* [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/14] bpf: share several utility functions as internal API Eduard Zingerman
` (13 more replies)
0 siblings, 14 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
This patch set converts current dynamic stack slot liveness tracking
mechanism to a static data flow analysis. The result is used during
state pruning (clean_verifier_state): to zero out dead stack slots,
enabling more aggressive state equivalence and pruning. To improve
analysis precision live stack slot tracking is converted to 4-byte
granularity.
The key ideas and the bulk of the execution behind the series belong
to Alexei Starovoitov. I contributed to patch set integration
with existing liveness tracking mechanism.
Due to complexity of the changes the bisectability property of the
patch set is not preserved. Some selftests may fail between
intermediate patches of the series.
Analysis consists of two passes:
- A forward fixed-point analysis that tracks which frame's FP each
register value is derived from, and at what byte offset. This is
needed because a callee can receive a pointer to its caller's stack
frame (e.g. r1 = fp-16 at the call site), then do *(u64 *)(r1 + 0)
inside the callee - a cross-frame stack access that the callee's
local liveness must attribute to the caller's stack.
- A backward dataflow pass within each callee subprog that computes
live_in = (live_out \ def) ∪ use for both local and non-local
(ancestor) stack slots. The result of the analysis for callee is
propagated up to the callsite.
The key idea making such analysis possible is that limited and
conservative argument tracking pass is sufficient to recover most of
the offsets / stack pointer arguments.
Verification performance impact:
========= selftests: master vs patch-set =========
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF)
----------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ---------------
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 20363 22910 +2547 (+12.51%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 20450 23001 +2551 (+12.47%)
Total progs: 4490
Old success: 2856
New success: 2856
total_insns diff min: -80.26%
total_insns diff max: 12.51%
0 -> value: 0
value -> 0: 0
total_insns abs max old: 837,487
total_insns abs max new: 837,487
-85 .. -75 %: 1
-50 .. -40 %: 1
-35 .. -25 %: 1
-20 .. -10 %: 5
-10 .. 0 %: 18
0 .. 5 %: 4458
5 .. 15 %: 6
========= scx: master vs patch-set =========
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF)
-------------- --------- --------- --------- --------------
scx_qmap.bpf.o qmap_init 20230 19022 -1208 (-5.97%)
Total progs: 376
Old success: 351
New success: 351
total_insns diff min: -27.15%
total_insns diff max: 0.50%
0 -> value: 0
value -> 0: 0
total_insns abs max old: 236,251
total_insns abs max new: 233,669
-30 .. -20 %: 8
-20 .. -10 %: 2
-10 .. 0 %: 21
0 .. 5 %: 345
========= meta: master vs patch-set =========
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------- --------- --------- -----------------
...
third-party-scx-backports-6.9-1.0.13.1-scheds-rust-scx_layered-bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o layered_dispatch 13944 13104 -840 (-6.02%)
third-party-scx-backports-6.9-1.0.13.2-scheds-rust-scx_layered-bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o layered_dispatch 13944 13104 -840 (-6.02%)
third-party-scx-gefe21962f49a-__scx_layered_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o layered_dispatch 13825 12985 -840 (-6.08%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.16-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_enqueue 15501 13602 -1899 (-12.25%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.16-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_select_cpu 19814 16231 -3583 (-18.08%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.17-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_enqueue 15501 13602 -1899 (-12.25%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.17-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_select_cpu 19814 16231 -3583 (-18.08%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.17-__scx_layered_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o layered_dispatch 13976 13151 -825 (-5.90%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.18-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_dispatch 260628 237930 -22698 (-8.71%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.18-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_enqueue 13437 12225 -1212 (-9.02%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.18-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_select_cpu 17744 14730 -3014 (-16.99%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.19-10-6b1958477-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_cpu_offline 19676 18418 -1258 (-6.39%)
third-party-scx-v1.0.19-10-6b1958477-__scx_lavd_bpf_skel_genskel-bpf.bpf.o lavd_cpu_online 19674 18416 -1258 (-6.39%)
...
Total progs: 1540
Old success: 1492
New success: 1493
total_insns diff min: -75.83%
total_insns diff max: 73.60%
0 -> value: 0
value -> 0: 0
total_insns abs max old: 434,763
total_insns abs max new: 666,036
-80 .. -70 %: 2
-55 .. -50 %: 7
-50 .. -45 %: 10
-45 .. -35 %: 4
-35 .. -25 %: 4
-25 .. -20 %: 8
-20 .. -15 %: 15
-15 .. -10 %: 11
-10 .. -5 %: 45
-5 .. 0 %: 112
0 .. 5 %: 1316
5 .. 15 %: 2
15 .. 25 %: 1
25 .. 35 %: 1
55 .. 65 %: 1
70 .. 75 %: 1
========= cilium: master vs patch-set =========
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF)
--------------- --------------------------------- --------- --------- ----------------
bpf_host.o cil_host_policy 45801 32027 -13774 (-30.07%)
bpf_host.o cil_to_netdev 100287 69042 -31245 (-31.16%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv4_cont_from_host 60911 20962 -39949 (-65.59%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv4_from_netdev 59735 33155 -26580 (-44.50%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_cont_from_host 23529 17036 -6493 (-27.60%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_from_host 11906 10303 -1603 (-13.46%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_from_netdev 29778 23743 -6035 (-20.27%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_snat_fwd_ipv4 61616 67463 +5847 (+9.49%)
bpf_host.o tail_handle_snat_fwd_ipv6 30802 22806 -7996 (-25.96%)
bpf_host.o tail_ipv4_host_policy_ingress 20017 10528 -9489 (-47.40%)
bpf_host.o tail_ipv6_host_policy_ingress 20693 17301 -3392 (-16.39%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 16455 13684 -2771 (-16.84%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv4 36174 20080 -16094 (-44.49%)
bpf_host.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 48039 25779 -22260 (-46.34%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_ipv4 13765 10001 -3764 (-27.34%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_ipv4_cont 96891 68725 -28166 (-29.07%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_ipv6_cont 21809 17697 -4112 (-18.85%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_ipv4_ct_egress 15949 17746 +1797 (+11.27%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 16183 13432 -2751 (-17.00%)
bpf_lxc.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv4 18532 10697 -7835 (-42.28%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_handle_inter_cluster_revsnat 15708 11099 -4609 (-29.34%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_handle_ipv4 105672 76108 -29564 (-27.98%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_handle_ipv6 15733 19944 +4211 (+26.77%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_handle_snat_fwd_ipv4 19327 26468 +7141 (+36.95%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_handle_snat_fwd_ipv6 20817 12556 -8261 (-39.68%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 16175 12184 -3991 (-24.67%)
bpf_overlay.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv4 20760 11951 -8809 (-42.43%)
bpf_wireguard.o tail_handle_ipv4 27466 28909 +1443 (+5.25%)
bpf_wireguard.o tail_nodeport_nat_egress_ipv4 15937 12094 -3843 (-24.11%)
bpf_wireguard.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv4 20624 11993 -8631 (-41.85%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 42673 60855 +18182 (+42.61%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv6 87903 108585 +20682 (+23.53%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv4 28787 20991 -7796 (-27.08%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6 207593 152012 -55581 (-26.77%)
Total progs: 134
Old success: 134
New success: 134
total_insns diff min: -65.59%
total_insns diff max: 42.61%
0 -> value: 0
value -> 0: 0
total_insns abs max old: 207,593
total_insns abs max new: 152,012
-70 .. -60 %: 1
-50 .. -40 %: 7
-40 .. -30 %: 9
-30 .. -25 %: 9
-25 .. -20 %: 12
-20 .. -15 %: 7
-15 .. -10 %: 14
-10 .. -5 %: 6
-5 .. 0 %: 16
0 .. 5 %: 42
5 .. 15 %: 5
15 .. 25 %: 2
25 .. 35 %: 2
35 .. 45 %: 2
---
Alexei Starovoitov (5):
bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks
selftests/bpf: update existing tests due to liveness changes
selftests/bpf: adjust verifier_log buffers
selftests/bpf: add new tests for static stack liveness analysis
bpf: poison dead stack slots
Eduard Zingerman (9):
bpf: share several utility functions as internal API
bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info
bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity
bpf: 4-byte precise clean_verifier_state
bpf: prepare bpf_liveness api for use by static analysis pass
bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis
bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks
bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances
bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 68 +-
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 1981 ++++++++++++++----
kernel/bpf/log.c | 9 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 259 ++-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier_log.c | 6 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c | 6 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_align.c | 10 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_mod_bounds.c | 18 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 2191 +++++++++++++++++++-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c | 26 +-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c | 10 +-
.../bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c | 8 +-
13 files changed, 3978 insertions(+), 615 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 6a14beefab457f267b8cedc6ac697a9562ec1244
change-id: 20260408-patch-set-29efd8c0f810
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 01/14] bpf: share several utility functions as internal API
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/14] bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info Eduard Zingerman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
Namely:
- bpf_subprog_is_global
- bpf_vlog_alignment
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/log.c | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++-----
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 36bfd96d4563087209d73dfcfe43786df0184256..15f7f9f35be98f6f30c46cdf03cf5c0249a8ac38 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -1121,12 +1121,14 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifie
u32 frameno, bool print_all);
void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate,
u32 frameno);
+u32 bpf_vlog_alignment(u32 pos);
struct bpf_subprog_info *bpf_find_containing_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off);
int bpf_jmp_offset(struct bpf_insn *insn);
struct bpf_iarray *bpf_insn_successors(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 idx);
void bpf_fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask);
bool bpf_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
+bool bpf_subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog);
int bpf_find_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off);
int bpf_compute_const_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/log.c b/kernel/bpf/log.c
index 37d72b0521920daf6f3274ad77d055c8b3aafa1b..f0902ecb7df69b6d43deaf808b4c0f00cc3438f2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/log.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/log.c
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifie
mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
}
-static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos)
+u32 bpf_vlog_alignment(u32 pos)
{
return round_up(max(pos + BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT / 2, BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT),
BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT) - pos - 1;
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifier_st
if (env->prev_log_pos && env->prev_log_pos == env->log.end_pos) {
/* remove new line character */
bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->prev_log_pos - 1);
- verbose(env, "%*c;", vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_pos), ' ');
+ verbose(env, "%*c;", bpf_vlog_alignment(env->prev_insn_print_pos), ' ');
} else {
verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 84699a428077d66f68203cdcccddee5f8207cd34..dd81cfbad680712e4d871163b8ee179fafe8587c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
return rec;
}
-static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
+bool bpf_subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
{
struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux;
@@ -4610,7 +4610,7 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
if (subprog < 0)
return -EFAULT;
- if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
+ if (bpf_subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
/* check that jump history doesn't have any
* extra instructions from subprog; the next
* instruction after call to global subprog
@@ -6971,7 +6971,7 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
if (subprog[idx].has_tail_call)
tail_call_reachable = true;
- frame = subprog_is_global(env, idx) ? 0 : frame + 1;
+ frame = bpf_subprog_is_global(env, idx) ? 0 : frame + 1;
if (frame >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES) {
verbose(env, "the call stack of %d frames is too deep !\n",
frame);
@@ -11040,7 +11040,7 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs);
if (err == -EFAULT)
return err;
- if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
+ if (bpf_subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
const char *sub_name = subprog_name(env, subprog);
if (env->cur_state->active_locks) {
@@ -25186,7 +25186,7 @@ static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
again:
new_cnt = 0;
for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
- if (!subprog_is_global(env, i))
+ if (!bpf_subprog_is_global(env, i))
continue;
sub_aux = subprog_aux(env, i);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 02/14] bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/14] bpf: share several utility functions as internal API Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/14] bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks Eduard Zingerman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
Subprogram name can be computed from function info and BTF, but it is
convenient to have the name readily available for logging purposes.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 +
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 15f7f9f35be98f6f30c46cdf03cf5c0249a8ac38..410939d7b3253f62c18b85072c921395709d7a3a 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ enum priv_stack_mode {
};
struct bpf_subprog_info {
+ const char *name;
/* 'start' has to be the first field otherwise find_subprog() won't work */
u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index dd81cfbad680712e4d871163b8ee179fafe8587c..c1da28de869cbb395dee7d7f700d90113af9f433 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3635,9 +3635,12 @@ static int add_kfunc_in_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
+ struct bpf_func_info *func_info = env->prog->aux->func_info;
struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len, ex_cb_insn;
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
+ struct btf *btf = env->prog->aux->btf;
+ const struct btf_type *t;
/* Add entry function. */
ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
@@ -3689,9 +3692,16 @@ static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
*/
subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
+ if (func_info) {
+ for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
+ t = btf_type_by_id(btf, func_info[i].type_id);
+ subprog[i].name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
+ }
+ }
+
if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
- verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
+ verbose(env, "func#%d @%d %s\n", i, subprog[i].start, subprog[i].name ?: "");
return 0;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 03/14] bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/14] bpf: share several utility functions as internal API Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/14] bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 3:12 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/14] bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity Eduard Zingerman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add helper functions for manipulating u64[2] bitmasks that represent
4-byte stack slot liveness. The 512-byte BPF stack is divided into
128 4-byte slots, requiring 128 bits (two u64s) to track.
These will be used by the static stack liveness analysis in the
next commit.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 97 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 410939d7b3253f62c18b85072c921395709d7a3a..64361cb49073935f0c218f1c4d7807cf113f8aa3 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -224,6 +224,103 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
+/* 4-byte stack slot granularity for liveness analysis */
+#define BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE 4
+#define STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) /* 128 */
+
+typedef struct {
+ u64 v[2];
+} spis_t;
+
+#define SPIS_ZERO ((spis_t){})
+#define SPIS_ALL ((spis_t){{ U64_MAX, U64_MAX }})
+
+static inline bool spis_is_zero(spis_t s)
+{
+ return s.v[0] == 0 && s.v[1] == 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool spis_equal(spis_t a, spis_t b)
+{
+ return a.v[0] == b.v[0] && a.v[1] == b.v[1];
+}
+
+static inline spis_t spis_or(spis_t a, spis_t b)
+{
+ return (spis_t){{ a.v[0] | b.v[0], a.v[1] | b.v[1] }};
+}
+
+static inline spis_t spis_and(spis_t a, spis_t b)
+{
+ return (spis_t){{ a.v[0] & b.v[0], a.v[1] & b.v[1] }};
+}
+
+static inline spis_t spis_xor(spis_t a, spis_t b)
+{
+ return (spis_t){{ a.v[0] ^ b.v[0], a.v[1] ^ b.v[1] }};
+}
+
+static inline spis_t spis_not(spis_t s)
+{
+ return (spis_t){{ ~s.v[0], ~s.v[1] }};
+}
+
+static inline void spis_set_bit(spis_t *s, u32 slot)
+{
+ s->v[slot / 64] |= BIT_ULL(slot % 64);
+}
+
+static inline bool spis_test_bit(spis_t s, u32 slot)
+{
+ return s.v[slot / 64] & BIT_ULL(slot % 64);
+}
+
+static inline void spis_or_range(spis_t *mask, u32 lo, u32 hi)
+{
+ u32 w;
+
+ for (w = lo; w <= hi && w < STACK_SLOTS; w++)
+ mask->v[w / 64] |= BIT_ULL(w % 64);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a mask with both 4-byte sub-slots of an 8-byte SPI set.
+ * Each 8-byte SPI maps to two consecutive 4-byte stack slots:
+ * spi -> slots [spi*2, spi*2+1]
+ */
+static inline spis_t spis_single_slot(u32 spi)
+{
+ spis_t m = SPIS_ZERO;
+
+ spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2);
+ spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2 + 1);
+ return m;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a mask with only the MSB (higher-addressed) 4-byte half
+ * of an 8-byte SPI set. This is sub-slot spi*2+1.
+ */
+static inline spis_t spis_msb_half_slot(u32 spi)
+{
+ spis_t m = SPIS_ZERO;
+
+ spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2 + 1);
+ return m;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a mask with only the LSB (lower-addressed) 4-byte half
+ * of an 8-byte SPI set. This is sub-slot spi*2.
+ */
+static inline spis_t spis_lsb_half_slot(u32 spi)
+{
+ spis_t m = SPIS_ZERO;
+
+ spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2);
+ return m;
+}
+
#define BPF_REGMASK_ARGS ((1 << BPF_REG_1) | (1 << BPF_REG_2) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_3) | (1 << BPF_REG_4) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_5))
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 04/14] bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/14] bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/14] bpf: 4-byte precise clean_verifier_state Eduard Zingerman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
Convert liveness bitmask type from u64 to spis_t, doubling the number
of trackable stack slots from 64 to 128 to support 4-byte granularity.
Each 8-byte SPI now maps to two consecutive 4-byte sub-slots in the
bitmask: spi*2 for the LSB (lower-addressed) half and spi*2+1 for the
MSB (higher-addressed) half. Three helpers encode this mapping:
- spis_single_slot(spi): sets both halves (full 8-byte slot)
- spis_lsb_half_slot(spi): sets only spi*2
- spis_msb_half_slot(spi): sets only spi*2+1
In verifier.c, check_stack_write_fixed_off() now reports 4-byte
aligned writes of 4-byte writes as half-slot marks and 8-byte aligned
8-byte writes as lsb + msb slots. Similar logic applied in
check_stack_read_fixed_off().
Queries (is_live_before) are not yet migrated to half-slot
granularity.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 +-
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 51 +++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 64361cb49073935f0c218f1c4d7807cf113f8aa3..e1b004081b69de389a872fa33595d29aa7758960 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -1248,8 +1248,8 @@ s64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int bpf_stack_liveness_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
void bpf_stack_liveness_free(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
int bpf_update_live_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
-int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 insn_idx, u64 mask);
-void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u64 mask);
+int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask);
+void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, spis_t mask);
int bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx);
int bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index 998986853c61babd446e3a562c7664f7e9459de9..9e36ea5f2eec88587749b316bebdfc92dfa33e8d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@ struct callchain {
};
struct per_frame_masks {
- u64 may_read; /* stack slots that may be read by this instruction */
- u64 must_write; /* stack slots written by this instruction */
- u64 must_write_acc; /* stack slots written by this instruction and its successors */
- u64 live_before; /* stack slots that may be read by this insn and its successors */
+ spis_t may_read; /* stack slots that may be read by this instruction */
+ spis_t must_write; /* stack slots written by this instruction */
+ spis_t must_write_acc; /* stack slots written by this instruction and its successors */
+ spis_t live_before; /* stack slots that may be read by this insn and its successors */
};
/*
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ struct bpf_liveness {
* Below fields are used to accumulate stack write marks for instruction at
* @write_insn_idx before submitting the marks to @cur_instance.
*/
- u64 write_masks_acc[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
+ spis_t write_masks_acc[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
u32 write_insn_idx;
};
@@ -299,23 +299,24 @@ static int ensure_cur_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* Accumulate may_read masks for @frame at @insn_idx */
static int mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, u64 mask)
+ struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
{
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
- u64 new_may_read;
+ spis_t new_may_read;
masks = alloc_frame_masks(env, instance, frame, insn_idx);
if (IS_ERR(masks))
return PTR_ERR(masks);
- new_may_read = masks->may_read | mask;
- if (new_may_read != masks->may_read &&
- ((new_may_read | masks->live_before) != masks->live_before))
+ new_may_read = spis_or(masks->may_read, mask);
+ if (!spis_equal(new_may_read, masks->may_read) &&
+ !spis_equal(spis_or(new_may_read, masks->live_before),
+ masks->live_before))
instance->updated = true;
- masks->may_read |= mask;
+ masks->may_read = spis_or(masks->may_read, mask);
return 0;
}
-int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, u64 mask)
+int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
{
int err;
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ static void reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
liveness->write_insn_idx = insn_idx;
for (i = 0; i <= instance->callchain.curframe; i++)
- liveness->write_masks_acc[i] = 0;
+ liveness->write_masks_acc[i] = SPIS_ZERO;
}
int bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx)
@@ -348,18 +349,18 @@ int bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx)
return 0;
}
-void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, u64 mask)
+void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, spis_t mask)
{
- env->liveness->write_masks_acc[frame] |= mask;
+ env->liveness->write_masks_acc[frame] = spis_or(env->liveness->write_masks_acc[frame], mask);
}
static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct func_instance *instance)
{
struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
- u32 idx, frame, curframe, old_must_write;
+ u32 idx, frame, curframe;
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
- u64 mask;
+ spis_t mask, old_must_write, dropped;
if (!instance)
return 0;
@@ -369,7 +370,7 @@ static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (frame = 0; frame <= curframe; frame++) {
mask = liveness->write_masks_acc[frame];
/* avoid allocating frames for zero masks */
- if (mask == 0 && !instance->must_write_set[idx])
+ if (spis_is_zero(mask) && !instance->must_write_set[idx])
continue;
masks = alloc_frame_masks(env, instance, frame, liveness->write_insn_idx);
if (IS_ERR(masks))
@@ -380,12 +381,14 @@ static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* to @mask. Otherwise take intersection with the previous value.
*/
if (instance->must_write_set[idx])
- mask &= old_must_write;
- if (old_must_write != mask) {
+ mask = spis_and(mask, old_must_write);
+ if (!spis_equal(old_must_write, mask)) {
masks->must_write = mask;
instance->updated = true;
}
- if (old_must_write & ~mask)
+ /* dropped = old_must_write & ~mask */
+ dropped = spis_and(old_must_write, spis_not(mask));
+ if (!spis_is_zero(dropped))
instance->must_write_dropped = true;
}
instance->must_write_set[idx] = true;
@@ -415,22 +418,52 @@ static char *fmt_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct callchain *callc
return env->tmp_str_buf;
}
+/*
+ * When both halves of an 8-byte SPI are set, print as "-8","-16",...
+ * When only one half is set, print as "-4h","-8h",...
+ */
+static void bpf_fmt_spis_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, spis_t spis)
+{
+ bool first = true;
+ int spi, n;
+
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+
+ for (spi = 0; spi < STACK_SLOTS / 2 && buf_sz > 0; spi++) {
+ bool lo = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2);
+ bool hi = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 1);
+
+ if (!lo && !hi)
+ continue;
+ n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d%s",
+ first ? "" : ",",
+ -(spi + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE + (lo && !hi ? BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE : 0),
+ lo && hi ? "" : "h");
+ first = false;
+ buf += n;
+ buf_sz -= n;
+ }
+}
+
static void log_mask_change(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct callchain *callchain,
- char *pfx, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, u64 old, u64 new)
+ char *pfx, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx,
+ spis_t old, spis_t new)
{
- u64 changed_bits = old ^ new;
- u64 new_ones = new & changed_bits;
- u64 new_zeros = ~new & changed_bits;
+ spis_t changed_bits, new_ones, new_zeros;
+
+ changed_bits = spis_xor(old, new);
+ new_ones = spis_and(new, changed_bits);
+ new_zeros = spis_and(spis_not(new), changed_bits);
- if (!changed_bits)
+ if (spis_is_zero(changed_bits))
return;
bpf_log(&env->log, "%s frame %d insn %d ", fmt_callchain(env, callchain), frame, insn_idx);
- if (new_ones) {
- bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_ones);
+ if (!spis_is_zero(new_ones)) {
+ bpf_fmt_spis_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_ones);
bpf_log(&env->log, "+%s %s ", pfx, env->tmp_str_buf);
}
- if (new_zeros) {
- bpf_fmt_stack_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_zeros);
+ if (!spis_is_zero(new_zeros)) {
+ bpf_fmt_spis_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_zeros);
bpf_log(&env->log, "-%s %s", pfx, env->tmp_str_buf);
}
bpf_log(&env->log, "\n");
@@ -562,7 +595,7 @@ static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
- u64 new_before, new_after, must_write_acc;
+ spis_t new_before, new_after, must_write_acc;
struct per_frame_masks *insn, *succ_insn;
struct bpf_iarray *succ;
u32 s;
@@ -574,28 +607,30 @@ static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
changed = false;
insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
- new_before = 0;
- new_after = 0;
+ new_before = SPIS_ZERO;
+ new_after = SPIS_ZERO;
/*
* New "must_write_acc" is an intersection of all "must_write_acc"
* of successors plus all "must_write" slots of instruction itself.
*/
- must_write_acc = U64_MAX;
+ must_write_acc = SPIS_ALL;
for (s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) {
succ_insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, succ->items[s]);
- new_after |= succ_insn->live_before;
- must_write_acc &= succ_insn->must_write_acc;
+ new_after = spis_or(new_after, succ_insn->live_before);
+ must_write_acc = spis_and(must_write_acc, succ_insn->must_write_acc);
}
- must_write_acc |= insn->must_write;
+ must_write_acc = spis_or(must_write_acc, insn->must_write);
/*
* New "live_before" is a union of all "live_before" of successors
* minus slots written by instruction plus slots read by instruction.
+ * new_before = (new_after & ~insn->must_write) | insn->may_read
*/
- new_before = (new_after & ~insn->must_write) | insn->may_read;
- changed |= new_before != insn->live_before;
- changed |= must_write_acc != insn->must_write_acc;
+ new_before = spis_or(spis_and(new_after, spis_not(insn->must_write)),
+ insn->may_read);
+ changed |= !spis_equal(new_before, insn->live_before);
+ changed |= !spis_equal(must_write_acc, insn->must_write_acc);
if (unlikely(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) &&
- (insn->may_read || insn->must_write ||
+ (!spis_is_zero(insn->may_read) || !spis_is_zero(insn->must_write) ||
insn_idx == callchain_subprog_start(&instance->callchain) ||
aux[insn_idx].prune_point)) {
log_mask_change(env, &instance->callchain, "live",
@@ -631,7 +666,7 @@ static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *i
for (i = 0; i < instance->insn_cnt; i++) {
insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, this_subprog_start + i);
- insn->must_write_acc = 0;
+ insn->must_write_acc = SPIS_ZERO;
}
}
}
@@ -702,7 +737,8 @@ static bool is_live_before(struct func_instance *instance, u32 insn_idx, u32 fra
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
masks = get_frame_masks(instance, frameno, insn_idx);
- return masks && (masks->live_before & BIT(spi));
+ return masks && (spis_test_bit(masks->live_before, spi * 2) ||
+ spis_test_bit(masks->live_before, spi * 2 + 1));
}
int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index c1da28de869cbb395dee7d7f700d90113af9f433..6e852d461289197276cb50b54fc6cf307de04962 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -828,7 +828,8 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_
state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
}
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - 1));
return 0;
}
@@ -845,7 +846,8 @@ static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - 1));
}
static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
@@ -963,7 +965,8 @@ static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - 1) | BIT(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - 1));
return 0;
}
@@ -1090,7 +1093,7 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - i));
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
}
@@ -1119,7 +1122,7 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi - i));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - i));
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
}
@@ -1209,7 +1212,7 @@ static int mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
slot = &state->stack[spi];
st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
__mark_reg_known_zero(st);
st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */
st->ref_obj_id = id;
@@ -1265,7 +1268,7 @@ static int unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_r
__mark_reg_not_init(env, st);
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, BIT(spi));
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
@@ -3856,7 +3859,8 @@ static int mark_stack_slot_obj_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg
int err, i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
- err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi - i));
+ err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx,
+ spis_single_slot(spi - i));
if (err)
return err;
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
@@ -5409,15 +5413,14 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return err;
if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_REG_SIZE) {
- /* only mark the slot as written if all 8 bytes were written
- * otherwise read propagation may incorrectly stop too soon
- * when stack slots are partially written.
