From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 2/4] x86/mm/pat: acquire mmap lock on page table free to avoid ptdump UAF
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 11:01:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260712110153.3965C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260712-series-vmap-race-fix-v2-2-ad134cc3a12a@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Lockless walkers of `init_mm` (such as `lookup_address()` and `vmalloc_to_page()`) are entirely unprotected against CPA large page collapse, resulting in use-after-free and severe executable memory corruption.
- [Critical] Kernel page tables are freed locklessly and before being unlinked in the error path of `populate_pgd()`, leading to concurrent ptdump Use-After-Free and hardware page table walker race conditions.
- [High] Acquiring `mmap_read_lock(&init_mm)` does not fully protect against `ptdump` use-after-free, as `ptdump` can walk kernel page tables while holding the `mmap_write_lock` of other `mm_struct`s.
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 2/4] x86/mm/pat: acquire mmap lock on page table free to avoid ptdump UAF ---
commit e694327eb6fa8a3cd99ff84b5655377d8ebf1050
Author: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>
x86/mm/pat: acquire mmap lock on page table free to avoid ptdump UAF
This commit attempts to fix a use-after-free regression when ptdump walks
page tables that are concurrently being freed during a large page
collapse. It does so by acquiring the mmap_read_lock on init_mm around
the page table freeing loop in cpa_collapse_large_pages().
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -436,9 +437,16 @@ static void cpa_collapse_large_pages(struct cpa_data *cpa)
>
> flush_tlb_all();
>
> - list_for_each_entry_safe(ptdesc, tmp, &pgtables, pt_list) {
> - list_del(&ptdesc->pt_list);
> - pagetable_free(ptdesc);
> + /*
> + * ptdump might read these page tables, so avoid a use-after-free by
> + * acquiring the mmap read lock on init_mm (ptdump acquires the mmap
> + * write lock).
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mmap_read_lock, &init_mm) {
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does acquiring the lock on init_mm fully
protect against ptdump?
Looking at arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c:ptdump_curknl_show(), the walk
is initiated using current->mm:
ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(m, current->mm, false);
Since this causes ptdump to acquire current->mm->mmap_lock instead of
init_mm's lock, could ptdump still walk these kernel page tables
concurrently with the collapse?
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does taking mmap_read_lock protect
against lockless walkers?
Functions like lookup_address_in_pgd_attr() perform a lockless traversal:
if (pmd_leaf(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
return (pte_t *)pmd;
...
return pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
If a lockless walker checks pmd_leaf() just before the large page collapse
overwrites the PMD, could it evaluate pte_offset_kernel() on a huge page
payload instead of a page table array?
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(ptdesc, tmp, &pgtables, pt_list) {
> + list_del(&ptdesc->pt_list);
> + pagetable_free(ptdesc);
> + }
> + }
> }
[ ... ]
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does unmap_pte_range() correctly
sequence freeing and unlinking page tables?
In the error rollback path of populate_pgd(), unmap_pte_range() clears
the PTEs and then calls try_to_free_pte_page():
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:unmap_pte_range() {
...
if (try_to_free_pte_page((pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd))) {
pmd_clear(pmd);
return true;
}
...
}
Since try_to_free_pte_page() invokes pte_free_kernel() locklessly, the
memory is returned to the allocator before pmd_clear() unlinks the PMD.
Could a concurrent software or hardware page table walker traverse the
freed page before the PMD is cleared?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260712-series-vmap-race-fix-v2-0-ad134cc3a12a@kernel.org?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-12 11:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-12 10:42 [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 0/4] mm: fix UAF caused by race between ptdump and vmap pgtable freeing Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-12 10:42 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 1/4] mm/vmalloc: acquire init_mm lock on huge vmap to avoid ptdump UAF Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-12 10:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-12 13:17 ` Dev Jain
2026-07-13 16:42 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-07-12 10:42 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 2/4] x86/mm/pat: acquire mmap lock on page table free " Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-12 11:01 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-12 16:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-12 10:42 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 3/4] mm/ptdump: always stabilise against page table freeing using init_mm Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-13 17:19 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-07-12 10:42 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 4/4] arm64: remove redundant concurrent ptdump UAF mitigation Lorenzo Stoakes
2026-07-13 11:40 ` Will Deacon
2026-07-13 17:21 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-07-13 13:32 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v2 0/4] mm: fix UAF caused by race between ptdump and vmap pgtable freeing Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-07-13 15:54 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-13 16:32 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
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