From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: eddyz87@gmail.com
Cc: memxor@gmail.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/6] bpf: Rewrite any fault prone load out of a mem or btf_id pointer
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 23:52:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260814215301.709827-4-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260814215301.709827-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() turns a BPF_LDX into a BPF_PROBE_MEM one by
matching the type recorded for the insn against a list of exact pointer
types. The list cannot keep up with the flag combinations the verifier
produces, and a type which is missing from it ends up as a plain load
without an exception table entry, so a bad address panics the kernel
instead of being handled.
Two such types exist today and are reachable:
- PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF
- PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_RCU
Rather than adding the two, just drop the list and state the property
itself in the default case of the switch. This is a superset of what
the list matched, the untrusted PTR_TO_MEM does not have to carry
MEM_RDONLY for it anymore, and it stays in sync with the verifier side
which uses the same match in save_aux_ptr_type() and reg_type_mismatch_ok().
Assert that a fault prone type which does not get the rewrite for whatever
reason is rejected at load time rather than left to fault at runtime to
catch any future cases.
Fixes: 1b12171533a9 ("bpf: Mark direct ld of stashed bpf_{rb,list}_node as non-owning ref")
Fixes: 6fcd486b3a0a ("bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
v1 -> v2:
- new patch, don't match on full types (Eduard)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 11 +++++++++
kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 ++----------
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 114ae4540d2c..7239cffa7b51 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -1297,6 +1297,17 @@ static inline u32 type_flag(u32 type)
return type & ~BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK;
}
+static inline bool bpf_is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type)
+{
+ switch (base_type(type)) {
+ case PTR_TO_MEM:
+ case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
static inline bool bpf_may_fault_on_deref(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
/*
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
index c4bd70befbb5..796fba0505dc 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
@@ -811,6 +811,7 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
+ enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type;
u8 mode;
if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec) {
@@ -903,7 +904,8 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
continue;
}
- switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
+ ptr_type = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type;
+ switch ((int)ptr_type) {
case PTR_TO_CTX:
if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
continue;
@@ -919,26 +921,6 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
break;
- case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
- case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
- /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike
- * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active referenced id, but the same cannot
- * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle
- * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed
- * for this case.
- */
- case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
- case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
- if (type == BPF_READ) {
- if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
- insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
- BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
- else
- insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |
- BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
- env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
- }
- continue;
case PTR_TO_ARENA:
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX) {
if (!bpf_jit_supports_insn(insn, true)) {
@@ -952,6 +934,29 @@ int bpf_convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
continue;
default:
+ /*
+ * A pointer which may fault on a dereference must not
+ * be loaded from without fault protection, hence turn
+ * the BPF_LDX into a BPF_PROBE_MEM one so that a bad
+ * address is handled rather than panicking the kernel.
+ * A store through one is rejected earlier, there is no
+ * probed counterpart to rewrite it into.
+ */
+ if (bpf_is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(ptr_type) &&
+ bpf_may_fault_on_deref(ptr_type) &&
+ type == BPF_READ) {
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
+ insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code);
+ else
+ insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code);
+ env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (verifier_bug_if(bpf_may_fault_on_deref(ptr_type), env,
+ "access to a fault prone pointer is not rewritten as a probed one"))
+ return -EFAULT;
continue;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 6610e2437047..6fff370749bf 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -16999,17 +16999,6 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev)
!reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev));
}
-static bool is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type)
-{
- switch (base_type(type)) {
- case PTR_TO_MEM:
- case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
- return true;
- default:
- return false;
- }
-}
-
static bool is_ptr_to_mem(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_MEM;
@@ -17049,8 +17038,8 @@ static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type typ
* Reject it.
*/
if (allow_trust_mismatch &&
- is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) &&
- is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) {
+ bpf_is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) &&
+ bpf_is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) {
/*
* Have to support a use case when one path through
* the program yields a TRUSTED pointer while another
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-14 21:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-14 21:52 [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/6] bpf: Keep fault protection when merging pointer types Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 21:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/6] bpf: Treat a fault prone PTR_TO_MEM as a pointer type mismatch Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-16 19:44 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-14 21:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/6] bpf: Reject a store through a fault prone pointer Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 22:40 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-14 23:26 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-16 19:54 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-16 20:02 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-14 21:52 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2026-08-16 20:06 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/6] bpf: Rewrite any fault prone load out of a mem or btf_id pointer Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-14 21:52 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 5/6] selftests/bpf: Add tests for pointer type merge at a shared load Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 22:56 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-14 23:35 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-16 22:24 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-16 22:32 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-17 8:08 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 21:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 6/6] selftests/bpf: Add tests for fault prone loads out of RCU pointers Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-14 22:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-14 22:28 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-16 22:24 ` Eduard Zingerman
2026-08-14 22:15 ` [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/6] bpf: Keep fault protection when merging pointer types sashiko-bot
2026-08-14 22:19 ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-08-16 19:42 ` Eduard Zingerman
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