- * This heuristic means that read propagation will be
- * conservative, since it will add reg_live_read marks
- * to stack slots all the way to first state when programs
- * writes+reads less than 8 bytes
- */
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, BIT(spi));
+ /* 8-byte aligned, 8-byte write */
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
+ } else if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) {
+ /* 8-byte aligned, 4-byte write */
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_lsb_half_slot(spi));
+ } else if (!(off % BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) {
+ /* 4-byte aligned, 4-byte write */
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_msb_half_slot(spi));
}
check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, off);
@@ -5676,6 +5679,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
u8 *stype, type;
int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(reg_state->frameno, spi);
+ spis_t mask;
int err;
stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
@@ -5683,7 +5687,15 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, env->insn_idx, off);
- err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg_state->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi));
+ if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE)
+ /* 8-byte aligned, 4-byte read */
+ mask = spis_lsb_half_slot(spi);
+ else if (!(off % BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE)
+ /* 4-byte aligned, 4-byte read */
+ mask = spis_msb_half_slot(spi);
+ else
+ mask = spis_single_slot(spi);
+ err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg_state->frameno, env->insn_idx, mask);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -8480,7 +8492,8 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
* the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
*/
- err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx, BIT(spi));
+ err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx,
+ spis_single_slot(spi));
if (err)
return err;
/* We do not call bpf_mark_stack_write(), as we can not
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 05/14] bpf: 4-byte precise clean_verifier_state
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/14] bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/14] bpf: prepare bpf_liveness api for use by static analysis pass Eduard Zingerman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87,
Alexei Starovoitov
Migrate clean_verifier_state() and its liveness queries from 8-byte
SPI granularity to 4-byte half-slot granularity.
In __clean_func_state(), each SPI is cleaned in two independent
halves:
- half_spi 2*i (lo): slot_type[0..3]
- half_spi 2*i+1 (hi): slot_type[4..7]
Slot types STACK_DYNPTR, STACK_ITER and STACK_IRQ_FLAG are never
cleaned, as their slot type markers are required by
destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(), is_iter_reg_valid_uninit() and
is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit() for correctness.
When only the hi half is dead, spilled_ptr metadata is destroyed and
the lo half's STACK_SPILL bytes are downgraded to STACK_MISC or
STACK_ZERO. When only the lo half is dead, spilled_ptr is preserved
because the hi half may still need it for state comparison.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 14 +++++-----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index 9e36ea5f2eec88587749b316bebdfc92dfa33e8d..e2697cd9ae27f95970a7a495a362c371d27922ed 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -732,13 +732,12 @@ int bpf_update_live_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return 0;
}
-static bool is_live_before(struct func_instance *instance, u32 insn_idx, u32 frameno, u32 spi)
+static bool is_live_before(struct func_instance *instance, u32 insn_idx, u32 frameno, u32 half_spi)
{
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
masks = get_frame_masks(instance, frameno, insn_idx);
- return masks && (spis_test_bit(masks->live_before, spi * 2) ||
- spis_test_bit(masks->live_before, spi * 2 + 1));
+ return masks && spis_test_bit(masks->live_before, half_spi);
}
int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
@@ -759,7 +758,7 @@ int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_
return 0;
}
-bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 spi)
+bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 half_spi)
{
/*
* Slot is alive if it is read before q->st->insn_idx in current func instance,
@@ -773,15 +772,16 @@ bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 spi)
bool alive;
curframe_instance = q->instances[q->curframe];
- if (is_live_before(curframe_instance, q->insn_idx, frameno, spi))
+ alive = is_live_before(curframe_instance, q->insn_idx, frameno, half_spi);
+ if (alive)
return true;
for (i = frameno; i < q->curframe; i++) {
callsite = curframe_instance->callchain.callsites[i];
instance = q->instances[i];
alive = bpf_calls_callback(env, callsite)
- ? is_live_before(instance, callsite, frameno, spi)
- : is_live_before(instance, callsite + 1, frameno, spi);
+ ? is_live_before(instance, callsite, frameno, half_spi)
+ : is_live_before(instance, callsite + 1, frameno, half_spi);
if (alive)
return true;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 6e852d461289197276cb50b54fc6cf307de04962..f971c89c77fc000a1e7b2d38fd8ed784cfb562ec 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -20068,11 +20068,10 @@ static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap);
}
-static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_func_state *st,
- u32 ip)
+static void __clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_func_state *st,
+ u16 live_regs, int frame)
{
- u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[ip].live_regs_before;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
@@ -20084,10 +20083,61 @@ static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->regs[i]);
}
+ /*
+ * Clean dead 4-byte halves within each SPI independently.
+ * half_spi 2*i → lower half: slot_type[0..3] (closer to FP)
+ * half_spi 2*i+1 → upper half: slot_type[4..7] (farther from FP)
+ */
for (i = 0; i < st->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
- if (!bpf_stack_slot_alive(env, st->frameno, i)) {
- __mark_reg_not_init(env, &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr);
- for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
+ bool lo_live = bpf_stack_slot_alive(env, frame, i * 2);
+ bool hi_live = bpf_stack_slot_alive(env, frame, i * 2 + 1);
+
+ if (!hi_live || !lo_live) {
+ int start = !lo_live ? 0 : BPF_REG_SIZE / 2;
+ int end = !hi_live ? BPF_REG_SIZE : BPF_REG_SIZE / 2;
+ u8 stype = st->stack[i].slot_type[7];
+
+ /*
+ * Don't clearn special slots.
+ * destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot() needs STACK_DYNPTR to
+ * detect overwrites and invalidate associated data slices.
+ * is_iter_reg_valid_uninit() and is_irq_flag_reg_valid_uninit()
+ * check for their respective slot types to detect double-create.
+ */
+ if (stype == STACK_DYNPTR || stype == STACK_ITER ||
+ stype == STACK_IRQ_FLAG)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Only destroy spilled_ptr when hi half is dead.
+ * If hi half is still live with STACK_SPILL, the
+ * spilled_ptr metadata is needed for correct state
+ * comparison in stacksafe().
+ * is_spilled_reg() is using slot_type[7], but
+ * is_spilled_scalar_after() check either slot_type[0] or [4]
+ */
+ if (!hi_live) {
+ struct bpf_reg_state *spill = &st->stack[i].spilled_ptr;
+
+ if (lo_live && stype == STACK_SPILL) {
+ u8 val = STACK_MISC;
+
+ /*
+ * 8 byte spill of scalar 0 where half slot is dead
+ * should become STACK_ZERO in lo 4 bytes.
+ */
+ if (register_is_null(spill))
+ val = STACK_ZERO;
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+ u8 *t = &st->stack[i].slot_type[j];
+
+ if (*t == STACK_SPILL)
+ *t = val;
+ }
+ }
+ __mark_reg_not_init(env, spill);
+ }
+ for (j = start; j < end; j++)
st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
}
}
@@ -20096,13 +20146,16 @@ static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
{
- int i, ip;
+ int i;
- bpf_live_stack_query_init(env, st);
- st->cleaned = true;
+ if (env->cur_state != st)
+ st->cleaned = true;
+ bpf_live_stack_query_init(env, st); // TODO: return err
for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) {
- ip = frame_insn_idx(st, i);
- clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i], ip);
+ u32 ip = frame_insn_idx(st, i);
+ u16 live_regs = env->insn_aux_data[ip].live_regs_before;
+
+ __clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i], live_regs, i);
}
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 06/14] bpf: prepare bpf_liveness api for use by static analysis pass
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/14] bpf: 4-byte precise clean_verifier_state Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/14] bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
bpf: prepare liveness internal API for static analysis pass
Move the `updated` check and reset from bpf_update_live_stack() into
update_instance() itself, so callers outside the main loop can reuse
it. Similarly, move write_insn_idx assignment out of
reset_stack_write_marks() into its public caller, and thread insn_idx
as a parameter to commit_stack_write_marks() instead of reading it
from liveness->write_insn_idx. Drop the unused `env` parameter from
alloc_frame_masks() and mark_stack_read().
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index e2697cd9ae27f95970a7a495a362c371d27922ed..a3af5972520f3c19d4d5fc003d2ca8088d6b4489 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -259,8 +259,7 @@ static struct per_frame_masks *get_frame_masks(struct func_instance *instance,
return &instance->frames[frame][relative_idx(instance, insn_idx)];
}
-static struct per_frame_masks *alloc_frame_masks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance,
+static struct per_frame_masks *alloc_frame_masks(struct func_instance *instance,
u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
{
struct per_frame_masks *arr;
@@ -298,13 +297,12 @@ static int ensure_cur_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
/* Accumulate may_read masks for @frame at @insn_idx */
-static int mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
+static int mark_stack_read(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
{
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
spis_t new_may_read;
- masks = alloc_frame_masks(env, instance, frame, insn_idx);
+ masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
if (IS_ERR(masks))
return PTR_ERR(masks);
new_may_read = spis_or(masks->may_read, mask);
@@ -321,17 +319,15 @@ int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, s
int err;
err = ensure_cur_instance(env);
- err = err ?: mark_stack_read(env, env->liveness->cur_instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
+ err = err ?: mark_stack_read(env->liveness->cur_instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
return err;
}
-static void reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance, u32 insn_idx)
+static void reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
{
struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
int i;
- liveness->write_insn_idx = insn_idx;
for (i = 0; i <= instance->callchain.curframe; i++)
liveness->write_masks_acc[i] = SPIS_ZERO;
}
@@ -345,7 +341,8 @@ int bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx)
if (err)
return err;
- reset_stack_write_marks(env, liveness->cur_instance, insn_idx);
+ liveness->write_insn_idx = insn_idx;
+ reset_stack_write_marks(env, liveness->cur_instance);
return 0;
}
@@ -355,7 +352,8 @@ void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, spis_t mask)
}
static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance)
+ struct func_instance *instance,
+ u32 insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
u32 idx, frame, curframe;
@@ -366,13 +364,13 @@ static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
curframe = instance->callchain.curframe;
- idx = relative_idx(instance, liveness->write_insn_idx);
+ idx = relative_idx(instance, insn_idx);
for (frame = 0; frame <= curframe; frame++) {
mask = liveness->write_masks_acc[frame];
/* avoid allocating frames for zero masks */
if (spis_is_zero(mask) && !instance->must_write_set[idx])
continue;
- masks = alloc_frame_masks(env, instance, frame, liveness->write_insn_idx);
+ masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
if (IS_ERR(masks))
return PTR_ERR(masks);
old_must_write = masks->must_write;
@@ -402,7 +400,7 @@ static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*/
int bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
- return commit_stack_write_marks(env, env->liveness->cur_instance);
+ return commit_stack_write_marks(env, env->liveness->cur_instance, env->liveness->write_insn_idx);
}
static char *fmt_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct callchain *callchain)
@@ -576,18 +574,17 @@ static int propagate_to_outer_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (IS_ERR(outer_instance))
return PTR_ERR(outer_instance);
callsite = callchain->callsites[callchain->curframe - 1];
-
- reset_stack_write_marks(env, outer_instance, callsite);
+ reset_stack_write_marks(env, outer_instance);
for (frame = 0; frame < callchain->curframe; frame++) {
insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, this_subprog_start);
if (!insn)
continue;
bpf_mark_stack_write(env, frame, insn->must_write_acc);
- err = mark_stack_read(env, outer_instance, frame, callsite, insn->live_before);
+ err = mark_stack_read(outer_instance, frame, callsite, insn->live_before);
if (err)
return err;
}
- commit_stack_write_marks(env, outer_instance);
+ commit_stack_write_marks(env, outer_instance, callsite);
return 0;
}
@@ -654,6 +651,9 @@ static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *i
bool changed;
int err;
+ if (!instance->updated)
+ return 0;
+
this_subprog_start = callchain_subprog_start(callchain);
/*
* If must_write marks were updated must_write_acc needs to be reset
@@ -699,6 +699,8 @@ static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *i
return err;
}
+ instance->updated = false;
+ instance->must_write_dropped = false;
return 0;
}
@@ -721,13 +723,9 @@ int bpf_update_live_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (IS_ERR(instance))
return PTR_ERR(instance);
- if (instance->updated) {
- err = update_instance(env, instance);
- if (err)
- return err;
- instance->updated = false;
- instance->must_write_dropped = false;
- }
+ err = update_instance(env, instance);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
return 0;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 07/14] bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/14] bpf: prepare bpf_liveness api for use by static analysis pass Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/14] bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks Eduard Zingerman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
The analysis is a basis for static liveness tracking mechanism
introduced by the next two commits.
A forward fixed-point analysis that tracks which frame's FP each
register value is derived from, and at what byte offset. This is
needed because a callee can receive a pointer to its caller's stack
frame (e.g. r1 = fp-16 at the call site), then do *(u64 *)(r1 + 0)
inside the callee — a cross-frame stack access that the callee's local
liveness must attribute to the caller's stack.
Each register holds an arg_track value from a three-level lattice:
- Precise {frame=N, off=[o1,o2,...]} — known frame index and
up to 4 concrete byte offsets
- Offset-imprecise {frame=N, off_cnt=0} — known frame, unknown offset
- Fully-imprecise {frame=ARG_IMPRECISE, mask=bitmask} — unknown frame,
mask says which frames might be involved
At CFG merge points the lattice moves toward imprecision (same
frame+offset stays precise, same frame different offsets merges offset
sets or becomes offset-imprecise, different frames become
fully-imprecise with OR'd bitmask).
The analysis also tracks spills/fills to the callee's own stack
(at_stack_in/out), so FP derived values spilled and reloaded.
This pass is run recursively per call site: when subprog A calls B
with specific FP-derived arguments, B is re-analyzed with those entry
args. The recursion follows analyze_subprog -> compute_subprog_args ->
(for each call insn) -> analyze_subprog. Subprogs that receive no
FP-derived args are skipped during recursion and analyzed
independently at depth 0.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 3 +
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 1059 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +
3 files changed, 1067 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index e1b004081b69de389a872fa33595d29aa7758960..202de7f09bca864f2750d4d9fdea5e95f1f722ed 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {
} cfg;
struct backtrack_state bt;
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *cur_hist_ent;
+ /* Per-callsite copy of parent's converged at_stack_in for cross-frame fills. */
+ struct arg_track **callsite_at_stack;
u32 pass_cnt; /* number of times do_check() was called */
u32 subprog_cnt;
/* number of instructions analyzed by the verifier */
@@ -1244,6 +1246,7 @@ s64 bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
s64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn, int arg,
int insn_idx);
+int bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
int bpf_stack_liveness_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
void bpf_stack_liveness_free(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index a3af5972520f3c19d4d5fc003d2ca8088d6b4489..4f77487202505212da1ca6d4f5a3c4f52318d1c2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -2,10 +2,13 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */
#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
+#include <linux/btf.h>
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#define verbose(env, fmt, args...) bpf_verifier_log_write(env, fmt, ##args)
+
/*
* This file implements live stack slots analysis. After accumulating
* stack usage data, the analysis answers queries about whether a
@@ -107,6 +110,7 @@ struct per_frame_masks {
struct func_instance {
struct hlist_node hl_node;
struct callchain callchain;
+ u32 subprog; /* subprog index */
u32 insn_cnt; /* cached number of insns in the function */
bool updated;
bool must_write_dropped;
@@ -200,11 +204,30 @@ static struct func_instance *__lookup_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
memcpy(&result->callchain, callchain, sizeof(*callchain));
+ result->subprog = subprog - env->subprog_info;
result->insn_cnt = subprog_sz;
hash_add(liveness->func_instances, &result->hl_node, key);
return result;
}
+static struct func_instance *call_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct func_instance *caller,
+ u32 callsite, int subprog)
+{
+ struct callchain cc;
+
+ if (caller) {
+ cc = caller->callchain;
+ cc.callsites[cc.curframe] = callsite;
+ cc.curframe++;
+ } else {
+ memset(&cc, 0, sizeof(cc));
+ }
+ cc.sp_starts[cc.curframe] = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
+ cc.callsites[cc.curframe] = cc.sp_starts[cc.curframe];
+ return __lookup_instance(env, &cc);
+}
+
static struct func_instance *lookup_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *st,
u32 frameno)
@@ -786,3 +809,1039 @@ bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 half_sp
return false;
}
+
+/*
+ * Per-register tracking state for compute_subprog_args().
+ * Tracks which frame's FP a value is derived from
+ * and the byte offset from that frame's FP.
+ *
+ * The .frame field forms a lattice with three levels of precision:
+ *
+ * precise {frame=N, off=V} -- known absolute frame index and byte offset
+ * |
+ * offset-imprecise {frame=N, off=OFF_IMPRECISE}
+ * | -- known frame identity, unknown offset
+ * fully-imprecise {frame=ARG_IMPRECISE, mask=bitmask}
+ * -- unknown frame identity; .mask is a
+ * bitmask of which frame indices might be
+ * involved
+ *
+ * At CFG merge points, arg_track_join() moves down the lattice:
+ * - same frame + same offset -> precise
+ * - same frame + different offset -> offset-imprecise
+ * - different frames -> fully-imprecise (bitmask OR)
+ *
+ * At memory access sites (LDX/STX/ST), offset-imprecise marks only
+ * the known frame's access mask as U64_MAX, while fully-imprecise
+ * iterates bits in the bitmask and routes each frame to its target.
+ */
+#define MAX_ARG_OFFSETS 4
+
+struct arg_track {
+ union {
+ s16 off[MAX_ARG_OFFSETS]; /* byte offsets; off_cnt says how many */
+ u16 mask; /* arg bitmask when arg == ARG_IMPRECISE */
+ };
+ s8 frame; /* absolute frame index, or enum arg_track_state */
+ s8 off_cnt; /* 0 = offset-imprecise, 1-4 = # of precise offsets */
+};
+
+enum arg_track_state {
+ ARG_NONE = -1, /* not derived from any argument */
+ ARG_UNVISITED = -2, /* not yet reached by dataflow */
+ ARG_IMPRECISE = -3, /* lost identity; .mask is arg bitmask */
+};
+
+#define OFF_IMPRECISE S16_MIN /* arg identity known but offset unknown */
+
+/* Track callee stack slots fp-8 through fp-64 (8 slots of 8 bytes each) */
+#define MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS 64
+
+static bool arg_is_visited(const struct arg_track *at)
+{
+ return at->frame != ARG_UNVISITED;
+}
+
+static bool arg_is_fp(const struct arg_track *at)
+{
+ return at->frame >= 0 || at->frame == ARG_IMPRECISE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear all tracked callee stack slots overlapping the byte range
+ * [off, off+sz-1] where off is a negative FP-relative offset.
+ */
+static void clear_overlapping_stack_slots(struct arg_track *at_stack, s16 off, u32 sz)
+{
+ struct arg_track none = { .frame = ARG_NONE };
+
+ if (off == OFF_IMPRECISE) {
+ for (int i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; i++)
+ at_stack[i] = none;
+ return;
+ }
+ for (int i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; i++) {
+ int slot_start = -((i + 1) * 8);
+ int slot_end = slot_start + 8;
+
+ if (slot_start < off + sz && slot_end > off)
+ at_stack[i] = none;
+ }
+}
+
+static void verbose_arg_track(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct arg_track *at)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ switch (at->frame) {
+ case ARG_NONE: verbose(env, "_"); break;
+ case ARG_UNVISITED: verbose(env, "?"); break;
+ case ARG_IMPRECISE: verbose(env, "IMP%x", at->mask); break;
+ default:
+ /* frame >= 0: absolute frame index */
+ if (at->off_cnt == 0) {
+ verbose(env, "fp%d ?", at->frame);
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < at->off_cnt; i++) {
+ if (i)
+ verbose(env, "|");
+ verbose(env, "fp%d%+d", at->frame, at->off[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool arg_track_eq(const struct arg_track *a, const struct arg_track *b)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (a->frame != b->frame)
+ return false;
+ if (a->frame == ARG_IMPRECISE)
+ return a->mask == b->mask;
+ if (a->frame < 0)
+ return true;
+ if (a->off_cnt != b->off_cnt)
+ return false;
+ for (i = 0; i < a->off_cnt; i++)
+ if (a->off[i] != b->off[i])
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static struct arg_track arg_single(s8 arg, s16 off)
+{
+ struct arg_track at = {};
+
+ at.frame = arg;
+ at.off[0] = off;
+ at.off_cnt = 1;
+ return at;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Merge two sorted offset arrays, deduplicate.
+ * Returns off_cnt=0 if the result exceeds MAX_ARG_OFFSETS.
+ * Both args must have the same frame and off_cnt > 0.
+ */
+static struct arg_track arg_merge_offsets(struct arg_track a, struct arg_track b)
+{
+ struct arg_track result = { .frame = a.frame };
+ struct arg_track imp = { .frame = a.frame };
+ int i = 0, j = 0, k = 0;
+
+ while (i < a.off_cnt && j < b.off_cnt) {
+ s16 v;
+
+ if (a.off[i] <= b.off[j]) {
+ v = a.off[i++];
+ if (v == b.off[j])
+ j++;
+ } else {
+ v = b.off[j++];
+ }
+ if (k > 0 && result.off[k - 1] == v)
+ continue;
+ if (k >= MAX_ARG_OFFSETS)
+ return imp;
+ result.off[k++] = v;
+ }
+ while (i < a.off_cnt) {
+ if (k >= MAX_ARG_OFFSETS)
+ return imp;
+ result.off[k++] = a.off[i++];
+ }
+ while (j < b.off_cnt) {
+ if (k >= MAX_ARG_OFFSETS)
+ return imp;
+ result.off[k++] = b.off[j++];
+ }
+ result.off_cnt = k;
+ return result;
+}
+/*
+ * Collapse to ARG_IMPRECISE with a bitmask of which arg
+ * identities are involved. This lets memory access sites
+ * mark only the relevant args' access masks and only set
+ * stack_use when AT_CURRENT (bit 0) is in the bitmask.
+ */
+static struct arg_track arg_join_imprecise(struct arg_track a, struct arg_track b)
+{
+ u32 m = 0;
+
+ if (a.frame >= 0)
+ m |= BIT(a.frame);
+ else if (a.frame == ARG_IMPRECISE)
+ m |= a.mask;
+
+ if (b.frame >= 0)
+ m |= BIT(b.frame);
+ else if (b.frame == ARG_IMPRECISE)
+ m |= b.mask;
+
+ return (struct arg_track){ .mask = m, .frame = ARG_IMPRECISE };
+}
+
+/* Join two arg_track values at merge points */
+static struct arg_track __arg_track_join(struct arg_track a, struct arg_track b)
+{
+ if (!arg_is_visited(&b))
+ return a;
+ if (!arg_is_visited(&a))
+ return b;
+ if (a.frame == b.frame && a.frame >= 0) {
+ /* Both offset-imprecise: stay imprecise */
+ if (a.off_cnt == 0 || b.off_cnt == 0)
+ return (struct arg_track){ .frame = a.frame };
+ /* Merge offset sets; falls back to off_cnt=0 if >4 */
+ return arg_merge_offsets(a, b);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * args are different, but one of them is known
+ * arg + none -> arg
+ * none + arg -> arg
+ *
+ * none + none -> none
+ */
+ if (a.frame == ARG_NONE && b.frame == ARG_NONE)
+ return a;
+ if (a.frame >= 0 && b.frame == ARG_NONE) {
+ /*
+ * When joining single fp-N add fake fp+0 to
+ * keep stack_use and prevent stack_def
+ */
+ if (a.off_cnt == 1)
+ return arg_merge_offsets(a, arg_single(a.frame, 0));
+ return a;
+ }
+ if (b.frame >= 0 && a.frame == ARG_NONE) {
+ if (b.off_cnt == 1)
+ return arg_merge_offsets(b, arg_single(b.frame, 0));
+ return b;
+ }
+
+ return arg_join_imprecise(a, b);
+}
+
+static bool arg_track_join(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int target, int r,
+ struct arg_track *in, struct arg_track out)
+{
+ struct arg_track old = *in;
+ struct arg_track new_val = __arg_track_join(old, out);
+
+ if (arg_track_eq(&new_val, &old))
+ return false;
+
+ *in = new_val;
+ if (!(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) || !arg_is_visited(&old))
+ return true;
+
+ verbose(env, "arg JOIN insn %d -> %d ", idx, target);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ verbose(env, "r%d: ", r);
+ else
+ verbose(env, "fp%+d: ", r * 8);
+ verbose_arg_track(env, &old);
+ verbose(env, " + ");
+ verbose_arg_track(env, &out);
+ verbose(env, " => ");
+ verbose_arg_track(env, &new_val);
+ verbose(env, "\n");
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the result when an ALU op destroys offset precision.
+ * If a single arg is identifiable, preserve it with OFF_IMPRECISE.
+ * If two different args are involved or one is already ARG_IMPRECISE,
+ * the result is fully ARG_IMPRECISE.
+ */
+static void arg_track_alu64(struct arg_track *dst, const struct arg_track *src)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!arg_is_visited(dst));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!arg_is_visited(src));
+
+ if (dst->frame >= 0 && (src->frame == ARG_NONE || src->frame == dst->frame)) {
+ /*
+ * rX += rY where rY is not arg derived
+ * rX += rX
+ */
+ dst->off_cnt = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (src->frame >= 0 && dst->frame == ARG_NONE) {
+ /*
+ * rX += rY where rX is not arg derived
+ * rY identity leaks into rX
+ */
+ dst->off_cnt = 0;
+ dst->frame = src->frame;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (dst->frame == ARG_NONE && src->frame == ARG_NONE)
+ return;
+
+ *dst = arg_join_imprecise(*dst, *src);
+}
+
+static s16 arg_add(s16 off, s64 delta)
+{
+ s64 res;
+
+ if (off == OFF_IMPRECISE)
+ return OFF_IMPRECISE;
+ res = (s64)off + delta;
+ if (res < S16_MIN + 1 || res > S16_MAX)
+ return OFF_IMPRECISE;
+ return res;
+}
+
+static void arg_padd(struct arg_track *at, s64 delta)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (at->off_cnt == 0)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < at->off_cnt; i++) {
+ s16 new_off = arg_add(at->off[i], delta);
+
+ if (new_off == OFF_IMPRECISE) {
+ at->off_cnt = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ at->off[i] = new_off;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a byte offset from FP to a callee stack slot index (0-7).
+ * Returns -1 if out of range or not 8-byte aligned.
+ * Slot 0 = fp-8, slot 1 = fp-16, ..., slot 7 = fp-64.
+ */
+static int fp_off_to_slot(s16 off)
+{
+ if (off == OFF_IMPRECISE)
+ return -1;
+ if (off >= 0 || off < -(int)(MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS * 8))
+ return -1;
+ if (off % 8)
+ return -1;
+ return (-off) / 8 - 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Join stack slot states across all possible FP offsets tracked in @reg.
+ * When a register holds multiple possible FP-derived offsets (off_cnt > 1),
+ * this merges the arg_track from each corresponding stack slot rather than
+ * falling back to imprecise.
+ */
+static struct arg_track fill_from_stack(struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ struct arg_track *at_out, int reg,
+ struct arg_track *at_stack_out,
+ int depth)
+{
+ int frame = at_out[reg].frame;
+ struct arg_track imp = {
+ .mask = frame >= 0 ? BIT(frame) : (1u << (depth + 1)) - 1,
+ .frame = ARG_IMPRECISE
+ };
+ struct arg_track result = { .frame = ARG_NONE };
+ int cnt, i;
+
+ if (reg == BPF_REG_FP) {
+ int slot = fp_off_to_slot(insn->off);
+
+ return slot >= 0 ? at_stack_out[slot] : imp;
+ }
+ cnt = at_out[reg].off_cnt;
+ if (cnt == 0)
+ return imp;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ s16 fp_off = arg_add(at_out[reg].off[i], insn->off);
+ int slot = fp_off_to_slot(fp_off);
+
+ if (slot < 0)
+ return imp;
+ result = __arg_track_join(result, at_stack_out[slot]);
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Spill @val to all possible stack slots indicated by the FP offsets in @reg.
