From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "David Windsor" <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: add tests for bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 01:10:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260427011024.7A5D9C2BCAF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260427001602.38353-3-dwindsor@gmail.com>
Sashiko AI review found 5 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Test flakiness due to missing file removal before open(O_CREAT).
- [Medium] Test fails instead of gracefully skipping on filesystems without xattr support.
- [Low] Uninitialized stack memory read if getxattr returns an unexpected length.
- [Low] Insecure temporary file creation in world-writable directory.
- [Low] Closing uninitialized file descriptor on error paths.
--
commit b0095935131688a0b976829cf24db472a2eab938
Author: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
selftests/bpf: add tests for bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc
This commit adds selftests for the bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc to test
atomic inode xattr labeling via the inode_init_security hook.
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
> index 43a26ec69a8e..26daef116ee2 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fs_kfuncs.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -268,6 +269,51 @@ static void test_fsverity(void)
> remove(testfile);
> }
>
> +static void test_init_inode_xattr(void)
> +{
> + struct test_init_inode_xattr *skel = NULL;
> + int fd = -1, err;
> + char value_out[32];
Could value_out be read while uninitialized?
If getxattr() succeeds but returns fewer bytes than expected, the size
ASSERT_EQ check will fail but execution will continue. The subsequent
strncmp() might then read uninitialized stack memory.
Would it be better to zero-initialize this buffer, or use
if (!ASSERT_EQ(...)) to abort the test early?
> + const char *testfile_new = "/tmp/test_progs_fs_kfuncs_new";
> +
> + skel = test_init_inode_xattr__open_and_load();
> + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "test_init_inode_xattr__open_and_load"))
> + return;
> +
> + skel->bss->monitored_pid = getpid();
> + err = test_init_inode_xattr__attach(skel);
> + if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "test_init_inode_xattr__attach"))
> + goto out;
> +
> + /* Create a new file — this triggers inode_init_security */
> + fd = open(testfile_new, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0644);
If this test file already exists from a previous failed run, will open() just
open the existing file without triggering the inode_init_security hook?
Since the hook only fires when a new inode is instantiated, this would cause
the test to persistently fail.
Also, since this runs as root in the world-writable /tmp directory, could
this predictable path be vulnerable to a symlink attack?
Would adding O_EXCL to the open flags ensure both that the hook is triggered
and prevent symlink issues?
> + if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "create_file"))
> + goto out;
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->init_result, 0, "init_result");
> +
> + /* The initxattrs callback prepends "security." to the name */
> + err = getxattr(testfile_new, "security.bpf.test_label", value_out,
> + sizeof(value_out));
> + if (err < 0 && errno == ENODATA) {
If the underlying /tmp filesystem does not support extended attributes at
all, getxattr() returns -1 with errno set to EOPNOTSUPP (or ENOTSUP).
Should this condition also be handled to correctly skip the test instead of
failing on the next ASSERT_GE check?
> + printf("%s:SKIP:filesystem did not apply LSM xattrs\n",
> + __func__);
> + test__skip();
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (!ASSERT_GE(err, 0, "getxattr"))
> + goto out;
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(err, (int)sizeof(skel->data->xattr_value), "xattr_size");
> + ASSERT_EQ(strncmp(value_out, "test_value",
> + sizeof("test_value")), 0, "xattr_value");
> +
> +out:
> + close(fd);
If an error occurs before the file is opened (e.g. during skeleton load
or attach), fd will be -1. Does this result in an unnecessary close(-1)
which returns -EBADF?
Should this be guarded with if (fd >= 0)?
> + test_init_inode_xattr__destroy(skel);
> + remove(testfile_new);
> +}
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260427001602.38353-1-dwindsor@gmail.com?part=2
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-27 1:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-27 0:15 [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
2026-04-27 0:15 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] " David Windsor
2026-04-27 0:51 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-04-27 0:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-04-27 2:10 ` David Windsor
2026-04-27 2:56 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-04-27 3:23 ` David Windsor
2026-04-27 3:32 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-04-27 3:42 ` David Windsor
2026-04-27 10:11 ` Matt Bobrowski
2026-04-27 14:20 ` Song Liu
2026-04-27 14:33 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-04-27 17:17 ` Song Liu
2026-04-27 9:48 ` Matt Bobrowski
2026-04-27 0:15 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: add tests for bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc David Windsor
2026-04-27 1:10 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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