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From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org
Cc: daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev, kernel-team@fb.com,
	yonghong.song@linux.dev, eddyz87@gmail.com, laoar.shao@gmail.com,
	mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/1] selftests/bpf: more precise cpu_mitigations state detection
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 22:06:16 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250614050617.4161083-1-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)

If kernel executing selftests is configured with spectre mitigations
disabled, verification of unprivileged BPF won't emulate speculative
branches.

A number of selftests relies on speculative branches being visited.
In discussion [1] it was decided not to add additional tests
classification, but to execute unprivileged tests only when
mitigations are enabled.

Current mitigations status detection inspects /proc/cmdline,
which is not sufficient for some configurations.
This patch adds logic to also inspect /proc/config.gz and
/boot/config-$(uname -r).

Changelog:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250610215221.846484-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
v1 -> v2:
- added code to visit /boot/config-$(uname -r) (Yafang, Andrii)
- in case if config can't be read, print a warning and disable
  unprivileged tests execution.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231025031144.5508-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com/

Eduard Zingerman (1):
  selftests/bpf: more precise cpu_mitigations state detection

 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

-- 
2.47.1


             reply	other threads:[~2025-06-14  5:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-14  5:06 Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2025-06-14  5:06 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/1] selftests/bpf: more precise cpu_mitigations state detection Eduard Zingerman
2025-06-15  2:18   ` Yafang Shao
2025-06-16 21:13   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2025-06-16 21:27     ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-06-16 23:36       ` Andrii Nakryiko

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