+ * For an 8-byte store, each candidate slot gets @val; for sub-8-byte stores
+ * the slot is cleared to ARG_NONE.
+ */
+static void spill_to_stack(struct bpf_insn *insn, struct arg_track *at_out,
+ int reg, struct arg_track *at_stack_out,
+ struct arg_track *val, u32 sz)
+{
+ struct arg_track none = { .frame = ARG_NONE };
+ int cnt, i;
+
+ if (reg == BPF_REG_FP) {
+ int slot = fp_off_to_slot(insn->off);
+
+ if (slot >= 0)
+ at_stack_out[slot] = sz == 8 ? *val : none;
+ else
+ clear_overlapping_stack_slots(at_stack_out, insn->off, sz);
+ return;
+ }
+ cnt = at_out[reg].off_cnt;
+ if (cnt == 0) {
+ clear_overlapping_stack_slots(at_stack_out, OFF_IMPRECISE, sz);
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ s16 fp_off = arg_add(at_out[reg].off[i], insn->off);
+ int slot = fp_off_to_slot(fp_off);
+
+ if (slot >= 0)
+ at_stack_out[slot] = sz == 8 ? *val : none;
+ else
+ clear_overlapping_stack_slots(at_stack_out, fp_off, sz);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear stack slots overlapping all possible FP offsets in @reg.
+ */
+static void clear_stack_for_all_offs(struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ struct arg_track *at_out, int reg,
+ struct arg_track *at_stack_out, u32 sz)
+{
+ int cnt, i;
+
+ if (reg == BPF_REG_FP) {
+ clear_overlapping_stack_slots(at_stack_out, insn->off, sz);
+ return;
+ }
+ cnt = at_out[reg].off_cnt;
+ if (cnt == 0) {
+ clear_overlapping_stack_slots(at_stack_out, OFF_IMPRECISE, sz);
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ s16 fp_off = arg_add(at_out[reg].off[i], insn->off);
+
+ clear_overlapping_stack_slots(at_stack_out, fp_off, sz);
+ }
+}
+
+static void arg_track_log(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, int idx,
+ struct arg_track *at_in, struct arg_track *at_stack_in,
+ struct arg_track *at_out, struct arg_track *at_stack_out)
+{
+ bool printed = false;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
+ if (arg_track_eq(&at_out[i], &at_in[i]))
+ continue;
+ if (!printed) {
+ verbose(env, "%3d: ", idx);
+ bpf_verbose_insn(env, insn);
+ bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->log.end_pos - 1);
+ printed = true;
+ }
+ verbose(env, "\tr%d: ", i); verbose_arg_track(env, &at_in[i]);
+ verbose(env, " -> "); verbose_arg_track(env, &at_out[i]);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; i++) {
+ if (arg_track_eq(&at_stack_out[i], &at_stack_in[i]))
+ continue;
+ if (!printed) {
+ verbose(env, "%3d: ", idx);
+ bpf_verbose_insn(env, insn);
+ bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->log.end_pos - 1);
+ printed = true;
+ }
+ verbose(env, "\tfp%+d: ", -(i + 1) * 8); verbose_arg_track(env, &at_stack_in[i]);
+ verbose(env, " -> "); verbose_arg_track(env, &at_stack_out[i]);
+ }
+ if (printed)
+ verbose(env, "\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pure dataflow transfer function for arg_track state.
+ * Updates at_out[] based on how the instruction modifies registers.
+ * Tracks spill/fill, but not other memory accesses.
+ */
+static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ int insn_idx,
+ struct arg_track *at_out, struct arg_track *at_stack_out,
+ struct func_instance *instance)
+{
+ int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
+ u8 code = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+ struct arg_track *dst = &at_out[insn->dst_reg];
+ struct arg_track *src = &at_out[insn->src_reg];
+ struct arg_track none = { .frame = ARG_NONE };
+ int r;
+
+ if (class == BPF_ALU64 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ if (code == BPF_MOV) {
+ *dst = none;
+ } else if (dst->frame >= 0) {
+ if (code == BPF_ADD)
+ arg_padd(dst, insn->imm);
+ else if (code == BPF_SUB)
+ arg_padd(dst, -(s64)insn->imm);
+ else
+ /* Any other 64-bit alu on the pointer makes it imprecise */
+ dst->off_cnt = 0;
+ } /* else if dst->frame is imprecise it stays so */
+ } else if (class == BPF_ALU64 && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
+ if (code == BPF_MOV) {
+ if (insn->off == 0) {
+ *dst = *src;
+ } else {
+ /* addr_space_cast destroys a pointer */
+ *dst = none;
+ }
+ } else {
+ arg_track_alu64(dst, src);
+ }
+ } else if (class == BPF_ALU) {
+ /*
+ * 32-bit alu destroys the pointer.
+ * If src was a pointer it cannot leak into dst
+ */
+ *dst = none;
+ } else if (class == BPF_JMP && code == BPF_CALL) {
+ /*
+ * at_stack_out[slot] is not cleared by the helper and subprog calls.
+ * The fill_from_stack() may return the stale spill — which is an FP-derived arg_track
+ * (the value that was originally spilled there). The loaded register then carries
+ * a phantom FP-derived identity that doesn't correspond to what's actually in the slot.
+ * This phantom FP pointer propagates forward, and wherever it's subsequently used
+ * (as a helper argument, another store, etc.), it sets stack liveness bits.
+ * Those bits correspond to stack accesses that don't actually happen.
+ * So the effect is over-reporting stack liveness — marking slots as live that aren't
+ * actually accessed. The verifier preserves more state than necessary across calls,
+ * which is conservative.
+ *
+ * helpers can scratch stack slots, but they won't make a valid pointer out of it.
+ * subprogs are allowed to write into parent slots, but they cannot write
+ * _any_ FP-derived pointer into it (either their own or parent's FP).
+ */
+ for (r = BPF_REG_0; r <= BPF_REG_5; r++)
+ at_out[r] = none;
+ } else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
+ u32 sz = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE(insn->code));
+ bool src_is_local_fp = insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_FP || src->frame == depth ||
+ (src->frame == ARG_IMPRECISE && (src->mask & BIT(depth)));
+
+ /*
+ * Reload from callee stack: if src is current-frame FP-derived
+ * and the load is an 8-byte BPF_MEM, try to restore the spill
+ * identity. For imprecise sources fill_from_stack() returns
+ * ARG_IMPRECISE (off_cnt == 0).
+ */
+ if (src_is_local_fp && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM && sz == 8) {
+ *dst = fill_from_stack(insn, at_out, insn->src_reg, at_stack_out, depth);
+ } else if (src->frame >= 0 && src->frame < depth &&
+ BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM && sz == 8) {
+ struct arg_track *parent_stack =
+ env->callsite_at_stack[instance->callchain.callsites[src->frame]];
+
+ *dst = fill_from_stack(insn, at_out, insn->src_reg,
+ parent_stack, src->frame);
+ } else if (src->frame == ARG_IMPRECISE &&
+ !(src->mask & BIT(depth)) && src->mask &&
+ BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM && sz == 8) {
+ /*
+ * Imprecise src with only parent-frame bits:
+ * conservative fallback.
+ */
+ *dst = *src;
+ } else {
+ *dst = none;
+ }
+ } else if (class == BPF_LD && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
+ *dst = none;
+ } else if (class == BPF_STX) {
+ u32 sz = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE(insn->code));
+ bool dst_is_local_fp;
+
+ /* Track spills to current-frame FP-derived callee stack */
+ dst_is_local_fp = insn->dst_reg == BPF_REG_FP || dst->frame == depth;
+ if (dst_is_local_fp && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
+ spill_to_stack(insn, at_out, insn->dst_reg,
+ at_stack_out, src, sz);
+
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) {
+ if (dst_is_local_fp)
+ clear_stack_for_all_offs(insn, at_out, insn->dst_reg,
+ at_stack_out, sz);
+
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
+ at_out[BPF_REG_0] = none;
+ else if (insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ)
+ *dst = none;
+ else if (insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)
+ *src = none;
+ }
+ } else if (class == BPF_ST && BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) {
+ u32 sz = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE(insn->code));
+ bool dst_is_local_fp = insn->dst_reg == BPF_REG_FP || dst->frame == depth;
+
+ /* BPF_ST to FP-derived dst: clear overlapping stack slots */
+ if (dst_is_local_fp)
+ clear_stack_for_all_offs(insn, at_out, insn->dst_reg,
+ at_stack_out, sz);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a calls_callback helper, find the callback subprog and determine
+ * which caller register maps to which callback register for FP passthrough.
+ */
+static int find_callback_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn, int insn_idx,
+ int *caller_reg, int *callee_reg)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
+ int cb_reg = -1;
+
+ *caller_reg = -1;
+ *callee_reg = -1;
+
+ if (!bpf_helper_call(insn))
+ return -1;
+ switch (insn->imm) {
+ case BPF_FUNC_loop:
+ /* bpf_loop(nr, cb, ctx, flags): cb=R2, R3->cb R2 */
+ cb_reg = BPF_REG_2;
+ *caller_reg = BPF_REG_3;
+ *callee_reg = BPF_REG_2;
+ break;
+ case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
+ /* for_each_map_elem(map, cb, ctx, flags): cb=R2, R3->cb R4 */
+ cb_reg = BPF_REG_2;
+ *caller_reg = BPF_REG_3;
+ *callee_reg = BPF_REG_4;
+ break;
+ case BPF_FUNC_find_vma:
+ /* find_vma(task, addr, cb, ctx, flags): cb=R3, R4->cb R3 */
+ cb_reg = BPF_REG_3;
+ *caller_reg = BPF_REG_4;
+ *callee_reg = BPF_REG_3;
+ break;
+ case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain:
+ /* user_ringbuf_drain(map, cb, ctx, flags): cb=R2, R3->cb R2 */
+ cb_reg = BPF_REG_2;
+ *caller_reg = BPF_REG_3;
+ *callee_reg = BPF_REG_2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!(aux->const_reg_subprog_mask & BIT(cb_reg)))
+ return -2;
+
+ return aux->const_reg_vals[cb_reg];
+}
+
+/* Per-subprog intermediate state kept alive across analysis phases */
+struct subprog_at_info {
+ struct arg_track (*at_in)[MAX_BPF_REG];
+ int len;
+};
+
+static void print_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ int subprog,
+ struct subprog_at_info *info,
+ struct arg_track (*at_stack_in)[MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS])
+{
+ struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
+ int start = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
+ int len = info->len;
+ int i, r;
+
+ if (!(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
+ return;
+
+ verbose(env, "subprog#%d %s:\n", subprog,
+ env->prog->aux->func_info
+ ? btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf,
+ btf_type_by_id(env->prog->aux->btf,
+ env->prog->aux->func_info[subprog].type_id)->name_off)
+ : "");
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ int idx = start + i;
+ bool has_extra = false;
+ u8 cls = BPF_CLASS(insns[idx].code);
+ bool is_ldx_stx_call = cls == BPF_LDX || cls == BPF_STX ||
+ insns[idx].code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL);
+
+ verbose(env, "%3d: ", idx);
+ bpf_verbose_insn(env, &insns[idx]);
+
+ /* Collect what needs printing */
+ if (is_ldx_stx_call &&
+ arg_is_visited(&info->at_in[i][0])) {
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_BPF_REG - 1; r++)
+ if (arg_is_fp(&info->at_in[i][r]))
+ has_extra = true;
+ }
+ if (is_ldx_stx_call) {
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; r++)
+ if (arg_is_fp(&at_stack_in[i][r]))
+ has_extra = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!has_extra) {
+ if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[idx]))
+ i++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->log.end_pos - 1);
+ verbose(env, " //");
+
+ if (is_ldx_stx_call && info->at_in &&
+ arg_is_visited(&info->at_in[i][0])) {
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_BPF_REG - 1; r++) {
+ if (!arg_is_fp(&info->at_in[i][r]))
+ continue;
+ verbose(env, " r%d=", r);
+ verbose_arg_track(env, &info->at_in[i][r]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (is_ldx_stx_call) {
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; r++) {
+ if (!arg_is_fp(&at_stack_in[i][r]))
+ continue;
+ verbose(env, " fp%+d=", -(r + 1) * 8);
+ verbose_arg_track(env, &at_stack_in[i][r]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ verbose(env, "\n");
+ if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[idx]))
+ i++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute arg tracking dataflow for a single subprog.
+ * Runs forward fixed-point with arg_track_xfer(), then records
+ * memory accesses in a single linear pass over converged state.
+ *
+ * @callee_entry: pre-populated entry state for R1-R5
+ * NULL for main (subprog 0).
+ * @info: stores at_in, len for debug printing.
+ */
+static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct subprog_at_info *info,
+ struct arg_track *callee_entry,
+ struct func_instance *instance)
+{
+ int subprog = instance->subprog;
+ struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
+ int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int start = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
+ int po_start = env->subprog_info[subprog].postorder_start;
+ int end = env->subprog_info[subprog + 1].start;
+ int po_end = env->subprog_info[subprog + 1].postorder_start;
+ int len = end - start;
+ struct arg_track (*at_in)[MAX_BPF_REG] = NULL;
+ struct arg_track at_out[MAX_BPF_REG];
+ struct arg_track (*at_stack_in)[MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS] = NULL;
+ struct arg_track *at_stack_out = NULL;
+ struct arg_track unvisited = { .frame = ARG_UNVISITED };
+ struct arg_track none = { .frame = ARG_NONE };
+ bool changed;
+ int i, p, r, err = -ENOMEM;
+
+ at_in = kvmalloc_objs(*at_in, len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!at_in)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ at_stack_in = kvmalloc_objs(*at_stack_in, len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!at_stack_in)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ at_stack_out = kvmalloc_objs(*at_stack_out, MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!at_stack_out)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_BPF_REG; r++)
+ at_in[i][r] = unvisited;
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; r++)
+ at_stack_in[i][r] = unvisited;
+ }
+
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_BPF_REG; r++)
+ at_in[0][r] = none;
+
+ /* Entry: R10 is always precisely the current frame's FP */
+ at_in[0][BPF_REG_FP] = arg_single(depth, 0);
+
+ /* R1-R5: from caller or ARG_NONE for main */
+ if (callee_entry) {
+ for (r = BPF_REG_1; r <= BPF_REG_5; r++)
+ at_in[0][r] = callee_entry[r];
+ }
+
+ /* Entry: all stack slots are ARG_NONE */
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; r++)
+ at_stack_in[0][r] = none;
+
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
+ verbose(env, "subprog#%d: analyzing (depth %d)...\n", subprog, depth);
+
+ /* Forward fixed-point iteration in reverse post order */
+redo:
+ changed = false;
+ for (p = po_end - 1; p >= po_start; p--) {
+ int idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[p];
+ int i = idx - start;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &insns[idx];
+ struct bpf_iarray *succ;
+
+ if (!arg_is_visited(&at_in[i][0]) && !arg_is_visited(&at_in[i][1]))
+ continue;
+
+ memcpy(at_out, at_in[i], sizeof(at_out));
+ memcpy(at_stack_out, at_stack_in[i], MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS * sizeof(*at_stack_out));
+
+ arg_track_xfer(env, insn, idx, at_out, at_stack_out, instance);
+ arg_track_log(env, insn, idx, at_in[i], at_stack_in[i], at_out, at_stack_out);
+
+ /* Propagate to successors within this subprogram */
+ succ = bpf_insn_successors(env, idx);
+ for (int s = 0; s < succ->cnt; s++) {
+ int target = succ->items[s];
+ int ti;
+
+ /* Filter: stay within the subprogram's range */
+ if (target < start || target >= end)
+ continue;
+ ti = target - start;
+
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_BPF_REG; r++)
+ changed |= arg_track_join(env, idx, target, r,
+ &at_in[ti][r], at_out[r]);
+
+ for (r = 0; r < MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS; r++)
+ changed |= arg_track_join(env, idx, target, -r - 1,
+ &at_stack_in[ti][r], at_stack_out[r]);
+ }
+ }
+ if (changed)
+ goto redo;
+
+ for (p = po_end - 1; p >= po_start; p--) {
+ int idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[p];
+ int i = idx - start;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &insns[idx];
+
+ if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn) || bpf_calls_callback(env, idx)) {
+ kvfree(env->callsite_at_stack[idx]);
+ env->callsite_at_stack[idx] =
+ kvmalloc_objs(*env->callsite_at_stack[idx],
+ MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!env->callsite_at_stack[idx])
+ goto err_free;
+ memcpy(env->callsite_at_stack[idx],
+ at_stack_in[i], sizeof(struct arg_track) * MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS);
+ }
+ }
+
+ info->at_in = at_in;
+ at_in = NULL;
+ info->len = len;
+ print_subprog_arg_access(env, subprog, info, at_stack_in);
+ err = 0;
+
+err_free:
+ kvfree(at_stack_out);
+ kvfree(at_stack_in);
+ kvfree(at_in);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Recursively analyze a subprog with specific 'entry_args'.
+ * Each callee is analyzed with the exact args from its call site.
+ *
+ * Args are recomputed for each call because the dataflow result at_in[]
+ * depends on the entry args and frame depth. Consider: A->C->D and B->C->D
+ * Callsites in A and B pass different args into C, so C is recomputed.
+ * Then within C the same callsite passes different args into D.
+ */
+static int analyze_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct arg_track *entry_args,
+ struct subprog_at_info *info,
+ struct func_instance *instance)
+{
+ int subprog = instance->subprog;
+ int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
+ int start = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
+ int po_start = env->subprog_info[subprog].postorder_start;
+ int po_end = env->subprog_info[subprog + 1].postorder_start;
+ int j, err;
+
+ /* Free prior analysis if this subprog was already visited */
+ kvfree(info[subprog].at_in);
+ info[subprog].at_in = NULL;
+
+ err = compute_subprog_args(env, &info[subprog], entry_args, instance);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* For each reachable call site in the subprog, recurse into callees */
+ for (int p = po_start; p < po_end; p++) {
+ int idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[p];
+ struct arg_track callee_args[BPF_REG_5 + 1];
+ struct arg_track none = { .frame = ARG_NONE };
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &insns[idx];
+ struct func_instance *callee_instance;
+ int callee, target;
+ int caller_reg, cb_callee_reg;
+
+ j = idx - start; /* relative index within this subprog */
+
+ if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn)) {
+ target = idx + insn->imm + 1;
+ callee = bpf_find_subprog(env, target);
+ if (callee < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Build entry args: R1-R5 from at_in at call site */
+ for (int r = BPF_REG_1; r <= BPF_REG_5; r++)
+ callee_args[r] = info[subprog].at_in[j][r];
+ } else if (bpf_calls_callback(env, idx)) {
+ callee = find_callback_subprog(env, insn, idx, &caller_reg, &cb_callee_reg);
+ if (callee == -2) {
+ /*
+ * same bpf_loop() calls two different callbacks and passes
+ * stack pointer to them
+ */
+ if (info[subprog].at_in[j][caller_reg].frame == ARG_NONE)
+ continue;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (callee < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ for (int r = BPF_REG_1; r <= BPF_REG_5; r++)
+ callee_args[r] = none;
+ callee_args[cb_callee_reg] = info[subprog].at_in[j][caller_reg];
+ } else {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (depth == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ callee_instance = call_instance(env, instance, idx, callee);
+ if (IS_ERR(callee_instance))
+ return PTR_ERR(callee_instance);
+ err = analyze_subprog(env, callee_args, info, callee_instance);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return update_instance(env, instance);
+}
+
+int bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
+ struct func_instance *instance;
+ struct subprog_at_info *info;
+ int k, err = 0;
+
+ info = kvzalloc_objs(*info, env->subprog_cnt, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ env->callsite_at_stack = kvzalloc_objs(*env->callsite_at_stack, insn_cnt,
+ GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!env->callsite_at_stack) {
+ kvfree(info);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ instance = call_instance(env, NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(instance)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(instance);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ err = analyze_subprog(env, NULL, info, instance);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Subprogs and callbacks that don't receive FP-derived arguments
+ * cannot access ancestor stack frames, so they were skipped during
+ * the recursive walk above. Async callbacks (timer, workqueue) are
+ * also not reachable from the main program's call graph. Analyze
+ * all unvisited subprogs as independent roots at depth 0.
+ *
+ * Use reverse topological order (callers before callees) so that
+ * each subprog is analyzed before its callees, allowing the
+ * recursive walk inside analyze_subprog() to naturally
+ * reach nested callees that also lack FP-derived args.
+ */
+ for (k = env->subprog_cnt - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
+ int sub = env->subprog_topo_order[k];
+
+ if (info[sub].at_in && !bpf_subprog_is_global(env, sub))
+ continue;
+ instance = call_instance(env, NULL, 0, sub);
+ if (IS_ERR(instance)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(instance);
+ break;
+ }
+ err = analyze_subprog(env, NULL, info, instance);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ for (k = 0; k < insn_cnt; k++)
+ kvfree(env->callsite_at_stack[k]);
+ kvfree(env->callsite_at_stack);
+ env->callsite_at_stack = NULL;
+ for (k = 0; k < env->subprog_cnt; k++)
+ kvfree(info[k].at_in);
+ kvfree(info);
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f971c89c77fc000a1e7b2d38fd8ed784cfb562ec..535a1cbaaafe6fae5fd0797540294e0a72e93751 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -26301,6 +26301,11 @@ static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i)
compute_insn_live_regs(env, &insns[i], &state[i]);
+ /* Forward pass: resolve stack access through FP-derived pointers */
+ err = bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(env);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
changed = true;
while (changed) {
changed = false;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 08/14] bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/14] bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/14] bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances Eduard Zingerman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87,
Alexei Starovoitov
After arg tracking reaches a fixed point, perform a single linear scan
over the converged at_in[] state and translate each memory access into
liveness read/write masks on the func_instance:
- Load/store instructions: FP-derived pointer's frame and offset(s)
are converted to half-slot masks targeting
per_frame_masks->{may_read,must_write}
- Helper/kfunc calls: record_call_access() queries
bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes() / bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes()
for each FP-derived argument to determine access size and direction.
Unknown access size (S64_MIN) conservatively marks all slots from
fp_off to fp+0 as read.
- Imprecise pointers (frame == ARG_IMPRECISE): conservatively mark
all slots in every frame covered by the pointer's frame bitmask
as fully read.
- Static subprog calls with unresolved arguments: conservatively mark
all frames as fully read.
In clean_live_states(), start cleaning the current state continuously
as registers and stack become dead, and drop the incomplete_read_marks
check for cached states since the static analysis provides complete
liveness information.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 +
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 +-
3 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 202de7f09bca864f2750d4d9fdea5e95f1f722ed..0cc415bfc851750fe658fb0920482e77ba0fc9be 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
/* 4-byte stack slot granularity for liveness analysis */
#define BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE 4
+#define STACK_SLOT_SZ 4
#define STACK_SLOTS (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) /* 128 */
typedef struct {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index 4f77487202505212da1ca6d4f5a3c4f52318d1c2..4457cd80d072b9b506bb2ef8ad477bd7e3403c2c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -1422,6 +1422,202 @@ static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
}
}
+/*
+ * Record access_bytes from helper/kfunc or load/store insn.
+ * access_bytes > 0: stack read
+ * access_bytes < 0: stack write
+ * access_bytes == S64_MIN: unknown — conservative, mark [0..slot] as read
+ * access_bytes == 0: no access
+ *
+ */
+static void record_stack_access_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,
+ s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
+{
+ s32 slot_hi, slot_lo;
+ spis_t mask;
+
+ if (fp_off >= 0)
+ /*
+ * out of bounds stack access doesn't contribute
+ * into actual stack liveness. It will be rejected
+ * by the main verifier pass later.
+ */
+ return;
+ if (access_bytes == S64_MIN) {
+ /* helper/kfunc read unknown amount of bytes from fp_off until fp+0 */
+ slot_hi = (-fp_off - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ;
+ mask = SPIS_ZERO;
+ spis_or_range(&mask, 0, slot_hi);
+ mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (access_bytes > 0) {
+ /* Mark any touched slot as use */
+ slot_hi = (-fp_off - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ;
+ slot_lo = max_t(s32, (-fp_off - access_bytes) / STACK_SLOT_SZ, 0);
+ mask = SPIS_ZERO;
+ spis_or_range(&mask, slot_lo, slot_hi);
+ mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
+ } else if (access_bytes < 0) {
+ /* Mark only fully covered slots as def */
+ access_bytes = -access_bytes;
+ slot_hi = (-fp_off) / STACK_SLOT_SZ - 1;
+ slot_lo = max_t(s32, (-fp_off - access_bytes + STACK_SLOT_SZ - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ, 0);
+ if (slot_lo <= slot_hi) {
+ mask = SPIS_ZERO;
+ spis_or_range(&mask, slot_lo, slot_hi);
+ bpf_mark_stack_write(env, frame, mask);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * 'arg' is FP-derived argument to helper/kfunc or load/store that
+ * reads (positive) or writes (negative) 'access_bytes' into 'use' or 'def'.
+ */
+static void record_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct func_instance *instance,
+ const struct arg_track *arg,
+ s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (access_bytes == 0)
+ return;
+ if (arg->off_cnt == 0) {
+ if (access_bytes > 0)
+ mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (access_bytes != S64_MIN && access_bytes < 0 && arg->off_cnt != 1)
+ /* multi-offset write cannot set stack_def */
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < arg->off_cnt; i++)
+ record_stack_access_off(env, instance, arg->off[i], access_bytes, frame, insn_idx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When a pointer is ARG_IMPRECISE, conservatively mark every frame in
+ * the bitmask as fully used.
+ */
+static void record_imprecise(struct func_instance *instance, u32 mask, u32 insn_idx)
+{
+ int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int f;
+
+ for (f = 0; mask; f++, mask >>= 1) {
+ if (!(mask & 1))
+ continue;
+ if (f <= depth)
+ mark_stack_read(instance, f, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Record load/store access for a given 'at' state of 'insn'. */
+static void record_load_store_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct func_instance *instance,
+ struct arg_track *at, int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
+ int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ s32 sz = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE(insn->code));
+ u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
+ struct arg_track resolved, *ptr;
+ int oi;
+
+ switch (class) {
+ case BPF_LDX:
+ ptr = &at[insn->src_reg];
+ break;
+ case BPF_STX:
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) {
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_STORE_REL)
+ sz = -sz;
+ if (insn->imm == BPF_LOAD_ACQ)
+ ptr = &at[insn->src_reg];
+ else
+ ptr = &at[insn->dst_reg];
+ } else {
+ ptr = &at[insn->dst_reg];
+ sz = -sz;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BPF_ST:
+ ptr = &at[insn->dst_reg];
+ sz = -sz;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Resolve offsets: fold insn->off into arg_track */
+ if (ptr->off_cnt > 0) {
+ resolved.off_cnt = ptr->off_cnt;
+ resolved.frame = ptr->frame;
+ for (oi = 0; oi < ptr->off_cnt; oi++) {
+ resolved.off[oi] = arg_add(ptr->off[oi], insn->off);
+ if (resolved.off[oi] == OFF_IMPRECISE) {
+ resolved.off_cnt = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ptr = &resolved;
+ }
+
+ if (ptr->frame >= 0 && ptr->frame <= depth) {
+ record_stack_access(env, instance, ptr, sz, ptr->frame, insn_idx);
+ } else if (ptr->frame == ARG_IMPRECISE) {
+ record_imprecise(instance, ptr->mask, insn_idx);
+ }
+ /* ARG_NONE: not derived from any frame pointer, skip */
+}
+
+/* Record stack access for a given 'at' state of helper/kfunc 'insn' */
+static void record_call_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct func_instance *instance,
+ struct arg_track *at,
+ int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
+ int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ struct bpf_call_summary cs;
+ int r, num_params = 5;
+
+ if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
+ return;
+
+ if (bpf_get_call_summary(env, insn, &cs))
+ num_params = cs.num_params;
+
+ for (r = BPF_REG_1; r < BPF_REG_1 + num_params; r++) {
+ int frame = at[r].frame;
+ s64 bytes;
+
+ if (!arg_is_fp(&at[r]))
+ continue;
+
+ if (bpf_helper_call(insn)) {
+ bytes = bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes(env, insn, r - 1, insn_idx);
+ } else if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) {
+ bytes = bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(env, insn, r - 1, insn_idx);
+ } else {
+ for (int f = 0; f <= depth; f++)
+ mark_stack_read(instance, f, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (bytes == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (frame >= 0 && frame <= depth) {
+ record_stack_access(env, instance, &at[r], bytes, frame, insn_idx);
+ } else if (frame == ARG_IMPRECISE) {
+ record_imprecise(instance, at[r].mask, insn_idx);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* For a calls_callback helper, find the callback subprog and determine
* which caller register maps to which callback register for FP passthrough.
