From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, paul@paul-moore.com,
keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
renauld@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 15:51:44 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231102005521.346983-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>
Hi KP,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on next-20231101]
[cannot apply to bpf-next/master bpf/master pcmoore-selinux/next linus/master v6.6 v6.6-rc7 v6.6-rc6 v6.6]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/KP-Singh/kernel-Add-helper-macros-for-loop-unrolling/20231102-085857
base: next-20231101
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102005521.346983-4-kpsingh%40kernel.org
patch subject: [PATCH v7 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
config: x86_64-randconfig-013-20231102 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231102/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-12) 11.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231102/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> security/security.c:157:1: error: Only string constants are supported as initializers for randomized structures with flexible arrays
157 | };
| ^
vim +157 security/security.c
136
137 /*
138 * Initialise a table of static calls for each LSM hook.
139 * DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL invocation above generates a key (STATIC_CALL_KEY)
140 * and a trampoline (STATIC_CALL_TRAMP) which are used to call
141 * __static_call_update when updating the static call.
142 */
143 struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init = {
144 #define INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME) \
145 (struct lsm_static_call) { \
146 .key = &STATIC_CALL_KEY(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM)), \
147 .trampoline = LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM), \
148 .active = &SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM), \
149 },
150 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
151 .NAME = { \
152 LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME) \
153 },
154 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
155 #undef LSM_HOOK
156 #undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL
> 157 };
158
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-02 7:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-02 0:55 [PATCH v7 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-11-02 7:51 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2023-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-11-02 2:26 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-10 22:19 ` KP Singh
2023-11-02 0:55 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-11-02 2:26 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-02 9:42 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-11-02 10:01 ` KP Singh
2023-11-02 10:30 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-11-02 10:48 ` KP Singh
2023-11-04 20:45 ` Kees Cook
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