From: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com,
Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>,
syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 19:03:23 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240324230323.1097685-1-andreimatei1@gmail.com> (raw)
This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack
memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result
of overflowing its signed int representation (the respective function
arguments is sometimes converted from a u32 and u64 without any overflow
checking), and causes out-of-bounds array accesses in
check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the verification of a
program with such a non-sensical access size to fail.
This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly
removed in a833a17a.
This omission was found by syzkaller. I have failed to actually create a
program that triggers the issue (different other protections kick in for
different code paths). The syzkaller program is opaque and I failed to
fully decipher it; from what I gather, it declares a map with a huge
value type (0x80000001 bytes, which is INT_MAX + 2), and somehow calls a
helper (bpf_map_peek_elem), and manages to pass to it a pointer to the
stack while, at the same time, the size of values in this map is being
used as the "access size".
Fixes: a833a17a ("bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access")
Reported-by: syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQLORV5PT0iTAhRER+iLBTkByCYNBYyvBSgjN1T31K+gOw@mail.gmail.com/
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 0bfc0050db28..2019d6177969 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6701,6 +6701,8 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(env, min_off, state, type);
if (!err && max_off > 0)
err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */
+ if (!err && access_size < 0)
+ err = -EINVAL; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */
if (err) {
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
--
2.40.1
next reply other threads:[~2024-03-24 23:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-24 23:03 Andrei Matei [this message]
2024-03-25 1:07 ` [PATCH bpf] bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size Alexei Starovoitov
2024-03-26 2:56 ` Andrei Matei
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