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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Dipayaan Roy" <dipayanroy@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/2] net: mana: force full-page RX buffers via ethtool private flag
Date: Fri, 08 May 2026 21:16:31 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260508211632.052D5C2BCB0@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260508115100.488506-3-dipayanroy@linux.microsoft.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] Faking `apc->port_is_up = true` on `mana_attach()` failure causes a guaranteed NULL pointer dereference in the asynchronous reset worker.
- [High] Toggling the 'full-page-rx' flag OFF leaks memory when initial packets are dropped because pre-allocated buffers are saved for reuse but never consumed by the fragment refill path.
- [High] `mana_pre_alloc_rxbufs` dangerously allocates huge arrays with `kmalloc` and thousands of pages with `GFP_ATOMIC` in process context, leading to allocation failures under load.
--

commit 57f161d214770cf8af214936230e6e5eeac378bc
Author: Dipayaan Roy <dipayanroy@linux.microsoft.com>

net: mana: force full-page RX buffers via ethtool private flag
    
On some ARM64 platforms with 4K PAGE_SIZE, page_pool fragment
allocation in the RX refill path can cause 15-20% throughput
regression under high connection counts. This adds an ethtool private
flag "full-page-rx" to force one RX buffer per page.

> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_ethtool.c
> index a28ca461c135f..dfd222de11d09 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_ethtool.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_ethtool.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -590,6 +609,88 @@ static int mana_get_link_ksettings(struct net_device *ndev,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static u32 mana_get_priv_flags(struct net_device *ndev)
> +{
[ ... ]
> +static int mana_set_priv_flags(struct net_device *ndev, u32 priv_flags)
> +{
> +	struct mana_port_context *apc = netdev_priv(ndev);
> +	u32 changed = apc->priv_flags ^ priv_flags;
> +	u32 old_priv_flags = apc->priv_flags;
> +	bool schedule_port_reset = false;
> +	int err = 0;
> +
> +	if (!changed)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	/* Reject unknown bits */
> +	if (priv_flags & ~GENMASK(MANA_PRIV_FLAG_MAX - 1, 0))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (changed & BIT(MANA_PRIV_FLAG_USE_FULL_PAGE_RXBUF)) {
> +		apc->priv_flags = priv_flags;
> +
> +		if (!apc->port_is_up) {
> +			/* Port is down, flag updated to apply on next up
> +			 * so just return.
> +			 */
> +			return 0;
> +		}
> +
> +		/* Pre-allocate buffers to prevent failure in mana_attach
> +		 * later
> +		 */
> +		err = mana_pre_alloc_rxbufs(apc, ndev->mtu, apc->num_queues);

Since mana_set_priv_flags() runs in process context under rtnl_lock, does
calling mana_pre_alloc_rxbufs() risk memory exhaustion and fragmentation
failures?

mana_pre_alloc_rxbufs() loops num_rxb times using dev_alloc_pages(), which
allocates using GFP_ATOMIC. Could mass-allocating thousands of atomic pages
exhaust atomic memory reserves?

It also uses kmalloc_array() for rxbufs_pre and das_pre, which might require
megabytes of physically contiguous memory. Would it be safer to use
kvmalloc_array() and alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL) here instead?

Additionally, if the full-page-rx flag is toggled OFF, does this leak memory
when initial packets are dropped?

When the flag is toggled, mana_pre_alloc_rxbufs() pre-allocates the RX ring
and the buffers are injected with from_pool = false. If the flag is toggled
OFF, the standard MTU configuration sets rxq->frag_count > 1.

If any initial packets are dropped (e.g. truncated packets), mana_rx_skb()
executes the drop path and saves the buffer for reuse via
rxq->xdp_save_va = buf_va.

However, mana_get_rxfrag() only reuses rxq->xdp_save_va if
rxq->frag_count == 1. For frag_count > 1, it allocates new fragments from the
page pool and ignores the saved buffer. If multiple pre-allocated packets are
dropped, could mana_rx_skb() repeatedly overwrite rxq->xdp_save_va, triggering
a WARN_ON_ONCE and leaking the pages?

> +		if (err) {
> +			netdev_err(ndev,
> +				   "Insufficient memory for new allocations\n");
> +			apc->priv_flags = old_priv_flags;
> +			return err;
> +		}
> +
> +		err = mana_detach(ndev, false);
[ ... ]
> +		err = mana_attach(ndev);
> +		if (err) {
> +			netdev_err(ndev, "mana_attach failed: %d\n", err);
> +			apc->priv_flags = old_priv_flags;
> +
> +			/* Restore 'port_is_up' so the reset work handler
> +			 * can properly detach/attach. Without this,
> +			 * the handler sees port_is_up=false and skips
> +			 * queue allocation, leaving the port dead.
> +			 */
> +			apc->port_is_up = true;
> +			schedule_port_reset = true;

Does setting apc->port_is_up = true on mana_attach() failure cause a NULL
pointer dereference in the async reset worker?

If mana_attach() fails, its error path calls mana_cleanup_port_context(),
which ultimately frees apc->tx_qp and sets it to NULL.

When the scheduled mana_per_port_queue_reset_work_handler executes, it calls
mana_detach(). Because we faked apc->port_is_up = true, mana_detach() invokes
mana_dealloc_queues(), which blindly iterates over apc->num_queues and
dereferences apc->tx_qp[i].txq.

Since apc->tx_qp is NULL, will this result in a kernel panic?

> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	mana_pre_dealloc_rxbufs(apc);
> +
> +	if (schedule_port_reset)
> +		queue_work(apc->ac->per_port_queue_reset_wq,
> +			   &apc->queue_reset_work);
> +
> +	return err;
> +}

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260508115100.488506-1-dipayanroy@linux.microsoft.com?part=2

  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-08 21:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-08 11:46 [PATCH v8 0/2] net: mana: add ethtool private flag for full-page RX buffers Dipayaan Roy
2026-05-08 11:46 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] net: mana: refactor mana_get_strings() and mana_get_sset_count() to use switch Dipayaan Roy
2026-05-08 11:46 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] net: mana: force full-page RX buffers via ethtool private flag Dipayaan Roy
2026-05-08 21:16   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-05-12  2:21   ` Jakub Kicinski

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