From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev,
kernel-team@fb.com, yonghong.song@linux.dev, memxor@gmail.com,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC bpf-next 01/11] bpf: use branch predictions in opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches()
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 09:50:30 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241107175040.1659341-2-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241107175040.1659341-1-eddyz87@gmail.com>
Consider dead code elimination problem for program like below:
main:
1: r1 = 42
2: call <subprogram>;
3: exit
subprogram:
4: r0 = 1
5: if r1 != 42 goto +1
6: r0 = 2
7: exit;
Here verifier would visit every instruction and thus
bpf_insn_aux_data->seen flag would be set for both true (7)
and falltrhough (6) branches of conditional (5).
Hence opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches() will not replace
conditional (5) with unconditional jump.
To cover such cases:
- add two fields in struct bpf_insn_aux_data:
- true_branch_taken;
- false_branch_taken;
- adjust check_cond_jmp_op() to set the fields according to jump
predictions;
- handle these flags in the opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches():
- true_branch_taken && !false_branch_taken
always jump, replace instruction with 'goto off';
- !true_branch_taken && false_branch_taken
always falltrhough, replace with 'goto +0';
- true_branch_taken && false_branch_taken
jump and falltrhough are possible, don't change the instruction;
- !true_branch_taken && !false_branch_taken
neither jump, nor falltrhough are possible, if condition itself
must be a dead code (should be removed by opt_remove_dead_code).
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 +++-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 4513372c5bc8..ed4eacfd4db7 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -570,7 +570,9 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta;
u64 map_key_state; /* constant (32 bit) key tracking for maps */
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
- u32 seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */
+ bool seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */
+ bool true_branch_taken; /* for cond jumps, set if verifier ever took true branch */
+ bool false_branch_taken; /* for cond jumps, set if verifier ever took false branch */
bool sanitize_stack_spill; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */
bool zext_dst; /* this insn zero extends dst reg */
bool needs_zext; /* alu op needs to clear upper bits */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 7958d6ff6b73..3bae0bbc1da9 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -13265,7 +13265,7 @@ static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* rewrite/sanitize them.
*/
if (!vstate->speculative)
- env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt > 0;
}
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -15484,6 +15484,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[*insn_idx];
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs, *src_reg = NULL;
struct bpf_reg_state *eq_branch_regs;
@@ -15510,6 +15511,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
insn->off, insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ aux->true_branch_taken = true;
+ aux->false_branch_taken = true;
prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, idx);
/* branch out 'fallthrough' insn as a new state to explore */
@@ -15579,6 +15582,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
* execution.
*/
+ aux->true_branch_taken = true;
if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
!sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
*insn_idx))
@@ -15592,6 +15596,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
* simulation under speculative execution.
*/
+ aux->false_branch_taken = true;
if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
!sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
*insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
@@ -15602,6 +15607,9 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+ aux->true_branch_taken = true;
+ aux->false_branch_taken = true;
+
/* Push scalar registers sharing same ID to jump history,
* do this before creating 'other_branch', so that both
* 'this_branch' and 'other_branch' share this history
@@ -19288,7 +19296,7 @@ static void adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi;
- u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
+ bool old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
u32 prog_len;
int i;
@@ -19608,9 +19616,9 @@ static void opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (!insn_is_cond_jump(insn->code))
continue;
- if (!aux_data[i + 1].seen)
+ if (aux_data[i].true_branch_taken && !aux_data[i].false_branch_taken)
ja.off = insn->off;
- else if (!aux_data[i + 1 + insn->off].seen)
+ else if (!aux_data[i].true_branch_taken && aux_data[i].false_branch_taken)
ja.off = 0;
else
continue;
--
2.47.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-07 17:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-07 17:50 [RFC bpf-next 00/11] bpf: inlinable kfuncs for BPF Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2024-11-14 22:20 ` [RFC bpf-next 01/11] bpf: use branch predictions in opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches() Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-15 0:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-15 0:19 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-15 0:50 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-15 3:03 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-15 0:20 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-15 0:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-15 0:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-15 0:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-15 0:43 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-15 0:16 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 02/11] selftests/bpf: tests for opt_hard_wire_dead_code_branches() Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 03/11] bpf: shared BPF/native kfuncs Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-08 20:43 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-11-08 21:25 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-11 18:41 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-11-15 0:27 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 04/11] bpf: allow specifying inlinable kfuncs in modules Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 05/11] bpf: dynamic allocation for bpf_verifier_env->subprog_info Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 06/11] bpf: KERNEL_VALUE register type Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 07/11] bpf: instantiate inlinable kfuncs before verification Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 08/11] bpf: special rules for kernel function calls inside inlinable kfuncs Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 09/11] bpf: move selected dynptr kfuncs to inlinable_kfuncs.c Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 10/11] selftests/bpf: tests to verify handling of inlined kfuncs Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 22:04 ` Jeff Johnson
2024-11-07 22:08 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 22:19 ` Jeff Johnson
2024-11-07 23:00 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-07 17:50 ` [RFC bpf-next 11/11] selftests/bpf: dynptr_slice benchmark Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-08 20:41 ` [RFC bpf-next 00/11] bpf: inlinable kfuncs for BPF Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-11-08 23:01 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-11-11 18:42 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20241107175040.1659341-2-eddyz87@gmail.com \
--to=eddyz87@gmail.com \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=kernel-team@fb.com \
--cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
--cc=memxor@gmail.com \
--cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).