[PATCH V10 RESEND 2/2] bpf: fix stackmap overflow check in __bpf_get_stackid()

[Arnaud Lecomte <contact@arnaud-lcm.com>]

Syzkaller reported a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write in __bpf_get_stackid()
when copying stack trace data. The issue occurs when the perf trace
 contains more stack entries than the stack map bucket can hold,
 leading to an out-of-bounds write in the bucket's data array.

Reported-by: syzbot+c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c9b724fbb41cf2538b7b
Fixes: ee2a098851bf ("bpf: Adjust BPF stack helper functions to accommodate skip > 0")
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaud Lecomte <contact@arnaud-lcm.com>
---
Changes in v2:
 - Fixed max_depth names across get stack id

Changes in v4:
 - Removed unnecessary empty line in __bpf_get_stackid

Changes in v6:
 - Added back trace_len computation in __bpf_get_stackid

Changes in v7:
 - Removed usefull trace->nr assignation in bpf_get_stackid_pe
 - Added restoration of trace->nr for both kernel and user traces
   in bpf_get_stackid_pe

Changes in v9:
 - Fixed variable declarations in bpf_get_stackid_pe
 - Added the missing truncate of trace_nr in __bpf_getstackid

Changes in v10:
 - Remove not required trace->nr = nr_kernel; in bpf_get_stackid_pe

Link to v9:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250912233558.75076-1-contact@arnaud-lcm.com/
---
---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index 5e9ad050333c..2365541c81dd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 {
 	struct bpf_stack_map *smap = container_of(map, struct bpf_stack_map, map);
 	struct stack_map_bucket *bucket, *new_bucket, *old_bucket;
+	u32 hash, id, trace_nr, trace_len, i, max_depth;
 	u32 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
-	u32 hash, id, trace_nr, trace_len, i;
 	bool user = flags & BPF_F_USER_STACK;
 	u64 *ips;
 	bool hash_matches;
@@ -261,7 +261,8 @@ static long __bpf_get_stackid(struct bpf_map *map,
 		/* skipping more than usable stack trace */
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	trace_nr = trace->nr - skip;
+	max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(map->value_size, stack_map_data_size(map), flags);
+	trace_nr = min_t(u32, trace->nr - skip, max_depth - skip);
 	trace_len = trace_nr * sizeof(u64);
 	ips = trace->ip + skip;
 	hash = jhash2((u32 *)ips, trace_len / sizeof(u32), 0);
@@ -390,15 +391,11 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	nr_kernel = count_kernel_ip(trace);
+	__u64 nr = trace->nr; /* save original */
 
 	if (kernel) {
-		__u64 nr = trace->nr;
-
 		trace->nr = nr_kernel;
 		ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
-
-		/* restore nr */
-		trace->nr = nr;
 	} else { /* user */
 		u64 skip = flags & BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK;
 
@@ -409,6 +406,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_pe, struct bpf_perf_event_data_kern *, ctx,
 		flags = (flags & ~BPF_F_SKIP_FIELD_MASK) | skip;
 		ret = __bpf_get_stackid(map, trace, flags);
 	}
+
+	/* restore nr */
+	trace->nr = nr;
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.47.3