@@ -1665,11 +1861,18 @@ static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (changed)
goto redo;
+ /* Record memory accesses using converged at_in (RPO skips dead code) */
for (p = po_end - 1; p >= po_start; p--) {
int idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[p];
int i = idx - start;
struct bpf_insn *insn = &insns[idx];
+ reset_stack_write_marks(env, instance);
+ record_load_store_access(env, instance, at_in[i], idx);
+
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
+ record_call_access(env, instance, at_in[i], idx);
+
if (bpf_pseudo_call(insn) || bpf_calls_callback(env, idx)) {
kvfree(env->callsite_at_stack[idx]);
env->callsite_at_stack[idx] =
@@ -1680,6 +1883,7 @@ static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
memcpy(env->callsite_at_stack[idx],
at_stack_in[i], sizeof(struct arg_track) * MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS);
}
+ commit_stack_write_marks(env, instance, idx);
}
info->at_in = at_in;
@@ -1755,6 +1959,11 @@ static int analyze_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*/
if (info[subprog].at_in[j][caller_reg].frame == ARG_NONE)
continue;
+ for (int f = 0; f <= depth; f++) {
+ err = mark_stack_read(instance, f, idx, SPIS_ALL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
continue;
}
if (callee < 0)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 535a1cbaaafe6fae5fd0797540294e0a72e93751..838f164f803fae7bb7fc203cd7e1225adb75ad7f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -20261,6 +20261,13 @@ static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
struct list_head *pos, *head;
+ /* keep cleaning the current state as registers/stack become dead */
+ clean_verifier_state(env, cur);
+
+ /*
+ * can simply return here, since cached states will also be clean,
+ * but keep old logic for the sake of dynamic liveness.
+ */
head = explored_state(env, insn);
list_for_each(pos, head) {
sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node);
@@ -20272,8 +20279,6 @@ static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
if (sl->state.cleaned)
/* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */
continue;
- if (incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state))
- continue;
clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state);
}
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 09/14] bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/14] bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/14] bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (4 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87,
Alexei Starovoitov
Rework func_instance identification and remove the dynamic liveness
API, completing the transition to fully static stack liveness analysis.
Replace callchain-based func_instance keys with (callsite, depth)
pairs. The full callchain (all ancestor callsites) is no longer part
of the hash key; only the immediate callsite and the call depth
matter. This does not lose precision in practice and simplifies the
data structure significantly: struct callchain is removed entirely,
func_instance stores just callsite, depth, and a callsites[] array
for outer frame lookups.
Drop must_write_acc propagation. Previously, must_write marks were
accumulated across successors and propagated to the caller via
propagate_to_outer_instance(). Instead, callee entry liveness
(live_before at subprog start) is pulled directly back to the
caller's callsite in analyze_subprog() after each callee returns.
Skip recursive descent into callees that receive no FP-derived
arguments (has_fp_args() check). This is needed because global
subprogram calls can push depth beyond MAX_CALL_FRAMES (max depth
is 64 for global calls but only 8 frames are accommodated for FP
passing). It also handles the case where a callback subprog cannot be
determined by argument tracking: such callbacks will be processed by
analyze_subprog() at depth 0 independently.
Update lookup_instance() (used by is_live_before queries) to search
for the func_instance with maximal depth at the corresponding
callsite, walking depth downward from frameno to 0. This accounts for
the fact that instance depth no longer corresponds 1:1 to
bpf_verifier_state->curframe, since skipped non-FP calls create gaps.
Remove the dynamic public liveness API from verifier.c:
- bpf_mark_stack_{read,write}(), bpf_reset/commit_stack_write_marks()
- bpf_update_live_stack(), bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain()
- All call sites in check_stack_{read,write}_fixed_off(),
check_stack_range_initialized(), mark_stack_slot_obj_read(),
mark/unmark_stack_slots_{dynptr,iter,irq_flag}()
- The per-instruction write mark accumulation in do_check()
- The bpf_update_live_stack() call in prepare_func_exit()
mark_stack_read() and mark_stack_write() become static functions in
liveness.c, called only from the static analysis pass. The
func_instance->updated and must_write_dropped flags are removed.
Remove spis_single_slot(), spis_msb_half_slot(), spis_lsb_half_slot()
helpers from bpf_verifier.h as they are no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 44 ----
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 559 +++++++++++++------------------------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 79 +-----
3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 518 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 0cc415bfc851750fe658fb0920482e77ba0fc9be..9f412142be7f8eed2053edd30a9ffd26ab012a5b 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -284,44 +284,6 @@ static inline void spis_or_range(spis_t *mask, u32 lo, u32 hi)
mask->v[w / 64] |= BIT_ULL(w % 64);
}
-/*
- * Return a mask with both 4-byte sub-slots of an 8-byte SPI set.
- * Each 8-byte SPI maps to two consecutive 4-byte stack slots:
- * spi -> slots [spi*2, spi*2+1]
- */
-static inline spis_t spis_single_slot(u32 spi)
-{
- spis_t m = SPIS_ZERO;
-
- spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2);
- spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2 + 1);
- return m;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return a mask with only the MSB (higher-addressed) 4-byte half
- * of an 8-byte SPI set. This is sub-slot spi*2+1.
- */
-static inline spis_t spis_msb_half_slot(u32 spi)
-{
- spis_t m = SPIS_ZERO;
-
- spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2 + 1);
- return m;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return a mask with only the LSB (lower-addressed) 4-byte half
- * of an 8-byte SPI set. This is sub-slot spi*2.
- */
-static inline spis_t spis_lsb_half_slot(u32 spi)
-{
- spis_t m = SPIS_ZERO;
-
- spis_set_bit(&m, spi * 2);
- return m;
-}
-
#define BPF_REGMASK_ARGS ((1 << BPF_REG_1) | (1 << BPF_REG_2) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_3) | (1 << BPF_REG_4) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_5))
@@ -1251,13 +1213,7 @@ int bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
int bpf_stack_liveness_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
void bpf_stack_liveness_free(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
-int bpf_update_live_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
-int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask);
-void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, spis_t mask);
-int bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx);
-int bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st);
bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 spi);
-void bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index 4457cd80d072b9b506bb2ef8ad477bd7e3403c2c..c3098369bee801eecc76ee40315cdeb49acf14b0 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -49,22 +49,8 @@
*
* The above equations are computed for each call chain and instruction
* index until state stops changing.
- * - Additionally, in order to transfer "must_write" information from a
- * subprogram to call instructions invoking this subprogram,
- * the "must_write_acc" set is tracked for each (cc, i) tuple.
- * A set of stack slots that are guaranteed to be written by this
- * instruction or any of its successors (within the subprogram).
- * The equation for "must_write_acc" propagation looks as follows:
- *
- * state[cc, i].must_write_acc =
- * ∩ [state[cc, s].must_write_acc for s in bpf_insn_successors(i)]
- * U state[cc, i].must_write
- *
- * (An intersection of all "must_write_acc" for instruction successors
- * plus all "must_write" slots for the instruction itself).
* - After the propagation phase completes for a subprogram, information from
* (cc, 0) tuple (subprogram entry) is transferred to the caller's call chain:
- * - "must_write_acc" set is intersected with the call site's "must_write" set;
* - "may_read" set is added to the call site's "may_read" set.
* - Any live stack queries must be taken after the propagation phase.
* - Accumulation and propagation phases can be entered multiple times,
@@ -85,43 +71,33 @@
* - A hash table mapping call chains to function instances.
*/
-struct callchain {
- u32 callsites[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; /* instruction pointer for each frame */
- /* cached subprog_info[*].start for functions owning the frames:
- * - sp_starts[curframe] used to get insn relative index within current function;
- * - sp_starts[0..current-1] used for fast callchain_frame_up().
- */
- u32 sp_starts[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
- u32 curframe; /* depth of callsites and sp_starts arrays */
-};
-
struct per_frame_masks {
spis_t may_read; /* stack slots that may be read by this instruction */
spis_t must_write; /* stack slots written by this instruction */
- spis_t must_write_acc; /* stack slots written by this instruction and its successors */
spis_t live_before; /* stack slots that may be read by this insn and its successors */
};
/*
- * A function instance created for a specific callchain.
+ * A function instance keyed by (callsite, depth).
* Encapsulates read and write marks for each instruction in the function.
- * Marks are tracked for each frame in the callchain.
+ * Marks are tracked for each frame up to @depth.
*/
struct func_instance {
struct hlist_node hl_node;
- struct callchain callchain;
+ u32 callsite; /* call insn that invoked this subprog (subprog_start for depth 0) */
+ u32 depth; /* call depth (0 = entry subprog) */
u32 subprog; /* subprog index */
+ u32 subprog_start; /* cached env->subprog_info[subprog].start */
u32 insn_cnt; /* cached number of insns in the function */
- bool updated;
- bool must_write_dropped;
+ u32 callsites[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; /* callsites[i] = call insn at frame i (for outer frame lookup) */
/* Per frame, per instruction masks, frames allocated lazily. */
struct per_frame_masks *frames[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
- /* For each instruction a flag telling if "must_write" had been initialized for it. */
- bool *must_write_set;
+ bool must_write_initialized;
};
struct live_stack_query {
struct func_instance *instances[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; /* valid in range [0..curframe] */
+ u32 callsites[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; /* callsite[i] = insn calling frame i+1 */
u32 curframe;
u32 insn_idx;
};
@@ -129,113 +105,81 @@ struct live_stack_query {
struct bpf_liveness {
DECLARE_HASHTABLE(func_instances, 8); /* maps callchain to func_instance */
struct live_stack_query live_stack_query; /* cache to avoid repetitive ht lookups */
- /* Cached instance corresponding to env->cur_state, avoids per-instruction ht lookup */
- struct func_instance *cur_instance;
- /*
- * Below fields are used to accumulate stack write marks for instruction at
- * @write_insn_idx before submitting the marks to @cur_instance.
- */
- spis_t write_masks_acc[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
- u32 write_insn_idx;
};
-/* Compute callchain corresponding to state @st at depth @frameno */
-static void compute_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st,
- struct callchain *callchain, u32 frameno)
+/*
+ * Hash/compare key for func_instance: (depth, callsite).
+ * For depth == 0 (entry subprog), @callsite is the subprog start insn.
+ * For depth > 0, @callsite is the call instruction index that invoked the subprog.
+ */
+static u32 instance_hash(u32 callsite, u32 depth)
{
- struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog_info = env->subprog_info;
- u32 i;
-
- memset(callchain, 0, sizeof(*callchain));
- for (i = 0; i <= frameno; i++) {
- callchain->sp_starts[i] = subprog_info[st->frame[i]->subprogno].start;
- if (i < st->curframe)
- callchain->callsites[i] = st->frame[i + 1]->callsite;
- }
- callchain->curframe = frameno;
- callchain->callsites[callchain->curframe] = callchain->sp_starts[callchain->curframe];
-}
+ u32 key[2] = { depth, callsite };
-static u32 hash_callchain(struct callchain *callchain)
-{
- return jhash2(callchain->callsites, callchain->curframe, 0);
+ return jhash2(key, 2, 0);
}
-static bool same_callsites(struct callchain *a, struct callchain *b)
-{
- int i;
-
- if (a->curframe != b->curframe)
- return false;
- for (i = a->curframe; i >= 0; i--)
- if (a->callsites[i] != b->callsites[i])
- return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-/*
- * Find existing or allocate new function instance corresponding to @callchain.
- * Instances are accumulated in env->liveness->func_instances and persist
- * until the end of the verification process.
- */
-static struct func_instance *__lookup_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct callchain *callchain)
+static struct func_instance *find_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ u32 callsite, u32 depth)
{
struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
- struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
- struct func_instance *result;
- u32 subprog_sz, size, key;
-
- key = hash_callchain(callchain);
- hash_for_each_possible(liveness->func_instances, result, hl_node, key)
- if (same_callsites(&result->callchain, callchain))
- return result;
-
- subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, callchain->sp_starts[callchain->curframe]);
- subprog_sz = (subprog + 1)->start - subprog->start;
- size = sizeof(struct func_instance);
- result = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!result)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- result->must_write_set = kvzalloc_objs(*result->must_write_set,
- subprog_sz, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!result->must_write_set) {
- kvfree(result);
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- }
- memcpy(&result->callchain, callchain, sizeof(*callchain));
- result->subprog = subprog - env->subprog_info;
- result->insn_cnt = subprog_sz;
- hash_add(liveness->func_instances, &result->hl_node, key);
- return result;
+ struct func_instance *f;
+ u32 key = instance_hash(callsite, depth);
+
+ hash_for_each_possible(liveness->func_instances, f, hl_node, key)
+ if (f->depth == depth && f->callsite == callsite)
+ return f;
+ return NULL;
}
static struct func_instance *call_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct func_instance *caller,
u32 callsite, int subprog)
{
- struct callchain cc;
-
- if (caller) {
- cc = caller->callchain;
- cc.callsites[cc.curframe] = callsite;
- cc.curframe++;
- } else {
- memset(&cc, 0, sizeof(cc));
- }
- cc.sp_starts[cc.curframe] = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
- cc.callsites[cc.curframe] = cc.sp_starts[cc.curframe];
- return __lookup_instance(env, &cc);
+ u32 depth = caller ? caller->depth + 1 : 0;
+ u32 subprog_start = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
+ u32 lookup_key = depth > 0 ? callsite : subprog_start;
+ struct func_instance *f;
+ u32 hash;
+
+ f = find_instance(env, lookup_key, depth);
+ if (f)
+ return f;
+
+ f = kvzalloc(sizeof(*f), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!f)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ f->callsite = lookup_key;
+ f->depth = depth;
+ f->subprog = subprog;
+ f->subprog_start = subprog_start;
+ f->insn_cnt = (env->subprog_info + subprog + 1)->start - subprog_start;
+ if (caller)
+ memcpy(f->callsites, caller->callsites, sizeof(f->callsites));
+ if (depth > 0)
+ f->callsites[depth - 1] = callsite;
+ hash = instance_hash(lookup_key, depth);
+ hash_add(env->liveness->func_instances, &f->hl_node, hash);
+ return f;
}
static struct func_instance *lookup_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *st,
u32 frameno)
{
- struct callchain callchain;
-
- compute_callchain(env, st, &callchain, frameno);
- return __lookup_instance(env, &callchain);
+ u32 callsite, subprog_start;
+ struct func_instance *f;
+ u32 key, depth;
+
+ subprog_start = env->subprog_info[st->frame[frameno]->subprogno].start;
+ callsite = frameno > 0 ? st->frame[frameno]->callsite : subprog_start;
+
+ for (depth = frameno; ; depth--) {
+ key = depth > 0 ? callsite : subprog_start;
+ f = find_instance(env, key, depth);
+ if (f || depth == 0)
+ return f;
+ }
}
int bpf_stack_liveness_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
@@ -256,9 +200,8 @@ void bpf_stack_liveness_free(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (!env->liveness)
return;
hash_for_each_safe(env->liveness->func_instances, bkt, tmp, instance, hl_node) {
- for (i = 0; i <= instance->callchain.curframe; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i <= instance->depth; i++)
kvfree(instance->frames[i]);
- kvfree(instance->must_write_set);
kvfree(instance);
}
kvfree(env->liveness);
@@ -270,7 +213,7 @@ void bpf_stack_liveness_free(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
*/
static int relative_idx(struct func_instance *instance, u32 insn_idx)
{
- return insn_idx - instance->callchain.sp_starts[instance->callchain.curframe];
+ return insn_idx - instance->subprog_start;
}
static struct per_frame_masks *get_frame_masks(struct func_instance *instance,
@@ -297,145 +240,36 @@ static struct per_frame_masks *alloc_frame_masks(struct func_instance *instance,
return get_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
}
-void bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
- env->liveness->cur_instance = NULL;
-}
-
-/* If @env->liveness->cur_instance is null, set it to instance corresponding to @env->cur_state. */
-static int ensure_cur_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
- struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
- struct func_instance *instance;
-
- if (liveness->cur_instance)
- return 0;
-
- instance = lookup_instance(env, env->cur_state, env->cur_state->curframe);
- if (IS_ERR(instance))
- return PTR_ERR(instance);
-
- liveness->cur_instance = instance;
- return 0;
-}
-
/* Accumulate may_read masks for @frame at @insn_idx */
static int mark_stack_read(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
{
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
- spis_t new_may_read;
masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
if (IS_ERR(masks))
return PTR_ERR(masks);
- new_may_read = spis_or(masks->may_read, mask);
- if (!spis_equal(new_may_read, masks->may_read) &&
- !spis_equal(spis_or(new_may_read, masks->live_before),
- masks->live_before))
- instance->updated = true;
masks->may_read = spis_or(masks->may_read, mask);
return 0;
}
-int bpf_mark_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
+static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
{
- int err;
-
- err = ensure_cur_instance(env);
- err = err ?: mark_stack_read(env->liveness->cur_instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
- return err;
-}
-
-static void reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
-{
- struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i <= instance->callchain.curframe; i++)
- liveness->write_masks_acc[i] = SPIS_ZERO;
-}
-
-int bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx)
-{
- struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
- int err;
-
- err = ensure_cur_instance(env);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- liveness->write_insn_idx = insn_idx;
- reset_stack_write_marks(env, liveness->cur_instance);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void bpf_mark_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frame, spis_t mask)
-{
- env->liveness->write_masks_acc[frame] = spis_or(env->liveness->write_masks_acc[frame], mask);
-}
-
-static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance,
- u32 insn_idx)
-{
- struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
- u32 idx, frame, curframe;
struct per_frame_masks *masks;
- spis_t mask, old_must_write, dropped;
- if (!instance)
- return 0;
-
- curframe = instance->callchain.curframe;
- idx = relative_idx(instance, insn_idx);
- for (frame = 0; frame <= curframe; frame++) {
- mask = liveness->write_masks_acc[frame];
- /* avoid allocating frames for zero masks */
- if (spis_is_zero(mask) && !instance->must_write_set[idx])
- continue;
- masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
- if (IS_ERR(masks))
- return PTR_ERR(masks);
- old_must_write = masks->must_write;
- /*
- * If instruction at this callchain is seen for a first time, set must_write equal
- * to @mask. Otherwise take intersection with the previous value.
- */
- if (instance->must_write_set[idx])
- mask = spis_and(mask, old_must_write);
- if (!spis_equal(old_must_write, mask)) {
- masks->must_write = mask;
- instance->updated = true;
- }
- /* dropped = old_must_write & ~mask */
- dropped = spis_and(old_must_write, spis_not(mask));
- if (!spis_is_zero(dropped))
- instance->must_write_dropped = true;
- }
- instance->must_write_set[idx] = true;
- liveness->write_insn_idx = 0;
+ masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
+ if (IS_ERR(masks))
+ return PTR_ERR(masks);
+ if (instance->must_write_initialized)
+ masks->must_write = spis_and(masks->must_write, mask);
+ else
+ masks->must_write = mask;
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Merge stack writes marks in @env->liveness->write_masks_acc
- * with information already in @env->liveness->cur_instance.
- */
-int bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
- return commit_stack_write_marks(env, env->liveness->cur_instance, env->liveness->write_insn_idx);
-}
-
-static char *fmt_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct callchain *callchain)
+static char *fmt_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
{
- char *buf_end = env->tmp_str_buf + sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf);
- char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf;
- int i;
-
- buf += snprintf(buf, buf_end - buf, "(");
- for (i = 0; i <= callchain->curframe; i++)
- buf += snprintf(buf, buf_end - buf, "%s%d", i ? "," : "", callchain->callsites[i]);
- snprintf(buf, buf_end - buf, ")");
+ snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf),
+ "(d%d,cs%d)", instance->depth, instance->callsite);
return env->tmp_str_buf;
}
@@ -466,7 +300,7 @@ static void bpf_fmt_spis_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, spis_t spis)
}
}
-static void log_mask_change(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct callchain *callchain,
+static void log_mask_change(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance,
char *pfx, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx,
spis_t old, spis_t new)
{
@@ -478,7 +312,7 @@ static void log_mask_change(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct callchain *call
if (spis_is_zero(changed_bits))
return;
- bpf_log(&env->log, "%s frame %d insn %d ", fmt_callchain(env, callchain), frame, insn_idx);
+ bpf_log(&env->log, "%s frame %d insn %d ", fmt_instance(env, instance), frame, insn_idx);
if (!spis_is_zero(new_ones)) {
bpf_fmt_spis_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_ones);
bpf_log(&env->log, "+%s %s ", pfx, env->tmp_str_buf);
@@ -561,61 +395,12 @@ bpf_insn_successors(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 idx)
__diag_pop();
-static struct func_instance *get_outer_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance)
-{
- struct callchain callchain = instance->callchain;
-
- /* Adjust @callchain to represent callchain one frame up */
- callchain.callsites[callchain.curframe] = 0;
- callchain.sp_starts[callchain.curframe] = 0;
- callchain.curframe--;
- callchain.callsites[callchain.curframe] = callchain.sp_starts[callchain.curframe];
- return __lookup_instance(env, &callchain);
-}
-
-static u32 callchain_subprog_start(struct callchain *callchain)
-{
- return callchain->sp_starts[callchain->curframe];
-}
-
-/*
- * Transfer @may_read and @must_write_acc marks from the first instruction of @instance,
- * to the call instruction in function instance calling @instance.
- */
-static int propagate_to_outer_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance)
-{
- struct callchain *callchain = &instance->callchain;
- u32 this_subprog_start, callsite, frame;
- struct func_instance *outer_instance;
- struct per_frame_masks *insn;
- int err;
-
- this_subprog_start = callchain_subprog_start(callchain);
- outer_instance = get_outer_instance(env, instance);
- if (IS_ERR(outer_instance))
- return PTR_ERR(outer_instance);
- callsite = callchain->callsites[callchain->curframe - 1];
- reset_stack_write_marks(env, outer_instance);
- for (frame = 0; frame < callchain->curframe; frame++) {
- insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, this_subprog_start);
- if (!insn)
- continue;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, frame, insn->must_write_acc);
- err = mark_stack_read(outer_instance, frame, callsite, insn->live_before);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
- commit_stack_write_marks(env, outer_instance, callsite);
- return 0;
-}
static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
- spis_t new_before, new_after, must_write_acc;
+ spis_t new_before, new_after;
struct per_frame_masks *insn, *succ_insn;
struct bpf_iarray *succ;
u32 s;
@@ -629,17 +414,10 @@ static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
new_before = SPIS_ZERO;
new_after = SPIS_ZERO;
- /*
- * New "must_write_acc" is an intersection of all "must_write_acc"
- * of successors plus all "must_write" slots of instruction itself.
- */
- must_write_acc = SPIS_ALL;
for (s = 0; s < succ->cnt; ++s) {
succ_insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, succ->items[s]);
new_after = spis_or(new_after, succ_insn->live_before);
- must_write_acc = spis_and(must_write_acc, succ_insn->must_write_acc);
}
- must_write_acc = spis_or(must_write_acc, insn->must_write);
/*
* New "live_before" is a union of all "live_before" of successors
* minus slots written by instruction plus slots read by instruction.
@@ -648,53 +426,27 @@ static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
new_before = spis_or(spis_and(new_after, spis_not(insn->must_write)),
insn->may_read);
changed |= !spis_equal(new_before, insn->live_before);
- changed |= !spis_equal(must_write_acc, insn->must_write_acc);
if (unlikely(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) &&
(!spis_is_zero(insn->may_read) || !spis_is_zero(insn->must_write) ||
- insn_idx == callchain_subprog_start(&instance->callchain) ||
+ insn_idx == instance->subprog_start ||
aux[insn_idx].prune_point)) {
- log_mask_change(env, &instance->callchain, "live",
+ log_mask_change(env, instance, "live",
frame, insn_idx, insn->live_before, new_before);
- log_mask_change(env, &instance->callchain, "written",
- frame, insn_idx, insn->must_write_acc, must_write_acc);
}
insn->live_before = new_before;
- insn->must_write_acc = must_write_acc;
return changed;
}
-/* Fixed-point computation of @live_before and @must_write_acc marks */
-static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
+/* Fixed-point computation of @live_before marks */
+static void update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
{
- u32 i, frame, po_start, po_end, cnt, this_subprog_start;
- struct callchain *callchain = &instance->callchain;
+ u32 i, frame, po_start, po_end, cnt;
int *insn_postorder = env->cfg.insn_postorder;
struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
- struct per_frame_masks *insn;
bool changed;
- int err;
-
- if (!instance->updated)
- return 0;
-
- this_subprog_start = callchain_subprog_start(callchain);
- /*
- * If must_write marks were updated must_write_acc needs to be reset
- * (to account for the case when new must_write sets became smaller).
- */
- if (instance->must_write_dropped) {
- for (frame = 0; frame <= callchain->curframe; frame++) {
- if (!instance->frames[frame])
- continue;
-
- for (i = 0; i < instance->insn_cnt; i++) {
- insn = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, this_subprog_start + i);
- insn->must_write_acc = SPIS_ZERO;
- }
- }
- }
- subprog = bpf_find_containing_subprog(env, this_subprog_start);
+ instance->must_write_initialized = true;
+ subprog = &env->subprog_info[instance->subprog];
po_start = subprog->postorder_start;
po_end = (subprog + 1)->postorder_start;
cnt = 0;
@@ -702,7 +454,7 @@ static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *i
do {
cnt++;
changed = false;
- for (frame = 0; frame <= instance->callchain.curframe; frame++) {
+ for (frame = 0; frame <= instance->depth; frame++) {
if (!instance->frames[frame])
continue;
@@ -713,43 +465,8 @@ static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *i
if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
bpf_log(&env->log, "%s live stack update done in %d iterations\n",
- fmt_callchain(env, callchain), cnt);
-
- /* transfer marks accumulated for outer frames to outer func instance (caller) */
- if (callchain->curframe > 0) {
- err = propagate_to_outer_instance(env, instance);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
+ fmt_instance(env, instance), cnt);
- instance->updated = false;
- instance->must_write_dropped = false;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Prepare all callchains within @env->cur_state for querying.
- * This function should be called after each verifier.c:pop_stack()
- * and whenever verifier.c:do_check_insn() processes subprogram exit.
- * This would guarantee that visited verifier states with zero branches
- * have their bpf_mark_stack_{read,write}() effects propagated in
- * @env->liveness.
