From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 2/5] x86/mm/pat: acquire init_mm write lock on collapse to avoid UAF
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 17:50:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260717175015.543751F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260717-series-vmap-race-fix-v5-2-606a0ac6d3e5@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] TOCTOU race in `_lookup_address_cpa` leading to kernel memory corruption.
- [High] Incomplete Use-After-Free fix against ptdump due to mmap_lock mismatch.
- [High] Use-after-free in `populate_pgd` rollback path due to premature page freeing.
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 2/5] x86/mm/pat: acquire init_mm write lock on collapse to avoid UAF ---
commit b25bc68391fb2bdee5625f9af3d5344a0d10d51f
Author: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
x86/mm/pat: acquire init_mm write lock on collapse to avoid UAF
This commit adds scoped_guard(mmap_write_lock, &init_mm) to
cpa_collapse_large_pages() to avoid use-after-free issues with ptdump
and to serialize concurrent CPA walkers.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index d023a40a1e034..d1e63f7d267ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -442,6 +443,18 @@ static void cpa_collapse_large_pages(struct cpa_data *cpa)
> }
> }
>
> +static void cpa_collapse_large_pages(struct cpa_data *cpa)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Take the mmap write lock on init_mm to:
> + * - Avoid a use-after-free if raced by ptdump (which takes its own
> + * write lock on init_mm).
> + * - Serialise concurrent CPA walkers.
> + */
> + scoped_guard(mmap_write_lock, &init_mm)
> + __cpa_collapse_large_pages(cpa);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this lock actually serialize
concurrent CPA walkers like set_memory_rw() that might evaluate pmd_leaf()?
Other CPA walkers rely on cpa_lock and do not take init_mm's mmap lock.
If CPU1 executes __change_page_attr() via set_memory_rw(), it takes
cpa_lock, calls _lookup_address_cpa() -> lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(),
and evaluates pmd_leaf(*pmd) as false.
If CPU2 concurrently executes cpa_collapse_large_pages(), taking
mmap_write_lock(&init_mm) and pgd_lock, it collapses the PMD into a large
page (leaf).
CPU1 then continues and calls pte_offset_kernel(pmd), which reads the new
leaf PMD and incorrectly returns a pointer to the 2M data page itself.
Then set_pte_atomic() writes to this data page, corrupting physical memory.
Are concurrent standard CPA walkers able to race with this collapse since
they do not share the same lock?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does taking the mmap lock on init_mm
fully prevent races with ptdump?
When ptdump is triggered via debugfs, it calls
ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs() on current->mm:
ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(m, current->mm, false);
This takes mmap_write_lock(current->mm) in ptdump_walk_pgd(), which provides
no mutual exclusion against mmap_write_lock(&init_mm) taken here.
Since current->mm can be different from init_mm, won't ptdump concurrently
walk the shared kernel page tables while this function frees the PTE pages,
resulting in the same use-after-free this patch attempts to fix?
> +}
> +
> static void cpa_flush(struct cpa_data *cpa, int cache)
> {
[ ... ]
As a related note on pre-existing issues in this file:
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is there a use-after-free in the
populate_pgd() rollback path due to premature page freeing?
In unmap_pte_range() during rollback (e.g., if populate_pgd() fails due to
OOM during dynamic encryption attribute changes via set_memory_encrypted()):
if (try_to_free_pte_page((pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd))) {
pmd_clear(pmd);
The PTE page is returned to the allocator by try_to_free_pte_page() before
pmd_clear() clears the PMD entry.
Could a concurrent ptdump or lockless walker read the PMD and access the
freed memory during this window?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260717-series-vmap-race-fix-v5-0-606a0ac6d3e5@kernel.org?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-17 17:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-17 17:30 [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 0/5] mm: fix UAF caused by race between ptdump and vmap pgtable freeing Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-17 17:30 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 1/5] mm/vmalloc: acquire init_mm lock on huge vmap to avoid ptdump UAF Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-17 17:30 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 2/5] x86/mm/pat: acquire init_mm write lock on collapse to avoid UAF Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-17 17:50 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-17 17:30 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 3/5] x86/mm/pat: acquire init_mm read lock on attribute change " Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-18 10:54 ` Mike Rapoport
2026-07-18 14:28 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-17 17:30 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 4/5] mm/ptdump: always stabilise against page table freeing using init_mm Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-17 17:30 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 5/5] arm64: remove redundant concurrent ptdump UAF mitigation Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-07-17 19:29 ` [PATCH mm-hotfixes v5 0/5] mm: fix UAF caused by race between ptdump and vmap pgtable freeing Andrew Morton
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