From: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 1/4] bpf: add a sysctl to enable destructive bpf helpers
Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2022 10:32:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220711083220.2175036-2-asavkov@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220711083220.2175036-1-asavkov@redhat.com>
Add a kernel.destructive_bpf_enabled sysctl knob to allow enabling bpf
helpers that can be destructive to the system. One such helper,
bpf_panic(), is added later in the series.
Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 0edd7d2c0064..77972724bed7 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1641,6 +1641,7 @@ bpf_map_alloc_percpu(const struct bpf_map *map, size_t size, size_t align,
#endif
extern int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
+extern int sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled;
static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(void)
{
@@ -1926,6 +1927,11 @@ static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
}
+static inline bool destructive_ebpf_enabled(void)
+{
+ return sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled;
+}
+
#else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 7d5af5b99f0d..1ce6541d90e1 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(link_idr_lock);
int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly =
IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF) ? 2 : 0;
+int sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled __read_mostly = 0;
+
static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = {
#define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type)
#define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) \
@@ -5226,6 +5228,24 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return ret;
}
+static int bpf_destructive_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int ret, destructive_enable = *(int *)table->data;
+ struct ctl_table tmp = *table;
+
+ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ tmp.data = &destructive_enable;
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (write && !ret) {
+ *(int *)table->data = destructive_enable;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static struct ctl_table bpf_syscall_table[] = {
{
.procname = "unprivileged_bpf_disabled",
@@ -5236,6 +5256,15 @@ static struct ctl_table bpf_syscall_table[] = {
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
},
+ {
+ .procname = "destructive_bpf_enabled",
+ .data = &sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = bpf_destructive_handler,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
{
.procname = "bpf_stats_enabled",
.data = &bpf_stats_enabled_key.key,
--
2.35.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-11 8:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-11 8:32 [RFC PATCH bpf-next 0/4] bpf_panic() helper Artem Savkov
2022-07-11 8:32 ` Artem Savkov [this message]
2022-07-11 8:32 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: add BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD Artem Savkov
2022-07-11 10:56 ` Jiri Olsa
2022-07-11 11:48 ` Artem Savkov
2022-07-11 8:32 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper Artem Savkov
2022-07-11 10:42 ` Jiri Olsa
2022-07-12 17:53 ` Song Liu
2022-07-12 18:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-07-13 13:31 ` Artem Savkov
2022-07-13 22:20 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-07-15 12:52 ` Artem Savkov
2022-07-18 21:01 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-07-11 8:32 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: bpf_panic selftest Artem Savkov
2022-07-11 10:51 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 0/4] bpf_panic() helper Jiri Olsa
2022-08-01 13:58 ` Daniel Vacek
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