public inbox for bpf@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Dave Chinner" <dchinner@redhat.com>,
	"Nathan Lynch" <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	"Micah Morton" <mortonm@chromium.org>,
	"Frederick Lawler" <fred@cloudflare.com>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] capability: introduce new capable flag NODENYAUDIT
Date: Wed, 31 May 2023 09:07:34 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230531140734.GA515872@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230511142535.732324-1-cgzones@googlemail.com>

On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 04:25:24PM +0200, Christian Göttsche wrote:
> Introduce a new capable flag, CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT, to not generate
> an audit event if the requested capability is not granted.  This will be
> used in a new capable_any() functionality to reduce the number of
> necessary capable calls.
> 
> Handle the flag accordingly in AppArmor and SELinux.
> 
> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

> ---
>  include/linux/security.h       |  2 ++
>  security/apparmor/capability.c |  8 +++++---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c       | 14 ++++++++------
>  3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index e2734e9e44d5..629c775ec297 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ struct watch_notification;
>  #define CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT BIT(1)
>  /* If capable is being called by a setid function */
>  #define CAP_OPT_INSETID BIT(2)
> +/* If capable should audit the security request for authorized requests only */
> +#define CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT BIT(3)
>  
>  /* LSM Agnostic defines for security_sb_set_mnt_opts() flags */
>  #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS	1
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
> index 326a51838ef2..98120dd62ca7 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
> @@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
>   * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
>   * @profile: profile being enforced    (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
>   * @cap: capability to test if allowed
> - * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
> + * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT/CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT bit determines whether audit
> + *	record is generated
>   * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
>   *
>   * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
> @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
>  	else
>  		error = -EPERM;
>  
> -	if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) {
> +	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) || ((opts & CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT) && error)) {
>  		if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
>  			return error;
>  		/* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
> @@ -142,7 +143,8 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
>   * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
>   * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
>   * @cap: capability to be tested
> - * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
> + * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT/CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT bit determines whether audit
> + *	record is generated
>   *
>   * Look up capability in profile capability set.
>   *
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 79b4890e9936..0730edf2f5f1 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
>  	u16 sclass;
>  	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
>  	u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
> -	int rc;
> +	int rc, rc2;
>  
>  	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
>  	ad.u.cap = cap;
> @@ -1590,11 +1590,13 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
>  	}
>  
>  	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
> -	if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
> -		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
> -		if (rc2)
> -			return rc2;
> -	}
> +	if ((opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) || ((opts & CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT) && rc))
> +		return rc;

Hm, if the caller passes only CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT, and rc == 0, then
you will audit the allow.  Is that what you want, or did you want, or
did you want CAP_OPT_NODENYAUDIT to imply CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT?

> +
> +	rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
> +	if (rc2)
> +		return rc2;
> +
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.40.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-05-31 15:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-11 14:25 [PATCH v4 1/9] capability: introduce new capable flag NODENYAUDIT Christian Göttsche
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message Christian Göttsche
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] capability: use new capable_any functionality Christian Göttsche
2023-05-16 18:42   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] block: " Christian Göttsche
2023-05-11 15:35   ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-05-11 16:53     ` Christian Göttsche
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] drivers: " Christian Göttsche
2023-05-16  6:33   ` Alexander Gordeev
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] fs: " Christian Göttsche
2023-05-15  7:56   ` Christian Brauner
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] kernel: " Christian Göttsche
2023-05-15  7:54   ` Christian Brauner
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] bpf: " Christian Göttsche
2023-05-16 18:42   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] net: " Christian Göttsche
2023-05-22 13:56   ` Miquel Raynal
2023-05-11 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] Introduce capable_any() Christian Göttsche
2023-05-31 14:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2023-05-31 14:08   ` [PATCH v4 1/9] capability: introduce new capable flag NODENYAUDIT Serge E. Hallyn
2023-05-31 18:34     ` Christian Göttsche
2023-05-31 22:13       ` Paul Moore
2023-06-06 19:00         ` Serge E. Hallyn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20230531140734.GA515872@mail.hallyn.com \
    --to=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=cgzones@googlemail.com \
    --cc=dchinner@redhat.com \
    --cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
    --cc=fred@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=gnoack3000@gmail.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mortonm@chromium.org \
    --cc=nathanl@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox