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From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Indu Bhagat <indu.bhagat@oracle.com>,
	"Jose E. Marchesi" <jemarch@gnu.org>,
	Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	"Carlos O'Donell" <codonell@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 03/11] x86/uaccess: Add unsafe_copy_from_user() implementation
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2025 16:15:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250827202440.610489845@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20250827201548.448472904@kernel.org

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

Add an x86 implementation of unsafe_copy_from_user() similar to the
existing unsafe_copy_to_user().

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 3a7755c1a441..3caf02d0503e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ _label:									\
  * We want the unsafe accessors to always be inlined and use
  * the error labels - thus the macro games.
  */
-#define unsafe_copy_loop(dst, src, len, type, label)				\
+#define unsafe_copy_to_user_loop(dst, src, len, type, label)			\
 	while (len >= sizeof(type)) {						\
 		unsafe_put_user(*(type *)(src),(type __user *)(dst),label);	\
 		dst += sizeof(type);						\
@@ -607,15 +607,34 @@ _label:									\
 		len -= sizeof(type);						\
 	}
 
-#define unsafe_copy_to_user(_dst,_src,_len,label)			\
-do {									\
-	char __user *__ucu_dst = (_dst);				\
-	const char *__ucu_src = (_src);					\
-	size_t __ucu_len = (_len);					\
-	unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u64, label);	\
-	unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u32, label);	\
-	unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u16, label);	\
-	unsafe_copy_loop(__ucu_dst, __ucu_src, __ucu_len, u8, label);	\
+#define unsafe_copy_to_user(_dst, _src, _len, label)				\
+do {										\
+	void __user *__dst = (_dst);						\
+	const void *__src = (_src);						\
+	size_t __len = (_len);							\
+	unsafe_copy_to_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u64, label);		\
+	unsafe_copy_to_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u32, label);		\
+	unsafe_copy_to_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u16, label);		\
+	unsafe_copy_to_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u8,  label);		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define unsafe_copy_from_user_loop(dst, src, len, type, label)			\
+	while (len >= sizeof(type)) {						\
+		unsafe_get_user(*(type *)(dst), (type __user *)(src), label);	\
+		dst += sizeof(type);						\
+		src += sizeof(type);						\
+		len -= sizeof(type);						\
+	}
+
+#define unsafe_copy_from_user(_dst, _src, _len, label)				\
+do {										\
+	void *__dst = (_dst);							\
+	void __user *__src = (_src);						\
+	size_t __len = (_len);							\
+	unsafe_copy_from_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u64, label);		\
+	unsafe_copy_from_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u32, label);		\
+	unsafe_copy_from_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u16, label);		\
+	unsafe_copy_from_user_loop(__dst, __src, __len, u8,  label);		\
 } while (0)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT
-- 
2.50.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-27 20:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-27 20:15 [PATCH v10 00/11] unwind_deferred: Implement sframe handling Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 01/11] unwind_user/sframe: Add support for reading .sframe headers Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 02/11] unwind_user/sframe: Store sframe section data in per-mm maple tree Steven Rostedt
2025-08-28  1:46   ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-08-28 14:28     ` Steven Rostedt
2025-08-28 15:27       ` Liam R. Howlett
2025-08-28 15:51         ` Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 04/11] unwind_user/sframe: Add support for reading .sframe contents Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 05/11] unwind_user/sframe: Detect .sframe sections in executables Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 06/11] unwind_user/sframe: Wire up unwind_user to sframe Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 07/11] unwind_user/sframe/x86: Enable sframe unwinding on x86 Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 08/11] unwind_user/sframe: Remove .sframe section on detected corruption Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 09/11] unwind_user/sframe: Show file name in debug output Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 10/11] unwind_user/sframe: Add .sframe validation option Steven Rostedt
2025-08-27 20:15 ` [PATCH v10 11/11] [DO NOT APPLY]unwind_user/sframe: Add prctl() interface for registering .sframe sections Steven Rostedt

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