From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev,
kernel-team@fb.com, yonghong.song@linux.dev,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v1 1/2] bpf: avoid jump misprediction for PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_UNTRUSTED
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 00:36:19 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250702073620.897517-1-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
Commit f2362a57aeff ("bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast()")
added a notion of PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED type.
This simultaneously introduced a bug in jump prediction logic for
situations like below:
p = bpf_rdonly_cast(..., 0);
if (p) a(); else b();
Here verifier would wrongly predict that else branch cannot be taken.
This happens because:
- Function reg_not_null() assumes that PTR_TO_MEM w/o PTR_MAYBE_NULL
flag cannot be zero.
- The call to bpf_rdonly_cast() returns a rdonly_untrusted_mem value
w/o PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag.
Tracking of PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag for untrusted PTR_TO_MEM does not make
sense, as the main purpose of the flag is to catch null pointer access
errors. Such errors are not possible on load of PTR_UNTRUSTED values
and verifier makes sure that PTR_UNTRUSTED can't be passed to helpers
or kfuncs.
Hence, modify reg_not_null() to assume that nullness of untrusted
PTR_TO_MEM is not known.
Fixes: f2362a57aeff ("bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast()")
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index a352b35be479..525a21dbcce3 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
(type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) ||
- type == PTR_TO_MEM ||
+ (type == PTR_TO_MEM && !(reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) ||
type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
}
--
2.49.0
next reply other threads:[~2025-07-02 7:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-02 7:36 Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2025-07-02 7:36 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/2] selftests/bpf: null checks for rdonly_untrusted_mem should be preserved Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-02 15:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 1/2] bpf: avoid jump misprediction for PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_UNTRUSTED patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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