From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Pu Lehui" <pulehui@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 2/7] riscv, bpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_jit_free
Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2026 06:54:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260708065406.66B4A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260708064436.2971933-3-pulehui@huaweicloud.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] bpf_jit_free() ignores the error return value of bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(), leading to a Use-After-Free, Double-Free, and potential JIT memory charge limit corruption.
- [High] The identical memory leak fixed in RISC-V remains present in ARM64 and LoongArch BPF JIT implementations.
- [High] Memory charge limit (modmem) is permanently leaked when bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() fails in bpf_int_jit_compile().
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH bpf-next v6 2/7] riscv, bpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_jit_free ---
commit 9c17e0351f5dcd9f2cb6815fc5c5e2c47b738ba2
Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
riscv, bpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_jit_free
This commit fixes a memory leak in the RISC-V BPF JIT compiler. When a
subprogram fails to compile, it cleans up earlier subprograms but previously
failed to free the jit_data->ctx.offset array.
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
> --- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c
> @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> */
> if (jit_data) {
> bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(jit_data->ro_header, jit_data->header);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does ignoring the return value of
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() here cause a use-after-free and double-free?
If bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() fails (for example, due to a text copy
failure), it frees the ro_header memory chunk and returns an error:
kernel/bpf/core.c:bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() {
...
if (IS_ERR(ptr)) {
bpf_prog_pack_free(ro_header, ro_header->size);
return PTR_ERR(ptr);
}
...
}
Since bpf_jit_free() ignores this failure, it extracts the now-freed
ro_header via bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr() below, and unconditionally passes
it to bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(). Inside that function, the freed ro_header
is dereferenced to read its size, leading to a use-after-free, double-free,
and uncharging the modmem with garbage data.
Can this be triggered by an unprivileged BPF program load?
[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but does bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize()
fail to uncharge the modmem limit when it returns an error?
As shown above, bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() frees ro_header on failure
but does not call bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(). In other callers like
bpf_int_jit_compile(), the error handler detects the failure, clears the
header pointers, and skips calling bpf_jit_binary_pack_free() completely:
arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c:bpf_int_jit_compile() {
...
if (WARN_ON(bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(jit_data->ro_header, jit_data->header))) {
/* ro_header has been freed */
jit_data->ro_header = NULL;
jit_data->header = NULL;
goto out_free_hdr;
}
...
}
Since out_free_hdr skips bpf_jit_binary_pack_free() when header is NULL,
the modmem uncharge is permanently bypassed. Does this leak the
bpf_jit_limit capacity?
> + kfree(jit_data->ctx.offset);
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but do arm64 and loongarch have
the exact same memory leak that is being fixed here for riscv?
Looking at bpf_jit_free() in arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:bpf_jit_free() {
...
if (jit_data) {
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(jit_data->ro_header, jit_data->header);
kfree(jit_data);
}
...
}
And similarly in arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c:
arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c:bpf_jit_free() {
...
if (jit_data) {
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(jit_data->ro_header, jit_data->header);
kfree(jit_data);
}
...
}
Neither architecture frees the jit_data->ctx.offset array before freeing
jit_data. Should a similar fix be applied to those architectures?
> kfree(jit_data);
> }
> hdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(prog);
> bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(hdr, NULL);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260708064436.2971933-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-08 6:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 6:44 [PATCH bpf-next v6 0/7] Mixing bpf2bpf and tailcalls for RV64 Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 1/7] bpf: Extract the is_struct_ops_tramp helper Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 2/7] riscv, bpf: Fix memory leak in bpf_jit_free Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 6:54 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-08 8:51 ` Pu Lehui
2026-07-09 8:46 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 3/7] riscv, bpf: Using kvzalloc_objs to allocate cache buffer Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 4/7] riscv, bpf: Fix kernel stack corruption in tailcall with CFI Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 5/7] riscv, bpf: Add RV_TAILCALL_OFFSET macro to format tailcall offset Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 6/7] riscv, bpf: Mixing bpf2bpf and tailcalls Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 7:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 8:48 ` Pu Lehui
2026-07-08 7:35 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-08 8:54 ` Pu Lehui
2026-07-09 11:37 ` Björn Töpel
2026-07-09 15:09 ` Pu Lehui
2026-07-09 19:51 ` Björn Töpel
2026-07-10 0:53 ` Pu Lehui
2026-07-10 9:43 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-07-17 7:37 ` Pu Lehui
2026-07-20 14:24 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2026-07-21 18:12 ` Björn Töpel
2026-07-08 6:44 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 7/7] selftests/bpf: Remove tailcalls tests from DENYLIST.riscv64 Pu Lehui
2026-07-21 18:30 ` [PATCH bpf-next v6 0/7] Mixing bpf2bpf and tailcalls for RV64 patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2026-07-22 3:05 ` Pu Lehui
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