- */
-int bpf_update_live_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
- struct func_instance *instance;
- int err, frame;
-
- bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(env);
- for (frame = env->cur_state->curframe; frame >= 0; --frame) {
- instance = lookup_instance(env, env->cur_state, frame);
- if (IS_ERR(instance))
- return PTR_ERR(instance);
-
- err = update_instance(env, instance);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -770,9 +487,12 @@ int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_
memset(q, 0, sizeof(*q));
for (frame = 0; frame <= st->curframe; frame++) {
instance = lookup_instance(env, st, frame);
- if (IS_ERR(instance))
- return PTR_ERR(instance);
- q->instances[frame] = instance;
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(instance))
+ q->instances[frame] = NULL;
+ else
+ q->instances[frame] = instance;
+ if (frame < st->curframe)
+ q->callsites[frame] = st->frame[frame + 1]->callsite;
}
q->curframe = st->curframe;
q->insn_idx = st->insn_idx;
@@ -782,27 +502,44 @@ int bpf_live_stack_query_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_
bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 half_spi)
{
/*
- * Slot is alive if it is read before q->st->insn_idx in current func instance,
+ * Slot is alive if it is read before q->insn_idx in current func instance,
* or if for some outer func instance:
* - alive before callsite if callsite calls callback, otherwise
* - alive after callsite
*/
struct live_stack_query *q = &env->liveness->live_stack_query;
struct func_instance *instance, *curframe_instance;
- u32 i, callsite;
- bool alive;
+ u32 i, callsite, rel;
+ int cur_delta, delta;
+ bool alive = false;
curframe_instance = q->instances[q->curframe];
- alive = is_live_before(curframe_instance, q->insn_idx, frameno, half_spi);
+ if (!curframe_instance)
+ return true;
+ cur_delta = (int)curframe_instance->depth - (int)q->curframe;
+ rel = frameno + cur_delta;
+ if (rel <= curframe_instance->depth)
+ alive = is_live_before(curframe_instance, q->insn_idx, rel, half_spi);
+
if (alive)
return true;
for (i = frameno; i < q->curframe; i++) {
- callsite = curframe_instance->callchain.callsites[i];
instance = q->instances[i];
+ if (!instance)
+ return true;
+ /* Map actual frameno to frame index within this instance */
+ delta = (int)instance->depth - (int)i;
+ rel = frameno + delta;
+ if (rel > instance->depth)
+ return true;
+
+ /* Get callsite from verifier state, not from instance callchain */
+ callsite = q->callsites[i];
+
alive = bpf_calls_callback(env, callsite)
- ? is_live_before(instance, callsite, frameno, half_spi)
- : is_live_before(instance, callsite + 1, frameno, half_spi);
+ ? is_live_before(instance, callsite, rel, half_spi)
+ : is_live_before(instance, callsite + 1, rel, half_spi);
if (alive)
return true;
}
@@ -1300,7 +1037,7 @@ static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct arg_track *at_out, struct arg_track *at_stack_out,
struct func_instance *instance)
{
- int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int depth = instance->depth;
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
u8 code = BPF_OP(insn->code);
struct arg_track *dst = &at_out[insn->dst_reg];
@@ -1372,7 +1109,7 @@ static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
} else if (src->frame >= 0 && src->frame < depth &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM && sz == 8) {
struct arg_track *parent_stack =
- env->callsite_at_stack[instance->callchain.callsites[src->frame]];
+ env->callsite_at_stack[instance->callsites[src->frame]];
*dst = fill_from_stack(insn, at_out, insn->src_reg,
parent_stack, src->frame);
@@ -1430,8 +1167,7 @@ static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
* access_bytes == 0: no access
*
*/
-static void record_stack_access_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,
+static void record_stack_access_off(struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,
s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
{
s32 slot_hi, slot_lo;
@@ -1467,7 +1203,7 @@ static void record_stack_access_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (slot_lo <= slot_hi) {
mask = SPIS_ZERO;
spis_or_range(&mask, slot_lo, slot_hi);
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, frame, mask);
+ mark_stack_write(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
}
}
}
@@ -1476,8 +1212,7 @@ static void record_stack_access_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* 'arg' is FP-derived argument to helper/kfunc or load/store that
* reads (positive) or writes (negative) 'access_bytes' into 'use' or 'def'.
*/
-static void record_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct func_instance *instance,
+static void record_stack_access(struct func_instance *instance,
const struct arg_track *arg,
s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
{
@@ -1495,7 +1230,7 @@ static void record_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return;
for (i = 0; i < arg->off_cnt; i++)
- record_stack_access_off(env, instance, arg->off[i], access_bytes, frame, insn_idx);
+ record_stack_access_off(instance, arg->off[i], access_bytes, frame, insn_idx);
}
/*
@@ -1504,7 +1239,7 @@ static void record_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*/
static void record_imprecise(struct func_instance *instance, u32 mask, u32 insn_idx)
{
- int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int depth = instance->depth;
int f;
for (f = 0; mask; f++, mask >>= 1) {
@@ -1521,7 +1256,7 @@ static void record_load_store_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct arg_track *at, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
- int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int depth = instance->depth;
s32 sz = bpf_size_to_bytes(BPF_SIZE(insn->code));
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
struct arg_track resolved, *ptr;
@@ -1567,7 +1302,7 @@ static void record_load_store_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
if (ptr->frame >= 0 && ptr->frame <= depth) {
- record_stack_access(env, instance, ptr, sz, ptr->frame, insn_idx);
+ record_stack_access(instance, ptr, sz, ptr->frame, insn_idx);
} else if (ptr->frame == ARG_IMPRECISE) {
record_imprecise(instance, ptr->mask, insn_idx);
}
@@ -1581,7 +1316,7 @@ static void record_call_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
- int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int depth = instance->depth;
struct bpf_call_summary cs;
int r, num_params = 5;
@@ -1611,7 +1346,7 @@ static void record_call_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
continue;
if (frame >= 0 && frame <= depth) {
- record_stack_access(env, instance, &at[r], bytes, frame, insn_idx);
+ record_stack_access(instance, &at[r], bytes, frame, insn_idx);
} else if (frame == ARG_IMPRECISE) {
record_imprecise(instance, at[r].mask, insn_idx);
}
@@ -1767,7 +1502,7 @@ static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
{
int subprog = instance->subprog;
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
- int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int depth = instance->depth;
int start = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
int po_start = env->subprog_info[subprog].postorder_start;
int end = env->subprog_info[subprog + 1].start;
@@ -1867,7 +1602,6 @@ static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int i = idx - start;
struct bpf_insn *insn = &insns[idx];
- reset_stack_write_marks(env, instance);
record_load_store_access(env, instance, at_in[i], idx);
if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
@@ -1883,7 +1617,6 @@ static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
memcpy(env->callsite_at_stack[idx],
at_stack_in[i], sizeof(struct arg_track) * MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS);
}
- commit_stack_write_marks(env, instance, idx);
}
info->at_in = at_in;
@@ -1899,6 +1632,15 @@ static int compute_subprog_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return err;
}
+/* Return true if any of R1-R5 is derived from a frame pointer. */
+static bool has_fp_args(struct arg_track *args)
+{
+ for (int r = BPF_REG_1; r <= BPF_REG_5; r++)
+ if (args[r].frame != ARG_NONE)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Recursively analyze a subprog with specific 'entry_args'.
* Each callee is analyzed with the exact args from its call site.
@@ -1914,7 +1656,7 @@ static int analyze_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct func_instance *instance)
{
int subprog = instance->subprog;
- int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
+ int depth = instance->depth;
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int start = env->subprog_info[subprog].start;
int po_start = env->subprog_info[subprog].postorder_start;
@@ -1976,6 +1718,9 @@ static int analyze_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
continue;
}
+ if (!has_fp_args(callee_args))
+ continue;
+
if (depth == MAX_CALL_FRAMES - 1)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1985,9 +1730,25 @@ static int analyze_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
err = analyze_subprog(env, callee_args, info, callee_instance);
if (err)
return err;
+
+ /* Pull callee's entry liveness back to caller's callsite */
+ {
+ u32 callee_start = callee_instance->subprog_start;
+ struct per_frame_masks *entry;
+
+ for (int f = 0; f < callee_instance->depth; f++) {
+ entry = get_frame_masks(callee_instance, f, callee_start);
+ if (!entry)
+ continue;
+ err = mark_stack_read(instance, f, idx, entry->live_before);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
}
- return update_instance(env, instance);
+ update_instance(env, instance);
+ return 0;
}
int bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 838f164f803fae7bb7fc203cd7e1225adb75ad7f..2bd8511aa1508a96c23e93df174f64708dafb4b5 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -828,9 +828,6 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_
state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
}
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - 1));
-
return 0;
}
@@ -845,9 +842,6 @@ static void invalidate_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
-
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - 1));
}
static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
@@ -965,9 +959,6 @@ static int destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - 1));
-
return 0;
}
@@ -1093,7 +1084,6 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_ITER;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - i));
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
}
@@ -1122,7 +1112,6 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
slot->slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi - i));
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
}
@@ -1212,7 +1201,6 @@ static int mark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
slot = &state->stack[spi];
st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
__mark_reg_known_zero(st);
st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */
st->ref_obj_id = id;
@@ -1268,8 +1256,6 @@ static int unmark_stack_slot_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_r
__mark_reg_not_init(env, st);
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, reg->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
-
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
slot->slot_type[i] = STACK_INVALID;
@@ -3856,15 +3842,10 @@ static int sort_subprogs_topo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
static int mark_stack_slot_obj_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int spi, int nr_slots)
{
- int err, i;
+ int i;
- for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
- err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx,
- spis_single_slot(spi - i));
- if (err)
- return err;
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++)
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -5412,17 +5393,6 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (err)
return err;
- if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_REG_SIZE) {
- /* 8-byte aligned, 8-byte write */
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_single_slot(spi));
- } else if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) {
- /* 8-byte aligned, 4-byte write */
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_lsb_half_slot(spi));
- } else if (!(off % BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) {
- /* 4-byte aligned, 4-byte write */
- bpf_mark_stack_write(env, state->frameno, spis_msb_half_slot(spi));
- }
-
check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, insn_idx, off);
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
if (reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && env->bpf_capable) {
@@ -5679,25 +5649,12 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
u8 *stype, type;
int insn_flags = insn_stack_access_flags(reg_state->frameno, spi);
- spis_t mask;
- int err;
stype = reg_state->stack[spi].slot_type;
reg = ®_state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
mark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi);
check_fastcall_stack_contract(env, state, env->insn_idx, off);
- if (!(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE)
- /* 8-byte aligned, 4-byte read */
- mask = spis_lsb_half_slot(spi);
- else if (!(off % BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE) && size == BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE)
- /* 4-byte aligned, 4-byte read */
- mask = spis_msb_half_slot(spi);
- else
- mask = spis_single_slot(spi);
- err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg_state->frameno, env->insn_idx, mask);
- if (err)
- return err;
if (is_spilled_reg(®_state->stack[spi])) {
u8 spill_size = 1;
@@ -8489,18 +8446,7 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
}
return -EACCES;
mark:
- /* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
- * the whole slot to be marked as 'read'
- */
- err = bpf_mark_stack_read(env, reg->frameno, env->insn_idx,
- spis_single_slot(spi));
- if (err)
- return err;
- /* We do not call bpf_mark_stack_write(), as we can not
- * be sure that whether stack slot is written to or not. Hence,
- * we must still conservatively propagate reads upwards even if
- * helper may write to the entire memory range.
- */
+ ;
}
return 0;
}
@@ -11115,8 +11061,6 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
*insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1;
- bpf_reset_live_stack_callchain(env);
-
if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
verbose(env, "caller:\n");
print_verifier_state(env, state, caller->frameno, true);
@@ -11401,10 +11345,6 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
bool in_callback_fn;
int err;
- err = bpf_update_live_stack(env);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
r0 = &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0];
if (r0->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
@@ -21751,7 +21691,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
- int err, marks_err;
+ int err;
/* reset current history entry on each new instruction */
env->cur_hist_ent = NULL;
@@ -21865,15 +21805,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec)
goto process_bpf_exit;
- err = bpf_reset_stack_write_marks(env, env->insn_idx);
- if (err)
- return err;
err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state);
- if (err >= 0 || error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)) {
- marks_err = bpf_commit_stack_write_marks(env);
- if (marks_err)
- return marks_err;
- }
if (error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) && state->speculative) {
/* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the
* insn that would have been unsafe to execute.
@@ -21914,9 +21846,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
process_bpf_exit:
mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
err = update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = bpf_update_live_stack(env);
if (err)
return err;
err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &env->insn_idx,
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 10/14] bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/14] bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/14] selftests/bpf: update existing tests due to liveness changes Eduard Zingerman
` (3 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
Instead of breadcrumps like:
(d2,cs15) frame 0 insn 18 +live -16
(d2,cs15) frame 0 insn 17 +live -16
Print final accumulated stack use/def data per-func_instance
per-instruction. printed func_instance's are ordered by callsite and
depth. For example:
stack use/def subprog#0 shared_instance_must_write_overwrite (d0,cs0):
0: (b7) r1 = 1
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; def: fp0-8
2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r1 ; def: fp0-16
3: (bf) r1 = r10
4: (07) r1 += -8
5: (bf) r2 = r10
6: (07) r2 += -16
7: (85) call pc+7 ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16
8: (bf) r1 = r10
9: (07) r1 += -16
10: (bf) r2 = r10
11: (07) r2 += -8
12: (85) call pc+2 ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16
13: (b7) r0 = 0
14: (95) exit
stack use/def subprog#1 forwarding_rw (d1,cs7):
15: (85) call pc+1 ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16
16: (95) exit
stack use/def subprog#1 forwarding_rw (d1,cs12):
15: (85) call pc+1 ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16
16: (95) exit
stack use/def subprog#2 write_first_read_second (d2,cs15):
17: (7a) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = 42
18: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 +0) ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16
19: (95) exit
For groups of three or more consecutive stack slots, abbreviate as
follows:
25: (85) call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp2-8..-512 fp1-8..-512 fp0-8..-512
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 5 -
kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 250 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 9f412142be7f8eed2053edd30a9ffd26ab012a5b..75f3ae48431cbb675d76af3d899064cafed2f9ee 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -256,11 +256,6 @@ static inline spis_t spis_and(spis_t a, spis_t b)
return (spis_t){{ a.v[0] & b.v[0], a.v[1] & b.v[1] }};
}
-static inline spis_t spis_xor(spis_t a, spis_t b)
-{
- return (spis_t){{ a.v[0] ^ b.v[0], a.v[1] ^ b.v[1] }};
-}
-
static inline spis_t spis_not(spis_t s)
{
return (spis_t){{ ~s.v[0], ~s.v[1] }};
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
index c3098369bee801eecc76ee40315cdeb49acf14b0..832c10846ec5eaea5840b66d85fc23b305d7925c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
#define verbose(env, fmt, args...) bpf_verifier_log_write(env, fmt, ##args)
@@ -266,64 +267,6 @@ static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_
return 0;
}
-static char *fmt_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
-{
- snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf),
- "(d%d,cs%d)", instance->depth, instance->callsite);
- return env->tmp_str_buf;
-}
-
-/*
- * When both halves of an 8-byte SPI are set, print as "-8","-16",...
- * When only one half is set, print as "-4h","-8h",...
- */
-static void bpf_fmt_spis_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, spis_t spis)
-{
- bool first = true;
- int spi, n;
-
- buf[0] = '\0';
-
- for (spi = 0; spi < STACK_SLOTS / 2 && buf_sz > 0; spi++) {
- bool lo = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2);
- bool hi = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 1);
-
- if (!lo && !hi)
- continue;
- n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d%s",
- first ? "" : ",",
- -(spi + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE + (lo && !hi ? BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE : 0),
- lo && hi ? "" : "h");
- first = false;
- buf += n;
- buf_sz -= n;
- }
-}
-
-static void log_mask_change(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance,
- char *pfx, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx,
- spis_t old, spis_t new)
-{
- spis_t changed_bits, new_ones, new_zeros;
-
- changed_bits = spis_xor(old, new);
- new_ones = spis_and(new, changed_bits);
- new_zeros = spis_and(spis_not(new), changed_bits);
-
- if (spis_is_zero(changed_bits))
- return;
- bpf_log(&env->log, "%s frame %d insn %d ", fmt_instance(env, instance), frame, insn_idx);
- if (!spis_is_zero(new_ones)) {
- bpf_fmt_spis_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_ones);
- bpf_log(&env->log, "+%s %s ", pfx, env->tmp_str_buf);
- }
- if (!spis_is_zero(new_zeros)) {
- bpf_fmt_spis_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf), new_zeros);
- bpf_log(&env->log, "-%s %s", pfx, env->tmp_str_buf);
- }
- bpf_log(&env->log, "\n");
-}
-
int bpf_jmp_offset(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 code = insn->code;
@@ -399,7 +342,6 @@ __diag_pop();
static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
{
- struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data;
spis_t new_before, new_after;
struct per_frame_masks *insn, *succ_insn;
struct bpf_iarray *succ;
@@ -426,13 +368,6 @@ static inline bool update_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
new_before = spis_or(spis_and(new_after, spis_not(insn->must_write)),
insn->may_read);
changed |= !spis_equal(new_before, insn->live_before);
- if (unlikely(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) &&
- (!spis_is_zero(insn->may_read) || !spis_is_zero(insn->must_write) ||
- insn_idx == instance->subprog_start ||
- aux[insn_idx].prune_point)) {
- log_mask_change(env, instance, "live",
- frame, insn_idx, insn->live_before, new_before);
- }
insn->live_before = new_before;
return changed;
}
@@ -462,12 +397,6 @@ static void update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *
changed |= update_insn(env, instance, frame, insn_postorder[i]);
}
} while (changed);
-
- if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
- bpf_log(&env->log, "%s live stack update done in %d iterations\n",
- fmt_instance(env, instance), cnt);
-
- return 0;
}
static bool is_live_before(struct func_instance *instance, u32 insn_idx, u32 frameno, u32 half_spi)
@@ -547,6 +476,173 @@ bool bpf_stack_slot_alive(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 frameno, u32 half_sp
return false;
}
+static char *fmt_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
+{
+ snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf),
+ "subprog#%d %s", subprog, env->subprog_info[subprog].name);
+ return env->tmp_str_buf;
+}
+
+static char *fmt_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
+{
+ snprintf(env->tmp_str_buf, sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf),
+ "(d%d,cs%d)", instance->depth, instance->callsite);
+ return env->tmp_str_buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When both halves of an 8-byte SPI are set, print as "-8","-16",...
+ * When only one half is set, print as "-4h","-8h",...
+ * Runs of 3+ consecutive fully-set SPIs are collapsed: "fp0-8..-24"
+ */
+static char *fmt_spis_mask(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int frame, bool first, spis_t spis)
+{
+ int buf_sz = sizeof(env->tmp_str_buf);
+ char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf;
+ int spi, n, run_start;
+
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+
+ for (spi = 0; spi < STACK_SLOTS / 2 && buf_sz > 0; spi++) {
+ bool lo = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2);
+ bool hi = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 1);
+
+ if (!lo && !hi)
+ continue;
+
+ /* half-spi, print individually */
+ if (!lo || !hi) {
+ n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sfp%d%d%s",
+ first ? "" : " ",
+ frame,
+ -(spi + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE +
+ (lo ? BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE : 0),
+ "h");
+ first = false;
+ buf += n;
+ buf_sz -= n;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* full spi, peek 4 bits ahead to check for 3+ consecutive */
+ if (spi + 2 < STACK_SLOTS / 2 &&
+ spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 2) &&
+ spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 3) &&
+ spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 4) &&
+ spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 5)) {
+ run_start = spi;
+ while (spi + 1 < STACK_SLOTS / 2 &&
+ spis_test_bit(spis, (spi + 1) * 2) &&
+ spis_test_bit(spis, (spi + 1) * 2 + 1))
+ spi++;
+ n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sfp%d%d..%d",
+ first ? "" : " ",
+ frame,
+ -(run_start + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE,
+ -(spi + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%sfp%d%d",
+ first ? "" : " ",
+ frame,
+ -(spi + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE);
+ }
+ first = false;
+ buf += n;
+ buf_sz -= n;
+ }
+ return env->tmp_str_buf;
+}
+
+static void print_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
+{
+ int start = env->subprog_info[instance->subprog].start;
+ struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
+ struct per_frame_masks *masks;
+ int insn_idx, frame, pos, insn_pos, i;
+ int len = instance->insn_cnt;
+ bool has_use, has_def;
+
+ if (!(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
+ return;
+
+ verbose(env, "stack use/def %s ", fmt_subprog(env, instance->subprog));
+ verbose(env, "%s:\n", fmt_instance(env, instance));
+ fmt_instance(env, instance);
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ insn_idx = start + i;
+ has_use = false;
+ has_def = false;
+ pos = env->log.end_pos;
+ verbose(env, "%3d: ", insn_idx);
+ bpf_verbose_insn(env, &insns[insn_idx]);
+ bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, env->log.end_pos - 1); /* remove \n */
+ insn_pos = env->log.end_pos;
+ verbose(env, "%*c;", bpf_vlog_alignment(insn_pos - pos), ' ');
+ pos = env->log.end_pos;
+ verbose(env, " use: ");
+ for (frame = instance->depth; frame >= 0; --frame) {
+ masks = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
+ if (!masks || spis_is_zero(masks->may_read))
+ continue;
+ verbose(env, "%s", fmt_spis_mask(env, frame, !has_use, masks->may_read));
+ has_use = true;
+ }
+ if (!has_use)
+ bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, pos);
+ pos = env->log.end_pos;
+ verbose(env, " def: ");
+ for (frame = instance->depth; frame >= 0; --frame) {
+ masks = get_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
+ if (!masks || spis_is_zero(masks->must_write))
+ continue;
+ verbose(env, "%s", fmt_spis_mask(env, frame, !has_def, masks->must_write));
+ has_def = true;
+ }
+ if (!has_def)
+ bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, has_use ? pos : insn_pos);
+ verbose(env, "\n");
+ if (bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[insn_idx]))
+ i++;
+ }
+}
+
+static int cmp_instances(const void *pa, const void *pb)
+{
+ struct func_instance *a = *(struct func_instance **)pa;
+ struct func_instance *b = *(struct func_instance **)pb;
+ int dcallsite = (int)a->callsite - b->callsite;
+ int ddepth = (int)a->depth - b->depth;
+
+ if (dcallsite)
+ return dcallsite;
+ if (ddepth)
+ return ddepth;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* print use/def slots for all instances ordered by callsite first, then by depth */
+static int print_instances(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ struct func_instance *instance, **sorted_instances;
+ struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
+ int i, bkt, cnt;
+
+ cnt = 0;
+ hash_for_each(liveness->func_instances, bkt, instance, hl_node)
+ cnt++;
+ sorted_instances = kvmalloc_objs(*sorted_instances, cnt, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (!sorted_instances)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ cnt = 0;
+ hash_for_each(liveness->func_instances, bkt, instance, hl_node)
+ sorted_instances[cnt++] = instance;
+ sort(sorted_instances, cnt, sizeof(*sorted_instances), cmp_instances, NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
+ print_instance(env, sorted_instances[i]);
+ kvfree(sorted_instances);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Per-register tracking state for compute_subprog_args().
* Tracks which frame's FP a value is derived from
@@ -1423,12 +1519,7 @@ static void print_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (!(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
return;
- verbose(env, "subprog#%d %s:\n", subprog,
- env->prog->aux->func_info
- ? btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf,
- btf_type_by_id(env->prog->aux->btf,
- env->prog->aux->func_info[subprog].type_id)->name_off)
- : "");
+ verbose(env, "%s:\n", fmt_subprog(env, subprog));
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
int idx = start + i;
bool has_extra = false;
@@ -1805,6 +1896,9 @@ int bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
break;
}
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
+ err = print_instances(env);
+
out:
for (k = 0; k < insn_cnt; k++)
kvfree(env->callsite_at_stack[k]);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 11/14] selftests/bpf: update existing tests due to liveness changes
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/14] bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/14] selftests/bpf: adjust verifier_log buffers Eduard Zingerman
` (2 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The verifier cleans all dead registers and stack slots in the current
state. Adjust expected output in tests or insert dummy stack/register
reads. Also update verifier_live_stack tests to adhere to new logging
scheme.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c | 6 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_align.c | 10 +--
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_mod_bounds.c | 18 +++--
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 88 +++++++++-------------
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c | 26 ++++---
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c | 8 +-
.../bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c | 8 +-
8 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c
index 2027cfcb748c50bdaa218300e73d04398c87c38d..e4abf4172fca5bc172585b6b836624050a3cf61a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_assert.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ check_assert(s64, >=, ge_neg, INT_MIN);
SEC("?tc")
__log_level(2) __failure
-__msg(": R0=0 R1=ctx() R2=scalar(smin=0xffffffff80000002,smax=smax32=0x7ffffffd,smin32=0x80000002) R10=fp0")
+__msg(": R1=ctx() R2=scalar(smin=0xffffffff80000002,smax=smax32=0x7ffffffd,smin32=0x80000002) R10=fp0")
int check_assert_range_s64(struct __sk_buff *ctx)
{
struct bpf_sock *sk = ctx->sk;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int check_assert_range_u64(struct __sk_buff *ctx)
SEC("?tc")
__log_level(2) __failure
-__msg(": R0=0 R1=ctx() R2=4096 R10=fp0")
+__msg(": R1=ctx() R2=4096 R10=fp0")
int check_assert_single_range_s64(struct __sk_buff *ctx)
{
struct bpf_sock *sk = ctx->sk;
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int check_assert_single_range_u64(struct __sk_buff *ctx)
SEC("?tc")
__log_level(2) __failure
-__msg(": R1=pkt(r=64,imm=64) R2=pkt_end() R6=pkt(r=64) R10=fp0")
+__msg(": R6=pkt(r=64) R10=fp0")
int check_assert_generic(struct __sk_buff *ctx)
{
u8 *data_end = (void *)(long)ctx->data_end;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c
index 046a204c8fc697bb04de5c79309f3c19713f6922..5db02323c89cf16235ad7e46447b4e27175dcbee 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uninit_stack.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ __naked int helper_uninit_to_misc(void *ctx)
* thus showing the stack state, matched by __msg(). \
*/ \
call %[dummy]; \
+ r1 = *(u64*)(r10 - 104); \
r0 = 0; \
exit; \
"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_align.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_align.c
index 24553ce6288170aecd123fcc8e392406b4321759..3e52686515cac6382a862e2c10aef74d27b33121 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_align.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_align.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ LBL ":" \
SEC("tc")
__success __log_level(2)
__flag(BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
-__msg("6: R0=pkt(r=8,imm=8)")
+__msg("6: {{.*}} R2=pkt(r=8)")
__msg("6: {{.*}} R3={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x0; 0xff)")
__msg("7: {{.*}} R3={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x0; 0x1fe)")
__msg("8: {{.*}} R3={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x0; 0x3fc)")
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ __success __log_level(2)
__msg("2: {{.*}} R5=pkt(r=0)")
__msg("4: {{.*}} R5=pkt(r=0,imm=14)")
__msg("5: {{.*}} R4=pkt(r=0,imm=14)")
-__msg("9: {{.*}} R2=pkt(r=18)")
+__msg("9: {{.*}} R5=pkt(r=18,imm=14)")
__msg("10: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x0; 0xff){{.*}} R5=pkt(r=18,imm=14)")
__msg("13: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)")
__msg("14: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)")
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ __msg("11: {{.*}} R5=pkt(id=1,{{[^)]*}},var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)")
* offset is considered using reg->aux_off_align which
* is 4 and meets the load's requirements.
*/
-__msg("15: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc){{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)")
+__msg("15: {{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)")
/* Variable offset is added to R5 packet pointer,
* resulting in auxiliary alignment of 4. To avoid BPF
* verifier's precision backtracking logging
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ __msg("19: {{.*}} R5=pkt(id=2,{{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)")
* aligned, so the total offset is 4-byte aligned and
* meets the load's requirements.
