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From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, paul@paul-moore.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
	daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	renauld@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 15:51:44 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231102005521.346983-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>

Hi KP,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on next-20231101]
[cannot apply to bpf-next/master bpf/master pcmoore-selinux/next linus/master v6.6 v6.6-rc7 v6.6-rc6 v6.6]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/KP-Singh/kernel-Add-helper-macros-for-loop-unrolling/20231102-085857
base:   next-20231101
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102005521.346983-4-kpsingh%40kernel.org
patch subject: [PATCH v7 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
config: x86_64-randconfig-013-20231102 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231102/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-12) 11.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231102/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311021532.iBwuZUZ0-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> security/security.c:157:1: error: Only string constants are supported as initializers for randomized structures with flexible arrays
     157 | };
         | ^


vim +157 security/security.c

   136	
   137	/*
   138	 * Initialise a table of static calls for each LSM hook.
   139	 * DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL invocation above generates a key (STATIC_CALL_KEY)
   140	 * and a trampoline (STATIC_CALL_TRAMP) which are used to call
   141	 * __static_call_update when updating the static call.
   142	 */
   143	struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init = {
   144	#define INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME)					\
   145		(struct lsm_static_call) {					\
   146			.key = &STATIC_CALL_KEY(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM)),	\
   147			.trampoline = LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM),		\
   148			.active = &SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM),		\
   149		},
   150	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...)				\
   151		.NAME = {							\
   152			LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME)		\
   153		},
   154	#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
   155	#undef LSM_HOOK
   156	#undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL
 > 157	};
   158	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-02  7:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-02  0:55 [PATCH v7 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-11-02  0:55 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-11-02  0:55 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-11-02  0:55 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-11-02  7:51   ` kernel test robot [this message]
2023-11-02  0:55 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-11-02  2:26   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-10 22:19     ` KP Singh
2023-11-02  0:55 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-11-02  2:26 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Andrii Nakryiko
2023-11-02  9:42 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-11-02 10:01   ` KP Singh
2023-11-02 10:30     ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-11-02 10:48       ` KP Singh
2023-11-04 20:45 ` Kees Cook

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