From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "HyeongJun An" <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf 1/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets
Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 07:50:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260614075013.75FD81F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260614053927.160566-2-sammiee5311@gmail.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] The `sec_sz` field in `struct dst_sec` is declared as an `int` instead of `size_t`, which causes large section sizes to truncate into negative values and leads to severe heap buffer underflows.
- [High] Static linker permits an out-of-bounds read when processing relocations against STT_SECTION symbols with a large st_shndx (e.g. SHN_ABS).
- [High] Processing relocations for an executable SHT_NOBITS section causes a NULL pointer dereference.
- [High] extend_sec() fails to properly handle realloc() returning NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in memcpy().
--
commit 3c2b5b3ea26336642319803cdebc730e9790c0e6
Author: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets
The static linker sanity-checks relocation sections before appending them,
but for executable target sections it only verifies that r_offset is
BPF-instruction aligned. It does not verify that the offset is inside the
relocated section.
> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c b/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
> index 78f92c39290af..3eb23da167d29 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
> @@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ static int linker_sanity_check_elf_relos(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *se
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> + if (relo->r_offset >= link_sec->shdr->sh_size) {
> + pr_warn("ELF relo #%d in section #%zu has invalid offset %zu in %s\n",
> + i, sec->sec_idx, (size_t)relo->r_offset, obj->filename);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> if (link_sec->shdr->sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR) {
> if (relo->r_offset % sizeof(struct bpf_insn) != 0) {
> pr_warn("ELF relo #%d in section #%zu points to missing symbol #%zu in %s\n",
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can this lead to an out-of-bounds read?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_append_elf_relos() {
...
struct src_sec *sec = &obj->secs[src_sym->st_shndx];
...
}
In linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(), the bounds check against obj->sec_cnt is
skipped if sym->st_shndx >= SHN_LORESERVE (such as SHN_ABS). However,
STT_SECTION symbols might still use these reserved indices. Does this array
access use the unvalidated 16-bit integer as an array index, potentially
causing a heap out-of-bounds read?
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but could this cause a NULL pointer
dereference?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:linker_append_elf_relos() {
...
insn = dst_linked_sec->raw_data + dst_rel->r_offset;
if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
...
}
For ELF sections of type SHT_NOBITS, extend_sec() does not allocate
dst->raw_data, leaving it as NULL. Since an SHT_NOBITS section can still carry
the SHF_EXECINSTR flag, does evaluating this pointer and reading insn->code
cause a crash when applying relocations to an SHT_NOBITS executable section?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this correctly handle memory allocation
failures?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:extend_sec() {
...
if (!tmp && dst_align_sz > 0)
return -ENOMEM;
dst->raw_data = tmp;
...
}
For the very first object added, dst->sec_sz is 0, making dst_align_sz 0. If
realloc() fails and returns NULL, the error check is bypassed. Since
dst->raw_data is then set to NULL, does the subsequent memcpy() crash when
attempting to copy data to address 0x0?
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does using an int for sec_sz truncate large
section sizes into negative values?
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:struct dst_sec {
...
/* final output section size */
int sec_sz;
...
};
tools/lib/bpf/linker.c:extend_sec() {
...
dst_align_sz = (dst->sec_sz + dst_align - 1) / dst_align * dst_align;
...
memcpy(dst->raw_data + dst_align_sz, src->data->d_buf, src->shdr->sh_size);
...
}
If a malformed ELF file specifies a very large section size, dst->sec_sz can
truncate to a negative value. When a second object file is linked, the
alignment calculation promotes the negative int to an unsigned 64-bit size_t,
wrapping around to a massive size.
Does this cause realloc() to allocate a small buffer while the subsequent
memcpy() writes the new section data behind the newly allocated heap chunk,
leading to a heap buffer underflow?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260614053927.160566-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-14 7:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-14 5:39 [PATCH bpf 0/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets HyeongJun An
2026-06-14 5:39 ` [PATCH bpf 1/2] " HyeongJun An
2026-06-14 7:50 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-14 5:39 ` [PATCH bpf 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test linker rejects out-of-range relocation offset HyeongJun An
2026-06-14 5:53 ` sashiko-bot
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