*/
-__msg("24: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc){{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)")
+__msg("24: {{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0x7fc)")
/* Constant offset is added to R5 packet pointer,
* resulting in reg->off value of 14.
*/
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ __msg("31: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0xffc){{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x
* the total offset is 4-byte aligned and meets the
* load's requirements.
*/
-__msg("35: {{.*}} R4={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0xffc){{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)")
+__msg("35: {{.*}} R5={{[^)]*}}var_off=(0x2; 0xffc)")
__naked void packet_variable_offset(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_mod_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_mod_bounds.c
index 4672af0b32685a4d8905683d813cc16fbac8c96f..e814a054d69a2aa4e7fe5851cea76b37f989855d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_mod_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_div_mod_bounds.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("UDIV32, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("w1 /= w2 {{.*}}; R1=0 R2=0")
+__msg("w1 /= w2 {{.*}}; R1=0")
__naked void udiv32_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("UDIV64, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("r1 /= r2 {{.*}}; R1=0 R2=0")
+__msg("r1 /= r2 {{.*}}; R1=0")
__naked void udiv64_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ l1_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("SDIV32, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("w1 s/= w2 {{.*}}; R1=0 R2=0")
+__msg("w1 s/= w2 {{.*}}; R1=0")
__naked void sdiv32_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ __naked void sdiv32_overflow_1(void)
w2 += 10; \
if w1 s> w2 goto l0_%=; \
w1 s/= -1; \
+ r2 = r1; \
l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
@@ -443,7 +444,7 @@ l1_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("SDIV64, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("r1 s/= r2 {{.*}}; R1=0 R2=0")
+__msg("r1 s/= r2 {{.*}}; R1=0")
__naked void sdiv64_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -476,6 +477,7 @@ __naked void sdiv64_overflow_1(void)
r2 += 10; \
if r1 s> r2 goto l0_%=; \
r1 s/= -1; \
+ r2 = r1; \
l0_%=: r0 = 0; \
exit; \
" :
@@ -553,7 +555,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("UMOD32, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("w1 %= w2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=1,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=9,var_off=(0x1; 0x8)) R2=0")
+__msg("w1 %= w2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=1,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=9,var_off=(0x1; 0x8))")
__naked void umod32_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -624,7 +626,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("UMOD64, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("r1 %= r2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=1,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=9,var_off=(0x1; 0x8)) R2=0")
+__msg("r1 %= r2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=1,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=9,var_off=(0x1; 0x8))")
__naked void umod64_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -833,7 +835,7 @@ l1_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("SMOD32, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("w1 s%= w2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=-8,smax32=10,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) R2=0")
+__msg("w1 s%= w2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=-8,smax32=10,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))")
__naked void smod32_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
@@ -1084,7 +1086,7 @@ l1_%=: r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0); \
SEC("socket")
__description("SMOD64, zero divisor")
__success __retval(0) __log_level(2)
-__msg("r1 s%= r2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=smin32=-8,smax=smax32=10) R2=0")
+__msg("r1 s%= r2 {{.*}}; R1=scalar(smin=smin32=-8,smax=smax32=10)")
__naked void smod64_zero_divisor(void)
{
asm volatile (" \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c
index 2de105057bbc42e3d8a8810b11ae46d00fdac829..0281955139c7543f44c5c1b62c69d5f121988e98 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
__uint(max_entries, 1);
@@ -14,12 +15,9 @@ struct {
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 2 +written -8")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 1 +live -24")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 1 +written -8")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 0 +live -8,-24")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 0 +written -8")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
+__msg("0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8")
+__msg("1: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24) ; use: fp0-24")
+__msg("2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; def: fp0-8")
__naked void simple_read_simple_write(void)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -33,12 +31,8 @@ __naked void simple_read_simple_write(void)
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 1 +live -8")
-__not_msg("(0) frame 0 insn 1 +written")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 1 +live -16")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 1 +written -32")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
+__msg("2: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8")
+__msg("6: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) ; use: fp0-16")
__naked void read_write_join(void)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -58,13 +52,9 @@ __naked void read_write_join(void)
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
-__msg("2: (25) if r0 > 0x2a goto pc+1")
-__msg("7: (95) exit")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 2 +written -16")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-__msg("7: (95) exit")
-__not_msg("(0) frame 0 insn 2")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 1 iterations")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#0 must_write_not_same_slot (d0,cs0):")
+__msg("6: (7b) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = r0{{$}}")
+__msg("Live regs before insn:")
__naked void must_write_not_same_slot(void)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -83,10 +73,8 @@ __naked void must_write_not_same_slot(void)
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 0 +written -8,-16")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 0 +written -8")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
+__msg("0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8")
+__msg("5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 ; use: fp0-8h")
__naked void must_write_not_same_type(void)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -110,10 +98,11 @@ __naked void must_write_not_same_type(void)
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
-__msg("(2,4) frame 0 insn 4 +written -8")
-__msg("(2,4) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 2 +written -8")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
+/* Callee writes fp[0]-8: stack_use at call site has slots 0,1 live */
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#0 caller_stack_write (d0,cs0):")
+__msg("2: (85) call pc+1{{$}}")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#1 write_first_param (d1,cs2):")
+__msg("4: (7a) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = 7 ; def: fp0-8")
__naked void caller_stack_write(void)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -135,23 +124,15 @@ static __used __naked void write_first_param(void)
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
-/* caller_stack_read() function */
-__msg("2: .12345.... (85) call pc+4")
-__msg("5: .12345.... (85) call pc+1")
-__msg("6: 0......... (95) exit")
-/* read_first_param() function */
-__msg("7: .1........ (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)")
-__msg("8: 0......... (95) exit")
-/* update for callsite at (2) */
-__msg("(2,7) frame 0 insn 7 +live -8")
-__msg("(2,7) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 2 +live -8")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-/* update for callsite at (5) */
-__msg("(5,7) frame 0 insn 7 +live -16")
-__msg("(5,7) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
-__msg("(0) frame 0 insn 5 +live -16")
-__msg("(0) live stack update done in 2 iterations")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#0 caller_stack_read (d0,cs0):")
+__msg("2: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8{{$}}")
+__msg("5: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-16{{$}}")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#1 read_first_param (d1,cs2):")
+__msg("7: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; use: fp0-8{{$}}")
+__msg("8: (95) exit")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#1 read_first_param (d1,cs5):")
+__msg("7: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; use: fp0-16{{$}}")
+__msg("8: (95) exit")
__naked void caller_stack_read(void)
{
asm volatile (
@@ -176,18 +157,19 @@ static __used __naked void read_first_param(void)
SEC("socket")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__log_level(2)
-/* read_first_param2() function */
-__msg(" 9: .1........ (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)")
-__msg("10: .......... (b7) r0 = 0")
-__msg("11: 0......... (05) goto pc+0")
-__msg("12: 0......... (95) exit")
+/* fp0-8 consumed at insn 9, dead by insn 11. stack_def at insn 4 kills slots 0,1. */
+__msg("4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r0 ; def: fp0-8")
+/* stack_use at call site: callee reads fp0-8, slots 0,1 live */
+__msg("7: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8")
+/* read_first_param2: no caller stack live inside callee after first read */
+__msg("9: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; use: fp0-8")
+__msg("10: (b7) r0 = 0{{$}}")
+__msg("11: (05) goto pc+0{{$}}")
+__msg("12: (95) exit")
/*
- * The purpose of the test is to check that checkpoint in
- * read_first_param2() stops path traversal. This will only happen if
- * verifier understands that fp[0]-8 at insn (12) is not alive.
+ * Checkpoint at goto +0 fires because fp0-8 is dead → state pruning.
*/
__msg("12: safe")
-__msg("processed 20 insns")
__naked void caller_stack_pruning(void)
{
asm volatile (
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
index a5b8753ce52cde2d489a74c16a0f086603c270f3..70ae14d6084fb082c7421d402b6214132ff114cf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_scalar_ids.c
@@ -264,13 +264,13 @@ void precision_many_frames__bar(void)
*/
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
-__msg("11: (0f) r2 += r1")
+__msg("12: (0f) r2 += r1")
/* foo frame */
-__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 10: (bf) r2 = r10")
-__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 9: (25) if r1 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
-__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8,-16 before 8: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r1")
-__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8 before 7: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
-__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 4: (85) call pc+2")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 11: (bf) r2 = r10")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 10: (25) if r1 > 0x7 goto pc+0")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8,-16 before 9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r1")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack=-8 before 8: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
+__msg("frame1: regs=r1 stack= before 4: (85) call pc+3")
/* main frame */
__msg("frame0: regs=r1 stack=-8 before 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")
__msg("frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 2: (bf) r1 = r0")
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ __naked void precision_stack(void)
"r1 = r0;"
"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
"call precision_stack__foo;"
+ "r0 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);"
"r0 = 0;"
"exit;"
:
@@ -309,6 +310,8 @@ void precision_stack__foo(void)
*/
"r2 = r10;"
"r2 += r1;"
+ "r0 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r0 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16);"
"exit"
::: __clobber_all);
}
@@ -802,9 +805,9 @@ __success __log_level(2)
/* The exit instruction should be reachable from two states,
* use two matches and "processed .. insns" to ensure this.
*/
-__msg("15: (95) exit")
-__msg("15: (95) exit")
-__msg("processed 20 insns")
+__msg("16: (95) exit")
+__msg("16: (95) exit")
+__msg("processed 22 insns")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void two_old_ids_one_cur_id(void)
{
@@ -835,6 +838,11 @@ __naked void two_old_ids_one_cur_id(void)
"r2 = r10;"
"r2 += r6;"
"r2 += r7;"
+ /*
+ * keep r8 and r9 live, otherwise r6->id and r7->id
+ * will become singular and reset to zero before if r6 > r7
+ */
+ "r9 += r8;"
"exit;"
:
: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
index 672e4446181efe8f437c9ec02400ddbadd160b3d..c6ae64b99cd6ef8af8dd8d341c06033bac0f61de 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 7 subseq_idx -1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 8: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 7: (bf) r1 = r6")
/* note, fp-8 is precise, fp-16 is not yet precise, we'll get there */
-__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R0=1 R1=ctx() R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=P1 fp-16=1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=P1 fp-16=1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 3 subseq_idx 7")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 6: (05) goto pc+0")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0")
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 9: (0f) r1 += r2")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 8: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 7: (bf) r1 = r6")
/* now both fp-8 and fp-16 are precise, very good */
-__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-16: R0=1 R1=ctx() R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=P1 fp-16=P1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-16: R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=P1 fp-16=P1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 3 subseq_idx 7")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 6: (05) goto pc+0")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0")
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ __msg("9: (0f) r1 += r2")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 7 subseq_idx -1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 8: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 7: (bf) r1 = r6")
-__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R0=1 R1=ctx() R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=????P1 fp-16=????1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=????P1 fp-16=????1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 3 subseq_idx 7")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 6: (05) goto pc+0")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 5: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -16) = r0")
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 10: (73) *(u8 *)(r1 +0) = r2
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 9: (0f) r1 += r2")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 8: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 7: (bf) r1 = r6")
-__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-16: R0=1 R1=ctx() R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=????P1 fp-16=????P1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-16: R6=map_value(map=.data.two_byte_,ks=4,vs=2) R10=fp0 fp-8=????P1 fp-16=????P1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 6 first_idx 3 subseq_idx 7")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 6: (05) goto pc+0")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-16 before 5: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -16) = r0")
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c
index 61886ed554de80e3349fd2315df5741d2cde4541..d21d32f6a6760249abaacfd1d258623f8e4e97de 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0,r6 stack= before 10: (bf) r6 = r0")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 9: (85) call bpf_loop")
/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */
__msg("from 9 to 17: frame1:")
-__msg("17: frame1: R1=scalar() R2=0 R10=fp0 cb")
+__msg("17: frame1: R10=fp0 cb")
__msg("17: (b7) r0 = 0")
__msg("18: (95) exit")
__msg("returning from callee:")
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 5: (b7) r1 = 1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 4: (b7) r6 = 3")
/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */
__msg("from 9 to 15: frame1:")
-__msg("15: frame1: R1=scalar() R2=0 R10=fp0 cb")
+__msg("15: frame1: R10=fp0 cb")
__msg("15: (b7) r0 = 0")
__msg("16: (95) exit")
__msg("returning from callee:")
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r6
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 4: (b7) r6 = 3")
/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */
__msg("from 10 to 17: frame1:")
-__msg("17: frame1: R1=scalar() R2=0 R10=fp0 cb")
+__msg("17: frame1: R10=fp0 cb")
__msg("17: (b7) r0 = 0")
__msg("18: (95) exit")
__msg("returning from callee:")
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ __msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 10 first_idx 7 subseq_idx -1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 9: (bf) r1 = r8")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 8: (27) r7 *= 4")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r7 stack= before 7: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
-__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R0=2 R6=1 R8=map_value(map=.data.vals,ks=4,vs=16) R10=fp0 fp-8=P1")
+__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8: R8=map_value(map=.data.vals,ks=4,vs=16) R10=fp0 fp-8=P1")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 18 first_idx 0 subseq_idx 7")
__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 18: (95) exit")
__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 17: (0f) r0 += r2")
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 12/14] selftests/bpf: adjust verifier_log buffers
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/14] selftests/bpf: update existing tests due to liveness changes Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/14] selftests/bpf: add new tests for static stack liveness analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 14/14] bpf: poison dead stack slots Eduard Zingerman
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The new liveness analysis in liveness.c adds verbose output at
BPF_LOG_LEVEL2, making the verifier log for good_prog exceed the 1024-byte
reference buffer. When the reference is truncated in fixed mode, the
rolling mode captures the actual tail of the full log, which doesn't match
the truncated reference.
The fix is to increase the buffer sizes in the test.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier_log.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier_log.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier_log.c
index aaa2854974c0a91cbbb9fc13ae0f966de1bcc818..c01c0114af1b7476d27885ce380d90400a4bdc89 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier_log.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier_log.c
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ static bool check_prog_load(int prog_fd, bool expect_err, const char *tag)
static struct {
/* strategically placed before others to avoid accidental modification by kernel */
- char filler[1024];
- char buf[1024];
+ char filler[16384];
+ char buf[16384];
/* strategically placed after buf[] to catch more accidental corruptions */
- char reference[1024];
+ char reference[16384];
} logs;
static const struct bpf_insn *insns;
static size_t insn_cnt;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 13/14] selftests/bpf: add new tests for static stack liveness analysis
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/14] selftests/bpf: adjust verifier_log buffers Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 14/14] bpf: poison dead stack slots Eduard Zingerman
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add a bunch of new tests to verify the static stack
liveness analysis.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c | 2103 ++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 2103 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c
index 0281955139c7543f44c5c1b62c69d5f121988e98..4aee1616964d2fe365fcac644854706c1629b67b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_live_stack.c
@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@ struct {
__type(value, long long);
} map SEC(".maps");
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, __u32);
+ __type(value, __u64);
+} array_map_8b SEC(".maps");
+
+const char snprintf_u64_fmt[] = "%llu";
+
SEC("socket")
__log_level(2)
__msg("0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8")
@@ -154,6 +163,33 @@ static __used __naked void read_first_param(void)
::: __clobber_all);
}
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__naked void arg_track_join_convergence(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 1;"
+ "r2 = 2;"
+ "call arg_track_join_convergence_subprog;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void arg_track_join_convergence_subprog(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "if r1 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "r0 = r1;"
+ "goto 2f;"
+"1:"
+ "r0 = r2;"
+"2:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
SEC("socket")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__log_level(2)
@@ -324,3 +360,2070 @@ static __used __naked unsigned long write_tail_call(void)
__imm_addr(map_array)
: __clobber_all);
}
+
+/* Test precise subprog stack access analysis.
+ * Caller passes fp-32 (SPI 3) to callee that only accesses arg+0 and arg+8
+ * (SPIs 3 and 2). Slots 0 and 1 should NOT be live at the call site.
+ *
+ * Insn layout:
+ * 0: *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = 0 write SPI 0
+ * 1: *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = 0 write SPI 1
+ * 2: *(u64*)(r10 - 24) = 0 write SPI 2
+ * 3: *(u64*)(r10 - 32) = 0 write SPI 3
+ * 4: r1 = r10
+ * 5: r1 += -32
+ * 6: call precise_read_two passes fp-32 (SPI 3)
+ * 7: r0 = 0
+ * 8: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 6 only SPIs 2,3 should be live (slots 4-7, 0xf0).
+ * SPIs 0,1 are written but never read → dead.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("6: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-24 fp0-32{{$}}")
+__naked void subprog_precise_stack_access(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 24) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -32;"
+ "call precise_read_two;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Callee reads only at arg+0 (SPI 3) and arg+8 (SPI 2) */
+static __used __naked void precise_read_two(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that multi-level subprog calls (callee passes arg-derived ptr
+ * to another BPF subprog) are analyzed precisely.
+ *
+ * Caller passes fp-32 (SPI 3). The callee forwards it to inner_callee.
+ * inner_callee only reads at offset 0 from the pointer.
+ * The analysis recurses into forward_to_inner -> inner_callee and
+ * determines only SPI 3 is accessed (slots 6-7, 0xc0), not all of SPIs 0-3.
+ *
+ * Insn layout:
+ * 0: *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = 0 write SPI 0
+ * 1: *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = 0 write SPI 1
+ * 2: *(u64*)(r10 - 24) = 0 write SPI 2
+ * 3: *(u64*)(r10 - 32) = 0 write SPI 3
+ * 4: r1 = r10
+ * 5: r1 += -32
+ * 6: call forward_to_inner passes fp-32 (SPI 3)
+ * 7: r0 = 0
+ * 8: exit
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("6: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-32{{$}}")
+__naked void subprog_multilevel_conservative(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 24) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -32;"
+ "call forward_to_inner;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Forwards arg to another subprog */
+static __used __naked void forward_to_inner(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call inner_callee;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void inner_callee(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test multi-frame precision loss: callee consumes caller stack early,
+ * but static liveness keeps it live at pruning points inside callee.
+ *
+ * Caller stores map_ptr or scalar(42) at fp-8, then calls
+ * consume_and_call_inner. The callee reads fp0-8 at entry (consuming
+ * the slot), then calls do_nothing2. After do_nothing2 returns (a
+ * pruning point), fp-8 should be dead -- the read already happened.
+ * But because the call instruction's stack_use includes SPI 0, the
+ * static live_stack_before at insn 7 is 0x1, keeping fp-8 live inside
+ * the callee and preventing state pruning between the two paths.
+ *
+ * Insn layout:
+ * 0: call bpf_get_prandom_u32
+ * 1: if r0 == 42 goto pc+2 -> insn 4
+ * 2: r0 = map ll (ldimm64 part1)
+ * 3: (ldimm64 part2)
+ * 4: *(u64)(r10 - 8) = r0 fp-8 = map_ptr OR scalar(42)
+ * 5: r1 = r10
+ * 6: r1 += -8
+ * 7: call consume_and_call_inner
+ * 8: r0 = 0
+ * 9: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 7, live_stack_before = 0x3 (slots 0-1 live due to stack_use).
+ * At insn 8, live_stack_before = 0x0 (SPI 0 dead, caller doesn't need it).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg(" 7: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8")
+__msg(" 8: {{.*}} (b7)")
+__naked void callee_consumed_caller_stack(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == 42 goto 1f;"
+ "r0 = %[map] ll;"
+"1:"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call consume_and_call_inner;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm_addr(map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void consume_and_call_inner(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);" /* read fp[0]-8 into caller-saved r0 */
+ "call do_nothing2;" /* inner call clobbers r0 */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void do_nothing2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reproducer for unsound pruning when clean_verifier_state() promotes
+ * live STACK_ZERO bytes to STACK_MISC.
+ *
+ * Program shape:
+ * - Build key at fp-4:
+ * - path A keeps key byte as STACK_ZERO;
+ * - path B writes unknown byte making it STACK_MISC.
+ * - Branches merge at a prune point before map_lookup.
+ * - map_lookup on ARRAY map is value-sensitive to constant zero key:
+ * - path A: const key 0 => PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (non-NULL);
+ * - path B: non-const key => PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL.
+ * - Dereference lookup result without null check.
+ *
+ * Note this behavior won't trigger at fp-8, since the verifier will
+ * track 32-bit scalar spill differently as spilled_ptr.
+ *
+ * Correct verifier behavior: reject (path B unsafe).
+ * With blanket STACK_ZERO->STACK_MISC promotion on live slots, cached path A
+ * state can be generalized and incorrectly prune path B, making program load.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'")
+__naked void stack_zero_to_misc_unsound_array_lookup(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* key at fp-4: all bytes STACK_ZERO */
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ /* fall-through (path A) explored first */
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_nonconst%=;"
+ /* path A: keep key constant zero */
+ "goto l_lookup%=;"
+"l_nonconst%=:"
+ /* path B: key byte turns to STACK_MISC, key no longer const */
+ "*(u8 *)(r10 - 4) = r0;"
+"l_lookup%=:"
+ /* value-sensitive lookup */
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -4;"
+ "r1 = %[array_map_8b] ll;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ /* unsafe when lookup result is map_value_or_null */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(array_map_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subprog variant of stack_zero_to_misc_unsound_array_lookup.
+ *
+ * Check unsound pruning when a callee modifies the caller's
+ * stack through a pointer argument.
+ *
+ * Program shape:
+ * main:
+ * *(u32)(fp - 4) = 0 key = 0 (all bytes STACK_ZERO)
+ * r1 = fp - 4
+ * call maybe_clobber_key may overwrite key[0] with scalar
+ * <-- prune point: two states meet here -->
+ * r2 = fp - 4
+ * r1 = array_map_8b
+ * call bpf_map_lookup_elem value-sensitive on const-zero key
+ * r0 = *(u64)(r0 + 0) deref without null check
+ * exit
+ *
+ * maybe_clobber_key(r1):
+ * r6 = r1 save &key
+ * call bpf_get_prandom_u32
+ * if r0 == 0 goto skip path A: key stays STACK_ZERO
+ * *(u8)(r6 + 0) = r0 path B: key[0] becomes STACK_MISC
+ * skip:
+ * r0 = 0
+ * exit
+ *
+ * Path A: const-zero key => array lookup => PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE => deref OK.
+ * Path B: non-const key => array lookup => PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL => UNSAFE.
+ *
+ * If the cleaner collapses STACK_ZERO -> STACK_MISC for the live key
+ * slot, path A's cached state matches path B, pruning the unsafe path.
+ *
+ * Correct verifier behaviour: reject.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'")
+__naked void subprog_stack_zero_to_misc_unsound(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* key at fp-4: all bytes STACK_ZERO */
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ /* subprog may clobber key[0] with a scalar byte */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -4;"
+ "call maybe_clobber_key;"
+ /* value-sensitive array lookup */
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -4;"
+ "r1 = %[array_map_8b] ll;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ /* unsafe when result is map_value_or_null (path B) */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(array_map_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void maybe_clobber_key(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ /* path A (r0==0): key stays STACK_ZERO, explored first */
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ /* path B (r0!=0): overwrite key[0] with scalar */
+ "*(u8 *)(r6 + 0) = r0;"
+ "1:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Demonstrate that subprog arg spill/reload breaks arg tracking,
+ * inflating caller stack liveness and preventing state pruning.
+ *
+ * modifier2(fp-24) has two paths: one writes a scalar to *(r1+8)
+ * = caller fp-16, the other leaves it as zero. After modifier2
+ * returns, fp-16 is never read again — it is dead.
+ *
+ * spill_reload_reader2(fp-24) only reads caller fp-8 via
+ * *(r1+16), but it spills r1 across a helper call. This
+ * breaks compute_subprog_arg_access(): the reload from callee
+ * stack cannot be connected back to arg1, so arg1 access goes
+ * "all (conservative)". At the call site (r1 = fp-24, slot 5)
+ * apply_callee_stack_access() marks slots 0..5 as stack_use —
+ * pulling fp-16 (slots 2-3) into live_stack_before even though
+ * the reader never touches it.
+ *
+ * Result: at modifier2's return point two states with different
+ * fp-16 values cannot be pruned.
+ *
+ * With correct (or old dynamic) liveness fp-16 is dead at that
+ * point and the states prune → "6: safe" appears in the log.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg("6: safe")
+__naked void spill_reload_inflates_stack_liveness(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* struct at fp-24: { ctx; ptr; tail; } */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 24) = r1;" /* fp-24 = ctx */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;" /* fp-16 = ctx (STACK_SPILL ptr) */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;" /* fp-8 = tail */
+ /* modifier2 writes different values to fp-16 on two paths */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -24;"
+ "call modifier2;"
+ /* insn 6: prune point — two states with different fp-16
+ * path A: fp-16 = STACK_MISC (scalar overwrote pointer)
+ * path B: fp-16 = STACK_SPILL (original ctx pointer)
+ * STACK_MISC does NOT subsume STACK_SPILL(ptr),
+ * so pruning fails unless fp-16 is cleaned (dead).
+ */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -24;"
+ "call spill_reload_reader2;" /* reads fp-8 via *(r1+16) */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Two paths: one writes a scalar to *(r1+8) = caller fp-16,
+ * the other leaves it unchanged. Both return 0 via separate
+ * exits to prevent pruning inside the subprog at the merge.
+ */
+static __used __naked void modifier2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 + 8) = r0;" /* fp-16 = random */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;" /* path A exit */
+ "1:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;" /* path B exit */
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Receives r1 = caller fp-24. Only reads *(r1+16) = fp-8.
+ * Spills r1 across a helper call → arg tracking goes conservative →
+ * slots 0..5 all appear used instead of just slot 1 (fp-8).
+ */
+static __used __naked void spill_reload_reader2(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;" /* spill arg1 */
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];" /* clobbers r1-r5 */
+ "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);" /* reload arg1 */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 16);" /* read caller fp-8 */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* BTF FUNC records are not generated for kfuncs referenced
+ * from inline assembly. These records are necessary for
+ * libbpf to link the program. The function below is a hack
+ * to ensure that BTF FUNC records are generated.
+ */
+void __kfunc_btf_root(void)
+{
+ bpf_iter_num_new(0, 0, 0);
+ bpf_iter_num_next(0);
+ bpf_iter_num_destroy(0);
+}
+
+/* Test that open-coded iterator kfunc arguments get precise stack
+ * liveness tracking. struct bpf_iter_num is 8 bytes (1 SPI).
+ *
+ * Insn layout:
+ * 0: *(u64*)(r10 - 8) = 0 write SPI 0 (dead)
+ * 1: *(u64*)(r10 - 16) = 0 write SPI 1 (dead)
+ * 2: r1 = r10
+ * 3: r1 += -24 iter state at fp-24 (SPI 2)
+ * 4: r2 = 0
+ * 5: r3 = 10
+ * 6: call bpf_iter_num_new defines SPI 2 (KF_ITER_NEW) → 0x0
+ * 7-8: r1 = fp-24
+ * 9: call bpf_iter_num_next uses SPI 2 → 0x30
+ * 10: if r0 == 0 goto 2f
+ * 11: goto 1b
+ * 12-13: r1 = fp-24
+ * 14: call bpf_iter_num_destroy uses SPI 2 → 0x30
+ * 15: r0 = 0
+ * 16: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 6, SPI 2 is defined (KF_ITER_NEW initializes, doesn't read),
+ * so it kills liveness from successors. live_stack_before = 0x0.
