From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] selftests/coredump: test that TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't truncate a coredump
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 10:45:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260818104530.8A74C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260818-work-tif_notify_signal-v1-3-1ee1fcc5b3ff@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Missing cleanup of stale temporary files in FIXTURE_SETUP can bypass the polling synchronization in the notify_signal_pipe test, leading to false test successes.
- [Medium] The test suite uses predictable, hardcoded paths in /tmp/ and opens them with O_CREAT | O_TRUNC without O_EXCL, creating a vulnerability to symlink truncation attacks.
- [Medium] The test globally changes /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to point to a test-specific helper. If the test terminates abnormally, this configuration is never restored.
--
--- Patch [3]: [PATCH 3/4] selftests/coredump: test that TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't truncate a coredump ---
commit c11ee8bbfd73149ce9b69d88e45aeab900d75512
Author: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
selftests/coredump: test that TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't truncate a coredump
Add a test that verifies that a coredump cannot be cut short by
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL through io_uring running task work for uninterruptible
tasks.
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_notify_signal_helper.c b/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_notify_signal_helper.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..849f5c1ea7365
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_notify_signal_helper.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
[ ... ]
> +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> +{
> + int fd_core_file;
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + fd_core_file = open(NOTIFY_SIGNAL_CORE_TMPFILE,
> + O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
[Severity: Medium]
Could this predictable hardcoded path in /tmp/ be vulnerable to a symlink
truncation attack? The helper is spawned by the kernel (typically as root)
and opens this path without O_EXCL. If an unprivileged user pre-creates this
path as a symlink, it might truncate important system files.
> + if (fd_core_file < 0) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s: open failed: %m\n", argv[0]);
> + return EXIT_FAILURE;
> + }
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_notify_signal_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_notify_signal_test.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..e63c06a81562f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_notify_signal_test.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
[ ... ]
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump)
> +{
> + FILE *file;
> + int ret;
[ ... ]
> + self->fd_tmpfs_detached = create_detached_tmpfs();
> + ASSERT_GE(self->fd_tmpfs_detached, 0);
> +
> + ret = fclose(file);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + unlink(NOTIFY_SIGNAL_TRIGGER);
> + ASSERT_EQ(mkfifo(NOTIFY_SIGNAL_TRIGGER, 0600), 0);
> +}
[Severity: Medium]
Should FIXTURE_SETUP() also unlink NOTIFY_SIGNAL_CORE_FILE? If a previous
test run fails or is interrupted before teardown, a stale file could be left
in /tmp/. The polling loop in notify_signal_pipe() would immediately break
when it sees this stale file instead of waiting for the new coredump, leading
to a false test success.
[ ... ]
> +TEST_F(coredump, notify_signal_pipe)
> +{
> + char pattern[PATH_MAX], helper[PATH_MAX], *p;
> + struct stat st;
[ ... ]
> + ASSERT_LT(snprintf(pattern, sizeof(pattern), "|%s", helper),
> + (int)sizeof(pattern));
> + ASSERT_TRUE(set_core_pattern(pattern));
[Severity: Medium]
What happens if the test terminates abnormally (e.g. via SIGKILL) after
modifying core_pattern here? FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() would not run, leaving the
global /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern permanently pointing to the test's
temporary helper binary. Could this break core dumps for the entire system?
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_test_helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_test_helpers.c
> index 2a20faf9cb0ad..20fcc5b644c32 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_test_helpers.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/coredump/coredump_test_helpers.c
> @@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
[ ... ]
> +static int make_file_mappings(void)
> +{
> + long pgsz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> + int fd, i;
> +
> + fd = open(NOTIFY_SIGNAL_MAPFILE,
> + O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
[Severity: Medium]
Is this another potential symlink truncation vulnerability? Like the helper
above, this opens a predictable, hardcoded path in /tmp/ with O_CREAT | O_TRUNC
but without O_EXCL.
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return 0;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260818-work-tif_notify_signal-v1-0-1ee1fcc5b3ff@kernel.org?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-18 10:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-18 10:29 [PATCH 0/4] Stop TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting work that can't be restarted Christian Brauner
2026-08-18 10:29 ` [PATCH 1/4] signal: allow taks to temporarily block TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL Christian Brauner
2026-08-18 10:29 ` [PATCH 2/4] coredump: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting coredumps Christian Brauner
2026-08-18 10:29 ` [PATCH 3/4] selftests/coredump: test that TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL doesn't truncate a coredump Christian Brauner
2026-08-18 10:45 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-18 10:29 ` [PATCH 4/4] smb: prevent TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL from interrupting Christian Brauner
2026-08-18 10:39 ` sashiko-bot
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