From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>,
Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, fsverity@lists.linux.dev,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@lists.linux.dev,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 15:35:01 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <88695db-efc0-6cc6-13ee-fd7c2abe61c@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQrnu8Sj=XnDvg=wGTBxacvMSW6OJyG3-tpwrsbGat6vA@mail.gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2554 bytes --]
On Thu, 15 Aug 2024, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 8, 2024 at 6:38 PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Mikulas,
> >
> > I hope you’re doing well. I wanted to thank you again for your thorough
> > review for the last version. I’ve since made some minor updates for this
> > version, including adding more comments and refactoring the way the hash
> > algorithm name is obtained due to recent changes in dm-verity.
> >
> > Would you mind if we keep the Review-by tag on the latest version since
> > the changes are minor? Your feedback is greatly valued, and I’d
> > appreciate it if you could take a quick look when you have a moment.
>
> To add a bit more to this, this patchset now looks like it is in a
> state where we would like to merge it into the LSM tree for the
> upcoming merge window, but I would really like to make sure that the
> device-mapper folks are okay with these changes; an
> Acked-by/Reviewed-by on this patch would be appreciated, assuming you
> are still okay with this patch.
>
> For those who may be missing the context, the full patchset can be
> found on lore at the link below:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/1722665314-21156-1-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com
Hi
I'm not an expert in Linux security subsystems. I skimmed through the
dm-verity patch, didn't find anything wrong with it, so you can add
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> > > + u8 *root_digest_sig; /* signature of the root digest */
> > > +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> > > unsigned int salt_size;
> > > sector_t data_start; /* data offset in 512-byte sectors */
> > > sector_t hash_start; /* hash start in blocks */
> > > @@ -58,6 +61,9 @@ struct dm_verity {
> > > bool hash_failed:1; /* set if hash of any block failed */
> > > bool use_bh_wq:1; /* try to verify in BH wq before normal work-queue */
> > > unsigned int digest_size; /* digest size for the current hash algorithm */
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> > > + unsigned int sig_size; /* root digest signature size */
> > > +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> > > unsigned int hash_reqsize; /* the size of temporary space for crypto */
> > > enum verity_mode mode; /* mode for handling verification errors */
> > > unsigned int corrupted_errs;/* Number of errors for corrupted blocks */
Just nit-picking: I would move "unsigned int sig_size" up, after "u8
*root_digest_sig" entry.
Mikulas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-16 13:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-03 6:08 [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-08-10 15:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-08-13 17:54 ` Fan Wu
2024-08-14 1:53 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-14 18:23 ` Fan Wu
2024-08-15 19:11 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-08-10 20:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 11/20] block|lsm: Add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-08-08 22:38 ` Fan Wu
2024-08-15 19:19 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-16 13:35 ` Mikulas Patocka [this message]
2024-08-16 19:11 ` Fan Wu
2024-08-18 17:22 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-19 17:47 ` Fan Wu
2024-08-19 19:40 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs Fan Wu
2024-08-05 18:51 ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-08-03 6:08 ` [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information Fan Wu
2024-08-03 8:14 ` Paul Menzel
2024-08-06 20:54 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-07 4:48 ` Paul Menzel
2024-08-07 18:01 ` Fan Wu
2024-08-07 19:42 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-06 20:59 ` [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Paul Moore
2024-08-20 2:51 ` Paul Moore
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