+ * At insns 9 and 14, SPI 2 is used (iter_next/destroy read the state),
+ * so live_stack_before = 0x30.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__msg(" 6: (85) call bpf_iter_num_new{{.*}} ; def: fp0-24{{$}}")
+__msg(" 9: (85) call bpf_iter_num_next{{.*}} ; use: fp0-24{{$}}")
+__msg("14: (85) call bpf_iter_num_destroy{{.*}} ; use: fp0-24{{$}}")
+__naked void kfunc_iter_stack_liveness(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;" /* SPI 0 - dead */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = 0;" /* SPI 1 - dead */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -24;"
+ "r2 = 0;"
+ "r3 = 10;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_new];"
+"1:"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -24;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_next];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 2f;"
+ "goto 1b;"
+"2:"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -24;"
+ "call %[bpf_iter_num_destroy];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_iter_num_new),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_next),
+ __imm(bpf_iter_num_destroy)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for soundness bug in static stack liveness analysis.
+ *
+ * The static pre-pass tracks FP-derived register offsets to determine
+ * which stack slots are accessed. When a PTR_TO_STACK is spilled to
+ * the stack and later reloaded, the reload (BPF_LDX) kills FP-derived
+ * tracking, making subsequent accesses through the reloaded pointer
+ * invisible to the static analysis.
+ *
+ * This causes the analysis to incorrectly mark SPI 0 as dead at the
+ * merge point. clean_verifier_state() zeros it in the cached state,
+ * and stacksafe() accepts the new state against STACK_INVALID,
+ * enabling incorrect pruning.
+ *
+ * Path A (verified first): stores PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE in SPI 0
+ * Path B (verified second): stores scalar 42 in SPI 0
+ * After merge: reads SPI 0 through spilled/reloaded PTR_TO_STACK
+ * and dereferences the result as a pointer.
+ *
+ * Correct behavior: reject (path B dereferences a scalar)
+ * Bug behavior: accept (path B is incorrectly pruned)
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__naked void spill_ptr_liveness_type_confusion(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Map lookup to get PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "r1 = %[map] ll;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -32;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto l_exit%=;"
+ /* r6 = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (callee-saved) */
+ "r6 = r0;"
+ /* Branch: fall-through (path A) verified first */
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_scalar%=;"
+ /* Path A: store map value ptr at SPI 0 */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6;"
+ "goto l_merge%=;"
+"l_scalar%=:"
+ /* Path B: store scalar at SPI 0 */
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+"l_merge%=:"
+ /*
+ * Spill PTR_TO_STACK{off=-8} to SPI 1, then reload.
+ * Reload kills FP-derived tracking, hiding the
+ * subsequent SPI 0 access from the static analysis.
+ */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 16);"
+ /* Read SPI 0 through reloaded pointer */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ /* Dereference: safe for map value (path A),
+ * unsafe for scalar (path B).
+ */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);"
+ "exit;"
+"l_exit%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm_addr(map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* === Tests for 4-byte stack slot liveness granularity === */
+
+/* Test that a 4-byte aligned write is stack_def and kills liveness.
+ *
+ * 0: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slots 0,1 (full SPI 0)
+ * 1: *(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slot 1 (4-byte write kills slot 1)
+ * 2: r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) use slots 0,1
+ * 3: r0 = 0
+ * 4: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 1, the 4-byte write defines slot 1. Slot 0 still flows
+ * backward from insn 2's read: live_stack_before = 0x1.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("1: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8h")
+__naked void four_byte_write_kills_slot(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that a write to the upper half of an SPI is dead when only
+ * the lower half is read. This was impossible at SPI granularity
+ * where any read of the SPI kept the entire SPI live.
+ *
+ * 0: *(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slot 1 (DEAD: never read)
+ * 1: *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0 def slot 0
+ * 2: r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) use slot 0 only
+ * 3: r0 = 0
+ * 4: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 0, nothing is live (0x0). Previously at SPI granularity,
+ * the read at insn 2 would mark the full SPI 0 as live and the
+ * 4-byte writes wouldn't count as def, so insn 0 would have had
+ * SPI 0 live (0x1).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8h")
+__msg("2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 -4) ; use: fp0-4h")
+__naked void dead_half_spi_write(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that a 4-byte read from the upper half of SPI 0 makes only
+ * slot 1 live (0x2), not the full SPI (0x3).
+ *
+ * 0: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slots 0,1
+ * 1: r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 8) use slot 1 only (upper half)
+ * 2: r0 = 0
+ * 3: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 1, live_stack_before = 0x2 (slot 1 only).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8h")
+__naked void four_byte_read_upper_half(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that a 2-byte write does NOT count as stack_def.
+ * Sub-4-byte writes don't fully cover a 4-byte slot,
+ * so liveness passes through.
+ *
+ * 0: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slots 0,1
+ * 1: *(u16 *)(r10 - 4) = 0 NOT stack_def (2 < 4 bytes)
+ * 2: r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) use slot 0
+ * 3: r0 = 0
+ * 4: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 1, slot 0 still live (0x1) because 2-byte write
+ * didn't kill it.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8")
+__msg("1: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -4) = 0{{$}}")
+__msg("2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 -4) ; use: fp0-4h")
+__naked void two_byte_write_no_kill(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u16 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that a 1-byte write does NOT count as stack_def.
+ *
+ * 0: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slots 0,1
+ * 1: *(u8 *)(r10 - 4) = 0 NOT stack_def (1 < 4 bytes)
+ * 2: r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) use slot 0
+ * 3: r0 = 0
+ * 4: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 1, slot 0 still live (0x1).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8")
+__msg("1: (72) *(u8 *)(r10 -4) = 0")
+__msg("2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 -4) ; use: fp0-4h")
+__naked void one_byte_write_no_kill(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u8 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test stack access beyond fp-256 exercising the second bitmask word.
+ * fp-264 is SPI 32, slots 64-65, which are bits 0-1 of live_stack[1].
+ *
+ * 0: *(u64 *)(r10 - 264) = 0 def slots 64,65
+ * 1: r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 264) use slots 64,65
+ * 2: r0 = 0
+ * 3: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 1, live_stack high word has bits 0,1 set: 0x3:0x0.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("1: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -264) ; use: fp0-264")
+__naked void high_stack_second_bitmask_word(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 264) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 264);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that two separate 4-byte writes to each half of an SPI
+ * together kill liveness for the full SPI.
+ *
+ * 0: *(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 def slot 1 (upper half)
+ * 1: *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0 def slot 0 (lower half)
+ * 2: r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) use slots 0,1
+ * 3: r0 = 0
+ * 4: exit
+ *
+ * At insn 0: live_stack_before = 0x0 (both slots killed by insns 0,1).
+ * At insn 1: live_stack_before = 0x2 (slot 1 still live, slot 0 killed here).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("0: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8h")
+__msg("1: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0 ; def: fp0-4h")
+__naked void two_four_byte_writes_kill_full_spi(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Test that 4-byte writes on both branches kill a slot at the
+ * join point. Previously at SPI granularity, a 4-byte write was
+ * not stack_def, so liveness would flow backward through the
+ * branch that only had a 4-byte write.
+ *
+ * 0: call bpf_get_prandom_u32
+ * 1: if r0 != 0 goto 1f
+ * 2: *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0 path A: def slots 0,1
+ * 3: goto 2f
+ * 1:4: *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0 path B: def slot 0
+ * 2:5: r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4) use slot 0
+ * 6: r0 = 0
+ * 7: exit
+ *
+ * Both paths define slot 0 before the read. At insn 1 (branch),
+ * live_stack_before = 0x0 because slot 0 is killed on both paths.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("1: (55) if r0 != 0x0 goto pc+2")
+__msg("2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 ; def: fp0-8")
+__msg("3: (05) goto pc+1")
+__msg("4: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = 0 ; def: fp0-4h")
+__msg("5: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 -4) ; use: fp0-4h")
+__naked void both_branches_kill_slot(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto 1f;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "goto 2f;"
+"1:"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+"2:"
+ "r0 = *(u32 *)(r10 - 4);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Soundness: cleaning the dead upper half of an SPI must not
+ * affect the live lower half's type information for pruning.
+ *
+ * Both halves of SPI 0 are written separately. Only the lower
+ * half (slot 0) is used as a 4-byte map key. The upper half
+ * (slot 1) is dead and cleaned to STACK_INVALID.
+ *
+ * Path A: key stays 0 (STACK_ZERO) → non-null array lookup
+ * Path B: key byte turns STACK_MISC → may-null array lookup
+ * Deref without null check: safe for A, unsafe for B.
+ *
+ * If half-SPI cleaning incorrectly corrupted the live half's
+ * type info, path A's cached state could generalize and unsoundly
+ * prune path B.
+ *
+ * Expected: reject (path B unsafe).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'")
+__naked void half_spi_clean_preserves_stack_zero(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;" /* slot 0: STACK_ZERO */
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;" /* slot 1: STACK_ZERO (dead) */
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_nonconst%=;"
+ "goto l_lookup%=;"
+"l_nonconst%=:"
+ "*(u8 *)(r10 - 4) = r0;" /* slot 0: STACK_MISC */
+"l_lookup%=:"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -4;"
+ "r1 = %[array_map_8b] ll;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);" /* unsafe if null */
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(array_map_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Model of scx_lavd's pick_idle_cpu_at_cpdom iat block:
+ * conditional block with helper call and temporary stack spill,
+ * spill dead after merge.
+ *
+ * Path A (fall-through): spill r6 to fp-8 across helper call
+ * Path B (branch taken): skip the block entirely
+ * At merge (insn 6): fp-8 is dead (never read after merge)
+ *
+ * Static liveness marks fp-8 dead at merge. clean_verifier_state()
+ * converts path A's STACK_SPILL to STACK_INVALID. Path B has
+ * STACK_INVALID. stacksafe() matches -> path B pruned -> "6: safe".
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__success
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("6: safe")
+__naked void dead_spill_at_merge_enables_pruning(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r6 = 7;"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_skip%=;"
+ /* conditional block: spill, call, reload */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+"l_skip%=:"
+ /* fp-8 dead. Path B pruned here -> "6: safe" */
+ "r0 = r6;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * FP-offset tracking loses precision on second ADD, killing all liveness.
+ *
+ * fp_off_insn_xfer() handles "FP itself + negative imm" precisely
+ * (e.g. r6 = r10; r6 += -24 -> slot 5). But any subsequent ADD/SUB
+ * on a register that already has non-zero spis falls through to
+ * spis_set_all(), because the code only handles the FP-itself case.
+ *
+ * A write through this imprecise register enters the non-zero-spis
+ * branch of set_indirect_stack_access(), which OR's the all-ones
+ * mask into stack_def. The backward liveness equation
+ *
+ * stack_in = (stack_out & ~stack_def) | stack_use
+ *
+ * sees ~ALL = 0, killing ALL slot liveness at that instruction.
+ *
+ * At the merge pruning point, live_stack_before is empty.
+ * clean_verifier_state() marks fp-8 as STACK_INVALID.
+ * stacksafe() skips STACK_INVALID (line "continue"), so pruning
+ * succeeds regardless of the current state's fp-8 value.
+ * Path B is pruned, its null deref is never explored.
+ *
+ * Correct behavior: reject (path B dereferences NULL).
+ * Bug behavior: accept (path B pruned away).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R1 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__naked void fp_add_loses_precision_kills_liveness(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_pathB%=;"
+
+ /* Path A (fall-through, explored first): fp-8 = 0 */
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "goto l_merge%=;"
+
+"l_pathB%=:"
+ /* Path B (explored second): fp-8 = 42 */
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+
+"l_merge%=:"
+ /*
+ * Create imprecise FP-derived register.
+ * r6 = r10 - 24 gets precise slot 5.
+ * r6 += 8 hits the else branch (spis non-zero, delta > 0)
+ * and sets spis to ALL. r6 is actually r10-16.
+ */
+ "r6 = r10;"
+ "r6 += -24;"
+ "r6 += 8;"
+
+ /*
+ * Write through imprecise r6. Actually writes to fp-16
+ * (does NOT touch fp-8), but liveness marks ALL slots
+ * as stack_def, killing fp-8's liveness.
+ */
+ "r7 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 + 0) = r7;"
+
+ /* Read fp-8: liveness says dead, but value is needed. */
+ "r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "if r2 == 42 goto l_danger%=;"
+
+ /* r2 != 42 (path A: r2 == 0): safe exit */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+
+"l_danger%=:"
+ /* Only reachable from path B (r2 == 42): null deref */
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R1 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__naked void fp_spill_loses_precision_kills_liveness(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_pathB%=;"
+
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "goto l_merge%=;"
+
+"l_pathB%=:"
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+
+"l_merge%=:"
+ "r6 = r10;"
+ "r6 += -64;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 160) = r6;"
+ "r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 160);"
+
+ "r7 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 + 0) = r7;"
+
+ "r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "if r2 == 42 goto l_danger%=;"
+
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 56);"
+ "exit;"
+
+"l_danger%=:"
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* === Tests for frame-based AT_FP tracking === */
+
+/*
+ * Test 1: conditional_stx_in_subprog
+ * Subprog conditionally writes caller's slot.
+ * Verify slot stays live (backward pass handles conditional def via CFG).
+ *
+ * Main writes fp-8=42, calls cond_writer(fp-8), reads fp-8.
+ * cond_writer only writes on one path → parent_def only on that path.
+ * The backward parent_live correctly keeps fp-8 live at entry
+ * (conditional write doesn't kill liveness at the join).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+/* fp-8 live at call (callee conditionally writes → slot not killed) */
+__msg("1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; def: fp0-8")
+__msg("4: (85) call pc+2{{$}}")
+__msg("5: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp0-8")
+__naked void conditional_stx_in_subprog(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call cond_writer;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Conditionally writes to *(r1+0) */
+static __used __naked void cond_writer(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 + 0) = r0;"
+ "1:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("4: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-16")
+__msg("7: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-32")
+__naked void multiple_callsites_different_offsets(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -16;"
+ "call read_first_param;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -32;"
+ "call read_first_param;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test 3: nested_fp_passthrough
+ * main→A→B, main's FP forwarded to B. B accesses main's stack.
+ * Verify liveness propagates through.
+ *
+ * Main passes fp-32 to outer_forwarder, which passes it to inner_reader.
+ * inner_reader reads at arg+0 (= main's fp-32).
+ * parent_live propagates transitively: inner→outer→main.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+/* At call to outer_forwarder: main's fp-32 (slots 6,7) should be live */
+__msg("6: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-32")
+__naked void nested_fp_passthrough(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 24) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -32;"
+ "call outer_forwarder;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Forwards arg to inner_reader */
+static __used __naked void outer_forwarder(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call inner_reader;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void inner_reader(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test 4: callee_must_write_before_read
+ * Callee unconditionally writes parent slot before reading.
+ * Verify slot is NOT live at call site (parent_def kills it).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+/* fp-8 NOT live at call: callee writes before reading (parent_def kills it) */
+__msg("2: .12345.... (85) call pc+")
+__naked void callee_must_write_before_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call write_then_read;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Unconditionally writes *(r1+0), then reads it back */
+static __used __naked void write_then_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "r7 = 99;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 + 0) = r7;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r6 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test 5: return_site_liveness_bleeding
+ * Main calls subprog twice. Slot used after one call but not the other.
+ * Context-insensitive: slot conservatively live at both.
+ *
+ * After first call: read fp-8.
+ * After second call: don't read fp-8.
+ * Since parent_live is per-subprog (not per call-site),
+ * fp-8 is live at both call sites.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+/* Both calls have fp-8 live due to context-insensitive parent_live */
+__msg("3: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8")
+__msg("7: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8")
+__naked void return_site_liveness_bleeding(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call read_first_param;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call read_first_param;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("9: (85) call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp0-16")
+__naked void callback_conditional_read_beyond_ctx(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ "r1 = 2;"
+ "r2 = cb_cond_read ll;"
+ "r3 = r10;"
+ "r3 += -8;"
+ "r4 = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_loop];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_loop)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Callback conditionally reads *(ctx - 8) = caller fp-16 */
+static __used __naked void cb_cond_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r2;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r6 - 8);"
+ "1:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("14: (7b) *(u64 *)(r6 -8) = r7 ; def: fp0-16")
+__msg("15: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r6 -8) ; use: fp0-16")
+__naked void callback_write_before_read_kills(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ "r1 = 2;"
+ "r2 = cb_write_read ll;"
+ "r3 = r10;"
+ "r3 += -8;"
+ "r4 = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_loop];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_loop)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Callback unconditionally writes *(ctx-8), then reads it back.
+ * The write (parent_def) kills liveness before entry.
+ */
+static __used __naked void cb_write_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r2;"
+ "r7 = 99;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 - 8) = r7;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r6 - 8);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * bpf_loop callback conditionally writes fp-16 then unconditionally
+ * reads it. The conditional write does NOT kill liveness
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("9: (85) call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp0-16")
+__naked void callback_conditional_write_preserves(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ "r1 = 2;"
+ "r2 = cb_cond_write_read ll;"
+ "r3 = r10;"
+ "r3 += -8;"
+ "r4 = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_loop];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_loop)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void cb_cond_write_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r2;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r6 - 8) = r0;"
+ "1:"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r6 - 8);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Two bpf_loop calls with the same callback but different ctx pointers.
+ *
+ * First call: ctx=fp-8, second call: ctx=fp-24.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg(" 8: (85) call bpf_loop{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8")
+__msg("15: (85) call bpf_loop{{.*}} ; use: fp0-24")
+__naked void callback_two_calls_different_ctx(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 24) = 0;"
+ "r1 = 1;"
+ "r2 = cb_read_ctx ll;"
+ "r3 = r10;"
+ "r3 += -8;"
+ "r4 = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_loop];"
+ "r1 = 1;"
+ "r2 = cb_read_ctx ll;"
+ "r3 = r10;"
+ "r3 += -24;"
+ "r4 = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_loop];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_loop)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Callback reads at ctx+0 unconditionally */
+static __used __naked void cb_read_ctx(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reproducer for unsound pruning in refined_caller_live_stack().
+ *
+ * Three-level call chain: main → mid_fwd → grandchild_deref.
+ * Main passes &fp-8 to mid_fwd, which forwards R1 to grandchild_deref.
+ * grandchild_deref reads main's fp-8 through the forwarded pointer
+ * and dereferences the result.
+ *
+ * refined_caller_live_stack() has a callee_offset++ when mid_fwd
+ * (frame 1) is mid-call. This drops the transitive parent_live
+ * contribution at mid_fwd's call instruction — the only place
+ * where grandchild_deref's read of main's fp-8 is recorded.
+ * As a result, main's fp-8 is cleaned to STACK_INVALID at the
+ * pruning point inside grandchild_deref, and path B is
+ * incorrectly pruned against path A.
+ *
+ * Path A: main stores PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE at fp-8
+ * Path B: main stores scalar 42 at fp-8
+ *
+ * Correct behavior: reject (path B dereferences scalar)
+ * Bug behavior: accept (path B pruned against cleaned path A)
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__naked void transitive_parent_stack_read_unsound(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Map lookup to get PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "r1 = %[map] ll;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -32;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto l_exit%=;"
+ "r6 = r0;"
+ /* Branch: path A (fall-through) explored first */
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_scalar%=;"
+ /* Path A: fp-8 = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6;"
+ "goto l_merge%=;"
+"l_scalar%=:"
+ /* Path B: fp-8 = scalar 42 */
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+"l_merge%=:"
+ /* Pass &fp-8 to mid_fwd → grandchild_deref */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call mid_fwd;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+"l_exit%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm_addr(map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Forwards R1 (ptr to main's fp-8) to grandchild_deref */
+static __used __naked void mid_fwd(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call grandchild_deref;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Reads main's fp-8 through forwarded pointer, dereferences result */
+static __used __naked void grandchild_deref(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ /* read main's fp-8: map_ptr (path A) or scalar (path B) */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ /* dereference: safe for map_ptr, unsafe for scalar */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg("14: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) // r6=fp0-8 r7=fp1-16 fp-8=fp1-16 fp-16=fp0-8")
+__msg("15: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) // r1=fp1-16 r6=fp0-8 r7=fp1-16 fp-8=fp1-16 fp-16=fp0-8")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#1 mid_two_fp_threshold (d1,cs2):")
+__msg("14: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp1-8")
+__msg("15: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; use: fp1-16")
+__naked void two_fp_clear_stack_threshold(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call mid_two_fp_threshold;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void mid_two_fp_threshold(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "r7 = r10;"
+ "r7 += -16;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r7;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r6;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = r6;"
+ "call inner_nop_fptest;"
+ "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void inner_nop_fptest(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg("13: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) // r6=fp0-8 r7=fp1-16 fp-8=fp1-16 fp-16=fp0-8")
+__msg("14: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) // r1=fp1-16 r6=fp0-8 r7=fp1-16 fp-8=fp1-16 fp-16=fp0-8")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#1 mid_one_fp_threshold (d1,cs2):")
+__msg("13: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) ; use: fp1-8")
+__msg("14: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; use: fp1-16")
+__naked void one_fp_clear_stack_threshold(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call mid_one_fp_threshold;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void mid_one_fp_threshold(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "r7 = r10;"
+ "r7 += -16;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r7;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r6;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call inner_nop_fptest;"
+ "r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reproducer for unsound pruning when a subprog forwards a parent
+ * stack pointer (AT_PARENT) to a helper with a memory argument.
+ *
+ * set_call_stack_access_at() previously only tracked AT_CURRENT args,
+ * skipping AT_PARENT entirely. This meant helper reads through parent
+ * stack pointers did not set parent_use, letting the slot appear dead
+ * at pruning checkpoints inside the subprog.
+ *
+ * Program shape:
+ * main:
+ * *(u32)(fp-4) = 0 key = STACK_ZERO (const 0)
+ * call bpf_get_prandom_u32
+ * if r0 != 0 goto clobber path A (fall-through) first
+ * goto merge
+ * clobber:
+ * *(u8)(fp-4) = r0 path B: key[0] = STACK_MISC
+ * merge:
+ * r1 = fp - 4
+ * call fwd_parent_key_to_helper
+ * r0 = 0
+ * exit
+ *
+ * fwd_parent_key_to_helper(r1 = &caller_fp-4):
+ * goto +0 checkpoint
+ * r2 = r1 R2 = AT_PARENT ptr to caller fp-4
+ * r1 = array_map_8b ll R1 = array map
+ * call bpf_map_lookup_elem reads key_size(4) from parent fp-4
+ * r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0) deref without null check
+ * r0 = 0
+ * exit
+ *
+ * Path A: STACK_ZERO key = const 0 -> array lookup -> PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
+ * (non-NULL for in-bounds const key) -> deref OK.
+ * Path B: STACK_MISC key = unknown -> array lookup ->
+ * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL -> deref UNSAFE.
+ *
+ * Bug: AT_PARENT R2 arg to bpf_map_lookup_elem skipped -> parent_use
+ * not set -> fp-4 cleaned at checkpoint -> STACK_ZERO collapses
+ * to STACK_INVALID -> path B pruned -> deref never checked.
+ *
+ * Correct verifier behavior: reject (path B deref of map_value_or_null).
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'")
+__naked void helper_parent_stack_read_unsound(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* key at fp-4: all bytes STACK_ZERO */
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 4) = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ /* fall-through (path A) explored first */
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_clobber%=;"
+ /* path A: key stays constant zero */
+ "goto l_merge%=;"
+"l_clobber%=:"
+ /* path B: key[0] becomes STACK_MISC, key no longer const */
+ "*(u8 *)(r10 - 4) = r0;"
+"l_merge%=:"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -4;"
+ "call fwd_parent_key_to_helper;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subprog forwards parent stack pointer to bpf_map_lookup_elem as key
+ * on an array map, then dereferences the result without a null check.
+ * R1 = &parent_fp-4 (AT_PARENT in this frame).
+ *
+ * The helper reads key_size(4) bytes from parent stack. The deref of
+ * R0 reads the map value, NOT parent stack, so record_insn_mem_accesses
+ * does not set parent_use for it. The ONLY parent stack access is
+ * through the helper's R2 arg.
+ */
+static __used __naked void fwd_parent_key_to_helper(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "goto +0;" /* checkpoint */
+ "r2 = r1;" /* R2 = parent ptr (AT_PARENT) */
+ "r1 = %[array_map_8b] ll;" /* R1 = array map */
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];" /* reads 4 bytes from parent fp-4 */
+ /* deref without null check: safe for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
+ * unsafe for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
+ */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(array_map_8b)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Regression for keeping later helper args after a whole-stack fallback
+ * on an earlier local arg. The first bpf_snprintf() arg is a local
+ * frame-derived pointer with offset-imprecise tracking (`fp1 ?`), which
+ * conservatively marks the whole local stack live. The fourth arg still
+ * forwards &parent_fp-8 and must contribute nonlocal_use[0]=0:3.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg("call bpf_snprintf{{.*}} ; use: fp1-8..-512 fp0-8")
+__naked void helper_arg_fallback_keeps_scanning(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call helper_snprintf_parent_after_local_fallback;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void helper_snprintf_parent_after_local_fallback(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;" /* save &parent_fp-8 */
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "r0 &= 8;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -16;"
+ "r1 += r0;" /* local fp, offset-imprecise */
+ "r2 = 8;"
+ "r3 = %[snprintf_u64_fmt] ll;"
+ "r4 = r6;" /* later arg: parent fp-8 */
+ "r5 = 8;"
+ "call %[bpf_snprintf];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm(bpf_snprintf),
+ __imm_addr(snprintf_u64_fmt)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that propagate_callee_ancestor() correctly chains ancestor
+ * liveness across sequential calls within a single frame.
+ *
+ * main → mid_seq_touch → {nop_callee, deref_ancestor}
+ *
+ * mid_seq_touch receives two pointers: R1 = &main_fp-8 (forwarded to
+ * deref_ancestor) and R2 = &main_fp-16 (read directly by mid_seq_touch).
+ * The direct read of fp-16 forces ensure_anc_arrays() to allocate
+ * ancestor_live[0] for mid_seq_touch, so refined_caller_live_stack()
+ * uses the refined path (not the conservative fallback).
+ *
+ * mid_seq_touch calls nop_callee first (no-op, creates a pruning point),
+ * then calls deref_ancestor which reads main's fp-8 and dereferences it.
+ *
+ * propagate_callee_ancestor() propagates deref_ancestor's entry
+ * ancestor_live[0] into mid_seq_touch's anc_use[0] at the call-to-deref
+ * instruction. mid_seq_touch's backward pass flows this backward so
+ * ancestor_live[0] includes fp-8 at the pruning point between the calls.
+ *
+ * Without propagation, mid_seq_touch's ancestor_live[0] only has fp-16
+ * (from the direct read) — fp-8 is missing. refined_caller_live_stack()
+ * Term 1 says fp-8 is dead, the verifier cleans it, and path B
+ * (scalar 42) is incorrectly pruned against path A (MAP_VALUE).
+ *
+ * Path A: main stores PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE at fp-8 → deref succeeds
+ * Path B: main stores scalar 42 at fp-8 → deref must fail
+ *
+ * Correct: reject (path B dereferences scalar)
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
+__naked void propagate_callee_ancestor_chain(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Map lookup to get PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "r1 = %[map] ll;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -32;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto l_exit%=;"
+ "r6 = r0;"
+ /* Branch: path A (fall-through) explored first */
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 != 0 goto l_scalar%=;"
+ /* Path A: fp-8 = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6;"
+ "goto l_merge%=;"
+"l_scalar%=:"
+ /* Path B: fp-8 = scalar 42 */
+ "r1 = 42;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+"l_merge%=:"
+ /* fp-16 = dummy value (mid_seq_touch reads it directly) */
+ "r1 = 99;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ /* R1 = &fp-8 (for deref_ancestor), R2 = &fp-16 (for mid_seq_touch) */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -16;"
+ "call mid_seq_touch;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+"l_exit%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm_addr(map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * R1 = &main_fp-8 (forwarded to deref_ancestor)
+ * R2 = &main_fp-16 (read directly here → allocates ancestor_live[0])
+ *
+ * Reads main's fp-16 to force ancestor_live[0] allocation, then
+ * calls nop_callee (pruning point), then deref_ancestor.
