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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
	daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org, renauld@google.com,
	Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@gmail.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2023 08:50:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309220848.010A198E7@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230922145505.4044003-3-kpsingh@kernel.org>

On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 04:55:02PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> These macros are a clever trick to determine a count of the number of
> LSMs that are enabled in the config to ascertain the maximum number of
> static calls that need to be configured per LSM hook.
> 
> Without this one would need to generate static calls for the total
> number of LSMs in the kernel (even if they are not compiled) times the
> number of LSM hooks which ends up being quite wasteful.
> 
> Suggested-by: Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@gmail.com>
> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>

Thought below, but regardless of result:

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>


> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_count.h | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 107 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/lsm_count.h
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_count.h b/include/linux/lsm_count.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..4d6dac6efb75
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_count.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H
> +#define __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H
> +
> +#include <linux/args.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +
> +/*
> + * Macros to count the number of LSMs enabled in the kernel at compile time.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * Capabilities is enabled when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled.
> + */
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> +#define CAPABILITIES_ENABLED 1,
> +#else
> +#define CAPABILITIES_ENABLED
> +#endif

We're in an #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY, so CAPABILITIES_ENABLED will always
be set. As such, we could leave off the trailing comma and list it
_last_ in the macro, and then ...

> +/*
> + *  There is a trailing comma that we need to be accounted for. This is done by
> + *  using a skipped argument in __COUNT_LSMS
> + */
> +#define __COUNT_LSMS(skipped_arg, args...) COUNT_ARGS(args)
> +#define COUNT_LSMS(args...) __COUNT_LSMS(args)

This wouldn't be needed...

> +
> +#define MAX_LSM_COUNT			\
> +	COUNT_LSMS(			\
> +		CAPABILITIES_ENABLED	\
> +		SELINUX_ENABLED		\
> +		SMACK_ENABLED		\
> +		APPARMOR_ENABLED	\
> +		TOMOYO_ENABLED		\
> +		YAMA_ENABLED		\
> +		LOADPIN_ENABLED		\
> +		LOCKDOWN_ENABLED	\
> +		BPF_LSM_ENABLED		\
> +		LANDLOCK_ENABLED)


	COUNT_ARGS(			\
		SELINUX_ENABLED		\
		SMACK_ENABLED		\
		...
		CAPABILITIES_ENABLED)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-22 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-22 14:55 [PATCH v4 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-22 14:55 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-22 14:55 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-22 15:50   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-09-22 16:07     ` KP Singh
2023-09-27 22:37       ` KP Singh
2023-09-22 14:55 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-23 14:52   ` kernel test robot
2023-09-27  5:26   ` kernel test robot
2023-09-22 14:55 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-09-22 14:55 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-22 15:50   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-22 15:51 ` [PATCH v4 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Kees Cook
2023-09-22 18:42 ` Mateusz Guzik
2023-09-23 16:16   ` KP Singh
2023-09-23 17:13     ` Mateusz Guzik
2023-09-23 17:15       ` Mateusz Guzik
2023-09-24  2:46         ` Kees Cook
2023-09-25 20:08           ` Mateusz Guzik
2023-09-25 22:02             ` Kees Cook

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