Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 14/14] bpf: Report Policy helper and kfunc errors

[Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>]

On Sat, 2026-08-15 at 07:20 +0000, bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org wrote:
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > index 64c5c31ed230..ff028a8c1cca 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
> > @@ -2924,6 +2924,10 @@ static int add_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> > 
> >  		if (!env->bpf_capable) {
> >  			verbose(env, "loading/calling other bpf or kernel functions are allowed for CAP_BPF and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n");
> > +			bpf_diag_policy(
> > +				env, i, "BPF-to-BPF function call",
> > +				"loading or calling other BPF functions requires CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
> > +				"Load this program with the required capability, or avoid BPF-to-BPF function calls in unprivileged programs.");
> >  			return -EPERM;
> >  		}
> 
> Does the operation string here accurately describe both cases? This
> branch can fire for two types of instructions. The loop filter above
> checks:
> 
>     if (!bpf_pseudo_func(insn) && !bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
>             continue;
> 
> So it matches both actual BPF-to-BPF calls (bpf_pseudo_call) and
> ld_imm64 instructions that load a subprogram address for later use as
> a callback argument (bpf_pseudo_func).

Wording is fine.

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