From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Message-ID: <4963633D.2020306@dd19.de> Date: Tue, 06 Jan 2009 14:57:17 +0100 From: Alexander Morlang MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <83b3410f8105237b1e68c92065dec7d0.squirrel@wm.ddmesh.de> <200812172114.43427.neumann@cgws.de> <3f7879383457743711ac3341637ff601.squirrel@wm.ddmesh.de> <200812191115.20610.neumann@cgws.de> In-Reply-To: <200812191115.20610.neumann@cgws.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: [B.A.T.M.A.N.] dublicate HNAs / certificates Reply-To: The list for a Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Networking List-Id: The list for a Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Networking List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: The list for a Better Approach To Mobile Ad-hoc Networking -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Axel Neumann schrieb: > HI, > > I like brainstorming like this. > We wanted batmand (and especially its core routing algorithm) to be decentral > and simple. So no central point of control/failure and therefore also no HNA > server. Of course there are many potential attack vectors in a community mesh > and probably there will always be until you completely restrict the access. > Therefore IMHO the preferable security to be solved should be: > > - detect and protect against (usually accidental) misconfigurations like > duplicate addresses. > sure, a duplicate address is something the routingprotocoll has to detect and to react on, but: duplicate HNA are very importand and widely accepted in the internet community, they are called anycast and are a vital instrument in network design and deployment. as an example, anycast ist used for dns root servers, 6to4 tunnel and many other usecases. i am still not understanding why you are discussing about removing such important thing as anycast. anycast is a way to use distributed services, as you can announce an anycast address on every node, providing a specific service and packets will get routed to the nearest service provider. > - find mechanisms to limit the impact of denial of service or other attacks to > the local environment (neighborhood). > Gruss, Alex -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkljYz0ACgkQhx2RbV7T5aESngCgm0gopTcK+C17sHB29nz4jfsY 5JcAmgIS2EXnvL37QfFU/mAxnBRAQDMe =nJZR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----