to be added to Smack and
AppArmor.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 5 +++++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++++---
security/lsm_init.c | 6 ++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +++-
security/smack/smack.h | 5 +++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 10 ++++++++--
8 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 5bc144c5f685..1ad9f8a86b10 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
unsigned int lbs_xattr_count; /* num xattr slots in new_xattrs array */
unsigned int lbs_tun_dev;
unsigned int lbs_bdev;
+ bool lbs_secmark; /* expressed desire for secmark use */
};
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index c42ed8a73f1c..2e43e1e8303c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
+static inline bool aa_secmark(void)
+{
+ return apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_secmark;
+}
+
static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
{
return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4ba6db93e5b0..255d2e40386f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- if (!skb->secmark)
+ if (!aa_secmark() || !skb->secmark)
return 0;
/*
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- if (!skb->secmark)
+ if (!aa_secmark() || !skb->secmark)
return 0;
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
@@ -1423,6 +1423,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
+ .lbs_secmark = true,
};
static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = {
@@ -2085,7 +2086,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
struct sock *sk;
- if (!skb->secmark)
+ if (!aa_secmark() || !skb->secmark)
return NF_ACCEPT;
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c
index 54166688efff..4e3944c68bc8 100644
--- a/security/lsm_init.c
+++ b/security/lsm_init.c
@@ -313,6 +313,12 @@ static void __init lsm_prep_single(struct lsm_info *lsm)
lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_xattr_count,
&blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count);
lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev);
+ if (blobs->lbs_secmark) {
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_secmark)
+ blobs->lbs_secmark = false;
+ else
+ blob_sizes.lbs_secmark = true;
+ }
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9f816e25198a..18ab1f13f3f9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
*/
static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
{
- return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+ return selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_secmark &&
+ (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
}
@@ -7160,6 +7161,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
.lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct),
.lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct),
+ .lbs_secmark = true,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 709e0d6cd5e1..2f7b8d79b69f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -389,6 +389,11 @@ static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
}
+static inline bool smack_secmark(void)
+{
+ return smack_blob_sizes.lbs_secmark;
+}
+
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an inode blob.
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d363adead435..c8c173bb9cc3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4102,7 +4102,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
+ if (!smack_secmark() || skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
return NULL;
return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
@@ -5030,6 +5030,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
.lbs_xattr_count = SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
+ .lbs_secmark = true,
};
static const struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index 17ba578b1308..1dcaba0d224a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static unsigned int smack_ip_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk) {
+ if (smack_secmark() && sk) {
ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
@@ -54,12 +54,18 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
static int __net_init smack_nf_register(struct net *net)
{
+ if (!smack_secmark())
+ return 0;
+
return nf_register_net_hooks(net, smack_nf_ops,
ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
}
static void __net_exit smack_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
{
+ if (!smack_secmark())
+ return;
+
nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, smack_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
}
@@ -70,7 +76,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations smack_net_ops = {
int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void)
{
- if (smack_enabled == 0)
+ if (smack_enabled == 0 || !smack_secmark())
return 0;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
--
2.47.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-21 17:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20250621171851.5869-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 00/15] LSM: No exclusive LSMs Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 01/15] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 1/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 02/15] LSM: security_lsmblob_to_secctx module selection Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 2/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 03/15] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 3/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 04/15] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 4/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 05/15] LSM: Single calls in secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 5/15] " Paul Moore
2025-11-04 16:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 6/15] LSM: Exclusive secmark usage Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 07/15] Audit: Call only the first of the audit rule hooks Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 7/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 08/15] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 09/15] LSM: Add mount opts blob size tracking Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC 9/15] " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 10/15] LSM: allocate mnt_opts blobs instead of module specific data Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 11/15] LSM: Infrastructure management of the mnt_opts security blob Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 12/15] LSM: Allow reservation of netlabel Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:12 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 13/15] LSM: restrict security_cred_getsecid() to a single LSM Casey Schaufler
2025-10-14 23:13 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 14/15] Smack: Remove LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE Casey Schaufler
2025-06-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH 15/15] LSM: Remove exclusive LSM flag Casey Schaufler
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