From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Qing Ming" <a0yami@mailbox.org>
Cc: tj@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, mkoutny@suse.com, hannes@cmpxchg.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] cgroup/rstat: validate cpu before css_rstat_cpu() access
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 12:52:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260515125231.BD66FC2BCB0@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260515122952.59209-1-a0yami@mailbox.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] The `css_rstat_updated` kfunc is vulnerable to a kernel panic if a BPF tracing program passes a `css` pointer where `css->rstat_cpu` is uninitialized (NULL).
--
commit e8d546639085dcc3eee578c0dace07ba513cb482
Author: Qing Ming <a0yami@mailbox.org>
cgroup/rstat: validate cpu before css_rstat_cpu() access
This commit adds a bounds and validity check for the cpu parameter in
css_rstat_updated() to prevent an out-of-bounds array access when called
from a BPF program.
> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c b/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c
> --- a/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c
> +++ b/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -90,6 +91,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc void css_rstat_updated(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, int cpu)
> !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NMI_SAFE_THIS_CPU_OPS)) && in_nmi())
> return;
>
> + if (unlikely(cpu < 0 || cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_possible(cpu)))
> + return;
> +
> rstatc = css_rstat_cpu(css, cpu);
Could this still lead to a panic if css->rstat_cpu is uninitialized?
The existing check at the top of this function:
if (!css_uses_rstat(css))
return;
only verifies that css->ss->css_rstat_flush is defined. It doesn't appear
to check if the per-cpu memory css->rstat_cpu has actually been allocated.
If a BPF program intercepts a css object during allocation (for example, by
tracing init_and_link_css before css_rstat_init completes), or if an
untrusted pointer is passed because the kfunc lacks KF_TRUSTED_ARGS,
css->rstat_cpu could be NULL.
In that scenario, css_rstat_cpu() would compute per_cpu_ptr(NULL, cpu),
which returns an offset from NULL rather than a valid memory address. The
subsequent call to llist_on_list() would then dereference this invalid
address.
Should there be an explicit check for !css->rstat_cpu to safely handle
uninitialized rstat state from BPF callers?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260515122952.59209-1-a0yami@mailbox.org?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-15 12:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-15 12:29 [PATCH] cgroup/rstat: validate cpu before css_rstat_cpu() access Qing Ming
2026-05-15 12:52 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-05-15 16:27 ` Tejun Heo
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