+ */
+static __used __naked void mid_seq_touch(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;" /* save &main_fp-8 in callee-saved */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0);" /* read main's fp-16: triggers anc_use[0] */
+ "call nop_callee;" /* no-op, creates pruning point after */
+ "r1 = r6;" /* restore ptr to &main_fp-8 */
+ "call deref_ancestor;" /* reads main's fp-8, dereferences */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void nop_callee(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Reads main's fp-8 through forwarded pointer, dereferences result */
+static __used __naked void deref_ancestor(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);" /* read main's fp-8 */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);" /* deref: safe for map_ptr, unsafe for scalar */
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test: callee loads an fp-derived pointer from caller's stack, then
+ * reads through it to access another caller stack slot.
+ *
+ * main stores PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE at fp-24, stores &fp-24 (an fp-derived
+ * pointer) at fp-8, passes &fp-8 through mid_fwd_spilled_ptr to
+ * load_ptr_deref_grandchild. The leaf loads the pointer from main's
+ * fp-8, then reads main's fp-24 through the loaded pointer.
+ *
+ * fill_from_stack() in arg_track_xfer() only handles local-frame
+ * FP-derived loads (src_is_local_fp check requires frame == depth).
+ * When a callee loads from a parent-frame pointer (frame < depth),
+ * the loaded value gets ARG_NONE instead of being recognized as
+ * fp-derived. Subsequent reads through that loaded pointer are
+ * invisible to liveness — nonlocal_use is never set for fp-24.
+ *
+ * clean_live_states() cleans the current state at every prune point.
+ * Because liveness misses fp-24, refined_caller_live_stack() tells
+ * __clean_func_state() that fp-24 is dead, which destroys the
+ * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE spill before the grandchild can read it.
+ * The grandchild then reads STACK_INVALID → scalar, and the deref
+ * is rejected with "R0 invalid mem access 'scalar'" — even though
+ * fp-24 is genuinely live and holds a valid map pointer.
+ *
+ * This is a false positive: a valid program incorrectly rejected.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__success
+__naked void spilled_fp_cross_frame_deref(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Map lookup to get PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "r1 = %[map] ll;"
+ "*(u32 *)(r10 - 32) = 0;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -32;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto l_exit%=;"
+ /* fp-24 = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 24) = r0;"
+ /* Store pointer to fp-24 at fp-8 */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -24;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ /* R1 = &fp-8: pointer to the spilled ptr */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call mid_fwd_spilled_ptr;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+"l_exit%=:"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Forwards R1 (ptr to main's fp-8, which holds &main_fp-24) to leaf */
+static __used __naked void mid_fwd_spilled_ptr(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call load_ptr_deref_grandchild;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * R1 = &main_fp-8 (where main stored ptr to fp-24)
+ * Loads the ptr from main's fp-8, reads main's fp-24 through it,
+ * then dereferences the result.
+ */
+static __used __naked void load_ptr_deref_grandchild(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* Load ptr from main's fp-8 → r2 = &main_fp-24 */
+ "r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ /* Read main's fp-24 through loaded ptr */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0);"
+ /* Dereference: safe for map_ptr */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exercise merge_nonlocal_live().
+ *
+ * merge_shared_mid is analyzed twice (once from each wrapper), so the
+ * callsite within merge_shared_mid that calls merge_leaf_read gets its
+ * nonlocal_live info merged twice via merge_nonlocal_live().
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg("14: (85) call pc+2 r1: fp0-16")
+__msg("17: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) // r1=fp0-16")
+__msg("14: (85) call pc+2 r1: fp0-8")
+__msg("17: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) // r1=fp0-8")
+__msg("5: (85) call pc+{{.*}} ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16")
+__naked void test_merge_nonlocal_live(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call merge_wrapper_a;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -16;"
+ "call merge_wrapper_b;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void merge_wrapper_a(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call merge_shared_mid;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void merge_wrapper_b(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call merge_shared_mid;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void merge_shared_mid(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call merge_leaf_read;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void merge_leaf_read(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Same bpf_loop instruction calls different callbacks depending on branch. */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__success
+__msg("call bpf_loop#181 ; use: fp2-8..-512 fp1-8..-512 fp0-8..-512")
+__naked void bpf_loop_two_callbacks(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 0;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "call dyn_wrapper_a;"
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -16;"
+ "call dyn_wrapper_b;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void dyn_wrapper_a(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call mid_dynamic_cb;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void dyn_wrapper_b(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call mid_dynamic_cb;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void mid_dynamic_cb(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r6 = r1;"
+ "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
+ "if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
+ "r2 = dyn_cb_a ll;"
+ "goto 2f;"
+ "1:"
+ "r2 = dyn_cb_b ll;"
+ "2:"
+ "r1 = 1;"
+ "r3 = r6;" /* ctx = fp-derived ptr from parent */
+ "r4 = 0;"
+ "call %[bpf_loop];"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ :: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
+ __imm(bpf_loop)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* Callback A/B: read parent stack through ctx */
+static __used __naked void dyn_cb_a(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void dyn_cb_b(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0);"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Path A: r0 = map_lookup result (non-FP, ARG_NONE for stack tracking)
+ * Path B: r0 = fp-8 (FP-derived, frame=0, off=-8)
+ * At the join: r0 is not guaranteed to be a frame pointer.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__msg("10: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) // r0=fp0-8|fp0+0")
+__naked void stack_or_non_stack_write(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ /* initial write to fp-8 */
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0;"
+ /* map lookup to get a non-FP pointer */
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -4;"
+ "r1 = %[map] ll;"
+ "call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];"
+ /* r0 = map_value (ARG_NONE) */
+ "if r0 != 0 goto 1f;"
+ /* path B: r0 = fp-8 */
+ "r0 = r10;"
+ "r0 += -8;"
+"1:"
+ /* join: the write is not a def for fp[0]-8 */
+ "*(u64 *)(r0 + 0) = 7;"
+ /* read fp-8: should be non-poisoned */
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8);"
+ "exit;"
+ :
+ : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
+ __imm_addr(map)
+ : __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
+__msg("subprog#2 write_first_read_second:")
+__msg("17: (7a) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = 42{{$}}")
+__msg("18: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 +0) // r1=fp0-8 r2=fp0-16{{$}}")
+__msg("stack use/def subprog#2 write_first_read_second (d2,cs15):")
+__msg("17: (7a) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = 42{{$}}")
+__msg("18: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 +0) ; use: fp0-8 fp0-16")
+__naked void shared_instance_must_write_overwrite(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "r1 = 1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r1;"
+ "*(u64 *)(r10 - 16) = r1;"
+ /* Call 1: write_first_read_second(&fp[-8], &fp[-16]) */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -8;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -16;"
+ "call forwarding_rw;"
+ /* Call 2: write_first_read_second(&fp[-16], &fp[-8]) */
+ "r1 = r10;"
+ "r1 += -16;"
+ "r2 = r10;"
+ "r2 += -8;"
+ "call forwarding_rw;"
+ "r0 = 0;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void forwarding_rw(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "call write_first_read_second;"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+static __used __naked void write_first_read_second(void)
+{
+ asm volatile (
+ "*(u64 *)(r1 + 0) = 42;"
+ "r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0);"
+ "exit;"
+ ::: __clobber_all);
+}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* [PATCH bpf-next 14/14] bpf: poison dead stack slots
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/14] selftests/bpf: add new tests for static stack liveness analysis Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 1:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
13 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: Eduard Zingerman @ 2026-04-09 1:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bpf, ast, andrii; +Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
As a sanity check poison stack slots that stack liveness determined
to be dead, so that any read from such slots will cause program rejection.
If stack liveness logic is incorrect the poison can cause
valid program to be rejected, but it also will prevent unsafe program
to be accepted.
Allow global subprogs "read" poisoned stack slots.
The static stack liveness determined that subprog doesn't read certain
stack slots, but sizeof(arg_type) based global subprog validation
isn't accurate enough to know which slots will actually be read by
the callee, so it needs to check full sizeof(arg_type) at the caller.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 +
kernel/bpf/log.c | 5 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++------
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c | 2 +
4 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 75f3ae48431cbb675d76af3d899064cafed2f9ee..1f9ee77aedd7e6747e46c973606d15584a984075 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
STACK_DYNPTR,
STACK_ITER,
STACK_IRQ_FLAG,
+ STACK_POISON,
};
#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/log.c b/kernel/bpf/log.c
index f0902ecb7df69b6d43deaf808b4c0f00cc3438f2..d5779a3426d9773ff36595ff4df2bf070c096070 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/log.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/log.c
@@ -542,7 +542,8 @@ static char slot_type_char[] = {
[STACK_ZERO] = '0',
[STACK_DYNPTR] = 'd',
[STACK_ITER] = 'i',
- [STACK_IRQ_FLAG] = 'f'
+ [STACK_IRQ_FLAG] = 'f',
+ [STACK_POISON] = 'p',
};
#define UNUM_MAX_DECIMAL U16_MAX
@@ -779,7 +780,7 @@ void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifie
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) {
slot_type = state->stack[i].slot_type[j];
- if (slot_type != STACK_INVALID)
+ if (slot_type != STACK_INVALID && slot_type != STACK_POISON)
valid = true;
types_buf[j] = slot_type_char[slot_type];
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2bd8511aa1508a96c23e93df174f64708dafb4b5..e0219be1c0aadd132419c639686372d67d9c4864 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ static bool is_stack_slot_special(const struct bpf_stack_state *stack)
case STACK_IRQ_FLAG:
return true;
case STACK_INVALID:
+ case STACK_POISON:
case STACK_MISC:
case STACK_ZERO:
return false;
@@ -1369,14 +1370,14 @@ static void mark_stack_slot_misc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u8 *stype)
{
if (*stype == STACK_ZERO)
return;
- if (*stype == STACK_INVALID)
+ if (*stype == STACK_INVALID || *stype == STACK_POISON)
return;
*stype = STACK_MISC;
}
static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype)
{
- if (*stype != STACK_INVALID)
+ if (*stype != STACK_INVALID && *stype != STACK_POISON)
*stype = STACK_MISC;
}
@@ -5574,7 +5575,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* that may or may not be written because, if we're reject
* them, the error would be too confusing.
*/
- if (*stype == STACK_INVALID && !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
+ if ((*stype == STACK_INVALID || *stype == STACK_POISON) &&
+ !env->allow_uninit_stack) {
verbose(env, "uninit stack in range of var-offset write prohibited for !root; insn %d, off: %d",
insn_idx, i);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -5710,8 +5712,13 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
continue;
- verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
- off, i, size);
+ if (type == STACK_POISON) {
+ verbose(env, "reading from stack off %d+%d size %d, slot poisoned by dead code elimination\n",
+ off, i, size);
+ } else {
+ verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ off, i, size);
+ }
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -5760,8 +5767,13 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
continue;
if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)
continue;
- verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
- off, i, size);
+ if (type == STACK_POISON) {
+ verbose(env, "reading from stack off %d+%d size %d, slot poisoned by dead code elimination\n",
+ off, i, size);
+ } else {
+ verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+ off, i, size);
+ }
return -EACCES;
}
if (dst_regno >= 0)
@@ -8326,16 +8338,22 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
* read-only.
*/
- bool clobber = false;
+ bool clobber = type == BPF_WRITE;
+ /*
+ * Negative access_size signals global subprog/kfunc arg check where
+ * STACK_POISON slots are acceptable. static stack liveness
+ * might have determined that subprog doesn't read them,
+ * but BTF based global subprog validation isn't accurate enough.
+ */
+ bool allow_poison = access_size < 0 || clobber;
+
+ access_size = abs(access_size);
if (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed) {
verbose(env, "invalid zero-sized read\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- if (type == BPF_WRITE)
- clobber = true;
-
err = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, regno, off, access_size, type);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -8434,7 +8452,12 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
goto mark;
}
- if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ if (*stype == STACK_POISON) {
+ if (allow_poison)
+ goto mark;
+ verbose(env, "reading from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d, slot poisoned by dead code elimination\n",
+ regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+ } else if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack R%d off %d+%d size %d\n",
regno, min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
} else {
@@ -8617,8 +8640,10 @@ static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg
mark_ptr_not_null_reg(reg);
}
- err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_READ, true, NULL);
- err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, mem_size, BPF_WRITE, true, NULL);
+ int size = base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_STACK ? -(int)mem_size : mem_size;
+
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, BPF_READ, true, NULL);
+ err = err ?: check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, size, BPF_WRITE, true, NULL);
if (may_be_null)
*reg = saved_reg;
@@ -20078,7 +20103,7 @@ static void __clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__mark_reg_not_init(env, spill);
}
for (j = start; j < end; j++)
- st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;
+ st->stack[i].slot_type[j] = STACK_POISON;
}
}
}
@@ -20407,7 +20432,8 @@ static bool is_stack_misc_after(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (i = im; i < ARRAY_SIZE(stack->slot_type); ++i) {
if ((stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_MISC) ||
- (stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack))
+ ((stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID || stack->slot_type[i] == STACK_POISON) &&
+ env->allow_uninit_stack))
continue;
return false;
}
@@ -20443,13 +20469,22 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
- if (exact == EXACT &&
- (i >= cur->allocated_stack ||
- old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
- cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]))
- return false;
+ if (exact == EXACT) {
+ u8 old_type = old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE];
+ u8 cur_type = i < cur->allocated_stack ?
+ cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] : STACK_INVALID;
+
+ /* STACK_INVALID and STACK_POISON are equivalent for pruning */
+ if (old_type == STACK_POISON)
+ old_type = STACK_INVALID;
+ if (cur_type == STACK_POISON)
+ cur_type = STACK_INVALID;
+ if (i >= cur->allocated_stack || old_type != cur_type)
+ return false;
+ }
- if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID)
+ if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID ||
+ old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_POISON)
continue;
if (env->allow_uninit_stack &&
@@ -20547,6 +20582,7 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
case STACK_MISC:
case STACK_ZERO:
case STACK_INVALID:
+ case STACK_POISON:
continue;
/* Ensure that new unhandled slot types return false by default */
default:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
index c6ae64b99cd6ef8af8dd8d341c06033bac0f61de..6bc721accbae001a3e16396dc69037071534e324 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c
@@ -780,6 +780,8 @@ __naked void stack_load_preserves_const_precision_subreg(void)
"r1 += r2;"
"*(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2;" /* this should be fine */
+ "r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8);" /* keep slots alive */
+ "r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16);"
"r0 = 0;"
"exit;"
:
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 10/14] bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/14] bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 2:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87, ast,
andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87, yonghong.song, clm,
ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2087 bytes --]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> index c3098369bee8..832c10846ec5 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
[ ... ]
> +static void print_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
> +{
> + int start = env->subprog_info[instance->subprog].start;
> + struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
> + struct per_frame_masks *masks;
> + int insn_idx, frame, pos, insn_pos, i;
> + int len = instance->insn_cnt;
> + bool has_use, has_def;
> +
> + if (!(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
> + return;
> +
> + verbose(env, "stack use/def %s ", fmt_subprog(env, instance->subprog));
> + verbose(env, "%s:\n", fmt_instance(env, instance));
> + fmt_instance(env, instance);
Is this bare fmt_instance() call intended? Its return value is
discarded and the tmp_str_buf it writes into is overwritten by
later fmt_spis_mask() calls in the loop below, so the call appears
to have no effect.
> + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
[ ... ]
> @@ -1805,6 +1896,9 @@ int bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> break;
> }
> +
> + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
> + err = print_instances(env);
> +
> out:
If the for-loop above breaks out with a non-zero err (e.g. from
analyze_subprog() returning -ENOMEM) and BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 is set,
this overwrites err with the return value of print_instances().
When print_instances() succeeds and returns 0, the original error
is silently lost and bpf_compute_subprog_arg_access() returns
success to compute_live_registers(), which then continues
processing with incomplete liveness data.
Something like the following would preserve both errors:
if (!err && (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2))
err = print_instances(env);
> for (k = 0; k < insn_cnt; k++)
> kvfree(env->callsite_at_stack[k]);
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 02/14] bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/14] bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 2:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87, ast,
andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87, yonghong.song, clm,
ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1643 bytes --]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 0bac5c537fad..e6c048c55899 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -3710,9 +3713,16 @@ static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> */
> subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
>
> + if (func_info) {
> + for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
> + t = btf_type_by_id(btf, func_info[i].type_id);
> + subprog[i].name = btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
> + }
> + }
Could this loop read past the end of the func_info array?
The loop iterates env->subprog_cnt times, but func_info was allocated
with prog->aux->func_info_cnt entries in check_btf_func_early(). The
validation that these two counts match only happens later in
check_btf_func():
bpf_check()
check_btf_info_early() -> sets func_info with func_info_cnt entries
add_subprog_and_kfunc() -> loops subprog_cnt times over func_info[]
check_btf_func() -> validates func_info_cnt == subprog_cnt
If a program has more subprograms than func_info entries, func_info[i]
reads past the kvcalloc'd buffer. A garbage type_id would then go into
btf_type_by_id(), which can return NULL, and the subsequent
t->name_off would be a NULL pointer dereference.
A bounds check against prog->aux->func_info_cnt, or moving the name
population after check_btf_func(), would close the window.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 04/14] bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/14] bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87, ast,
andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87, yonghong.song, clm,
ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2080 bytes --]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> index 998986853c61..9e36ea5f2eec 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
[ ... ]
> +/*
> + * When both halves of an 8-byte SPI are set, print as "-8","-16",...
> + * When only one half is set, print as "-4h","-8h",...
> + */
> +static void bpf_fmt_spis_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, spis_t spis)
> +{
> + bool first = true;
> + int spi, n;
> +
> + buf[0] = '\0';
> +
> + for (spi = 0; spi < STACK_SLOTS / 2 && buf_sz > 0; spi++) {
> + bool lo = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2);
> + bool hi = spis_test_bit(spis, spi * 2 + 1);
> +
> + if (!lo && !hi)
> + continue;
> + n = snprintf(buf, buf_sz, "%s%d%s",
> + first ? "" : ",",
> + -(spi + 1) * BPF_REG_SIZE + (lo && !hi ? BPF_HALF_REG_SIZE : 0),
> + lo && hi ? "" : "h");
Is the ternary condition here inverted? The lo bit (spi*2) represents
the LSB / lower-addressed half of the 8-byte slot, which starts at
offset -(spi + 1) * 8 (e.g. fp-8 for spi 0). The hi bit (spi*2+1)
represents the MSB / higher-addressed half, which starts 4 bytes
higher (e.g. fp-4 for spi 0).
With the current expression, when only lo is set (lower half at fp-8),
the +4 adjustment fires and produces "-4h". When only hi is set
(upper half at fp-4), no adjustment fires and it produces "-8h".
This swaps the two half-slot offsets in the verbose log output.
For example, a 4-byte write at fp-8 marks the lo bit via
spis_lsb_half_slot() in check_stack_write_fixed_off(), but
bpf_fmt_spis_mask() would then print it as "-4h" instead of "-8h".
Should the condition be (hi && !lo) rather than (lo && !hi)?
Note: this function is removed in cc55f39c101d ("bpf: change logging
scheme for live stack analysis") later in this series.
> + first = false;
> + buf += n;
> + buf_sz -= n;
> + }
> +}
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 08/14] bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/14] bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87,
alexei.starovoitov, ast, andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87,
yonghong.song, clm, ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2856 bytes --]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> index 4f7748720250..4457cd80d072 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
[ ... ]
> +static void record_stack_access_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> + struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,
> + s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)
> +{
[ ... ]
> + if (access_bytes == S64_MIN) {
> + /* helper/kfunc read unknown amount of bytes from fp_off until fp+0 */
> + slot_hi = (-fp_off - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ;
> + mask = SPIS_ZERO;
> + spis_or_range(&mask, 0, slot_hi);
> + mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
mark_stack_read() returns int and can fail with -ENOMEM via
alloc_frame_masks(), but this and the other call sites in
record_stack_access_off() silently discard the return value.
The same pattern repeats in record_stack_access():
> +static void record_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
[ ... ]
> + if (arg->off_cnt == 0) {
> + if (access_bytes > 0)
> + mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);
and record_imprecise():
> +static void record_imprecise(struct func_instance *instance, u32 mask, u32 insn_idx)
> +{
> + int depth = instance->callchain.curframe;
> + int f;
> +
> + for (f = 0; mask; f++, mask >>= 1) {
> + if (!(mask & 1))
> + continue;
> + if (f <= depth)
> + mark_stack_read(instance, f, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);
and record_call_access():
> +static void record_call_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
[ ... ]
> + } else {
> + for (int f = 0; f <= depth; f++)
> + mark_stack_read(instance, f, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);
However, later in analyze_subprog() the same commit does check the
return value:
> + for (int f = 0; f <= depth; f++) {
> + err = mark_stack_read(instance, f, idx, SPIS_ALL);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + }
Is the inconsistency intentional? If alloc_frame_masks() fails in
the recording functions, the may_read mask for that frame/instruction
is never updated, so the slot could silently appear dead to the main
verifier pass. The existing callers of mark_stack_read()
(bpf_mark_stack_read(), propagate_to_outer_instance()) also propagate
its errors.
Similarly, in the recording loop of compute_subprog_args():
> + commit_stack_write_marks(env, instance, idx);
commit_stack_write_marks() also returns int (can fail via
alloc_frame_masks()), and the return value is not checked here.
Should these recording functions propagate errors from
mark_stack_read() and commit_stack_write_marks() back to
compute_subprog_args(), which already has error-handling via
goto err_free?
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 09/14] bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/14] bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87,
alexei.starovoitov, ast, andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87,
yonghong.song, clm, ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2832 bytes --]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> index 4457cd80d072..c3098369bee8 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
[ ... ]
> -static int commit_stack_write_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> - struct func_instance *instance,
> - u32 insn_idx)
> -{
> - struct bpf_liveness *liveness = env->liveness;
> - u32 idx, frame, curframe;
> struct per_frame_masks *masks;
> - spis_t mask, old_must_write, dropped;
>
> - if (!instance)
> - return 0;
> -
> - curframe = instance->callchain.curframe;
> - idx = relative_idx(instance, insn_idx);
> - for (frame = 0; frame <= curframe; frame++) {
> - mask = liveness->write_masks_acc[frame];
> - /* avoid allocating frames for zero masks */
> - if (spis_is_zero(mask) && !instance->must_write_set[idx])
> - continue;
> - masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
> - if (IS_ERR(masks))
> - return PTR_ERR(masks);
[ ... ]
> +static int mark_stack_write(struct func_instance *instance, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx, spis_t mask)
> +{
> + struct per_frame_masks *masks;
> +
> + masks = alloc_frame_masks(instance, frame, insn_idx);
> + if (IS_ERR(masks))
> + return PTR_ERR(masks);
> + if (instance->must_write_initialized)
> + masks->must_write = spis_and(masks->must_write, mask);
> + else
> + masks->must_write = mask;
> + return 0;
> +}
mark_stack_write() now returns int and can fail with -ENOMEM via
alloc_frame_masks(), but its sole caller record_stack_access_off()
is a void function that ignores the return value:
kernel/bpf/liveness.c:record_stack_access_off() {
...
mark_stack_write(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);
...
}
The old code path through commit_stack_write_marks() did propagate
alloc_frame_masks() errors back through compute_subprog_args().
Should the return value be checked here, or is the silent failure
(conservative liveness, more slots appear live) intentional?
[ ... ]
> -/* Fixed-point computation of @live_before and @must_write_acc marks */
> -static int update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
> +/* Fixed-point computation of @live_before marks */
> +static void update_instance(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct func_instance *instance)
> {
[ ... ]
> - instance->updated = false;
> - instance->must_write_dropped = false;
> - return 0;
> + return 0;
> }
update_instance() was changed from returning int to void, but
"return 0;" was left behind. This is resolved by the later commit
cc55f39c101d ("bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis")
which removes it.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 07/14] bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/14] bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87, ast,
andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87, yonghong.song, clm,
ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 962 bytes --]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> index a3af5972520f..4f7748720250 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/liveness.c
[ ... ]
> +/* Track callee stack slots fp-8 through fp-64 (8 slots of 8 bytes each) */
> +#define MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS 64
Should the comment say "fp-8 through fp-512 (64 slots of 8 bytes
each)"?
The define is 64, and the code consistently uses it as a slot count.
For example, fp_off_to_slot() rejects offsets below
-(MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS * 8) = -512:
if (off >= 0 || off < -(int)(MAX_ARG_SPILL_SLOTS * 8))
return -1;
So valid offsets are fp-8 through fp-512, which is 64 slots, not the
8 slots (fp-8 through fp-64) described in the comment.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 03/14] bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/14] bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks Eduard Zingerman
@ 2026-04-09 3:12 ` bot+bpf-ci
0 siblings, 0 replies; 22+ messages in thread
From: bot+bpf-ci @ 2026-04-09 3:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: eddyz87, bpf, ast, andrii
Cc: daniel, martin.lau, kernel-team, yonghong.song, eddyz87, ast,
andrii, daniel, martin.lau, eddyz87, yonghong.song, clm,
ihor.solodrai
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1767 bytes --]
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> index 410939d7b325..64361cb49073 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
[ ... ]
> +static inline spis_t spis_xor(spis_t a, spis_t b)
> +{
> + return (spis_t){{ a.v[0] ^ b.v[0], a.v[1] ^ b.v[1] }};
> +}
spis_xor() does not appear to have any callers in this series.
The same applies to spis_set_bit(), spis_single_slot(),
spis_msb_half_slot(), and spis_lsb_half_slot() -- none of them
are used by any commit in the series up through "bpf: poison
dead stack slots". Could these be dropped, or are they intended
for use beyond this series?
[ ... ]
> +/*
> + * Return a mask with only the MSB (higher-addressed) 4-byte half
> + * of an 8-byte SPI set. This is sub-slot spi*2+1.
> + */
> +static inline spis_t spis_msb_half_slot(u32 spi)
> +/*
> + * Return a mask with only the LSB (lower-addressed) 4-byte half
> + * of an 8-byte SPI set. This is sub-slot spi*2.
> + */
> +static inline spis_t spis_lsb_half_slot(u32 spi)
If these helpers are kept, the comments appear to have the
address direction inverted. Later in the series,
clean_verifier_state() documents the sub-slot mapping as:
half_spi 2*i -> slot_type[0..3] (closer to FP)
half_spi 2*i+1 -> slot_type[4..7] (farther from FP)
Since the BPF stack grows downward, closer to FP means higher
addresses. So spi*2 is the higher-addressed half and spi*2+1
is the lower-addressed half, which is the opposite of what
these comments say.
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24168298083
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 22+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-09 3:12 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-04-09 1:33 [PATCH bpf-next 00/14] bpf: static stack liveness data flow analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/14] bpf: share several utility functions as internal API Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/14] bpf: save subprogram name in bpf_subprog_info Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/14] bpf: Add spis_*() helpers for 4-byte stack slot bitmasks Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 3:12 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/14] bpf: make liveness.c track stack with 4-byte granularity Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/14] bpf: 4-byte precise clean_verifier_state Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/14] bpf: prepare bpf_liveness api for use by static analysis pass Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/14] bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/14] bpf: record arg tracking results in bpf_liveness masks Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/14] bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth) keyed func_instances Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:26 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/14] bpf: change logging scheme for live stack analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 2:14 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/14] selftests/bpf: update existing tests due to liveness changes Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/14] selftests/bpf: adjust verifier_log buffers Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/14] selftests/bpf: add new tests for static stack liveness analysis Eduard Zingerman
2026-04-09 1:33 ` [PATCH bpf-next 14/14] bpf: poison dead stack slots Eduard Zingerman
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